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Abstract 
In today’s globalized world, the power of influence of multinational corporations over the state 
and society is significant. One particular area is related to how MNCs have influenced states and 
public educational institutions in order to shape their educational agendas and training initiatives. 
Many scholars have conceptualized such an influence as processes of corporate capture. In this 
dissertation, I examine and compare the existing processes of corporate capture related to Boeing 
and Embraer in the regional training systems of Charleston, South Carolina, U.S.A., and São 
José dos Campos, São Paulo, Brazil. I also investigate how their distinctive state forms and their 
forms of governance account for differences in the evolution of such processes. This research, 
drawing from Neo-Marxist theories of the state and labor geography, critically engages with FDI 
studies and the GPN literature. Methodologically, this dissertation is based on qualitative cross-
national comparative methods. Fieldwork was undertaken between 2014 and 2017, when fifty-
nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with state managers, representatives from 
educational institutions, not-for-profit organizations, and firms, among others. In this research I 
develop two major arguments. First, I argue that the evolution of processes of corporate capture 
in the regional training systems of São José dos Campos and Charleston is intrinsically 
connected to their accumulation strategies and state forms. However, such an evolution happens 
through different mechanisms and is related to different state scales. Second, I turn my attention 
to the local forms of governance of Charleston and São José dos Campos, claiming that they 
reinforce processes of corporate capture at the local scale. I argue that their tendency to reinforce 
processes of corporate capture in training has to be comprehended alongside with their state form 
and type of state selectivity.  
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Glossary 
 
Aftercare policies: The term is defined as “…comprising all potential services offered at the 
company level by investment promotion organizations, designed to facilitate both the successful 
start-up and continuing development of a foreign affiliate with a view toward maximizing its 
contribution to local economic development and to ensuring the success and sustainability of the 
company’s investment.” (Sachs 2009, 109). 
 
Clientelism: Is a type of public management in Brazil that lacked a distinction between the 
private and public sectors, having initiatives and actions based on favor exchanges, individualism 
and personal ties. It was centralized in powerful economic actors such as landowners, who were 
employed at the state based on cronyism (Seibel & De Oliveira 2006). 
 
Corporate capture: Refers to the exercise of control or influence of MNCs over the interests of 
business communities and governments (Phelps 2008). 
 
Externalization/spillovers: There are two main categories of externalities. One category refers to 
how industrial agglomeration of firms can facilitate assets sharing such as the provision of 
specific services and goods, more skilled workforce, and the implementation of infrastructures 
(such as roads, pipes and telecommunication networks). The other category refers to 
technological externalities and are related to how agglomeration of firms facilitates the exchange 
of information and expertise and thus, innovation (Paci and Usai 1999). 
 
Global Production Networks: The term refers to “…the nexus of interconnected functions and 
operations through which goods and services are produced, distributed and consumed… Such 
networks not only integrate firms (and parts of firms) into structures which blur traditional 
organizational boundaries – through the development of diverse forms of equity and non-equity 
relationships – but also integrate national economies…” (Henderson et al. 2002, 445). 
 
Governance: The term is broader than government and refers to the informal and formal 
networks of relations through which actors, such as firms and representatives of public, private 
and not-for-profit institutions coordinate, organize, and foster initiatives (Rhodes 2007). 
Governance mainly functions as a mechanism through which fractions of capital, multinational 
corporations, and local firms present and foster their interests (Lovering 2011). 
 
Industrial Clusters: Porter defines industrial clusters as “…geographic concentrations of 
interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, 
and associated institutions (e.g., universities, standards agencies, trade associations) in a 
particular field that compete but also cooperate.” (Porter 2000, 1). 
 
Managerialism: It is a form of public management that focus on reducing the “structural 
distinctions between the public and private sectors so that the behavior of public managers 
resembles that of managers in entrepreneurial, profit-driven, investor-owned firms.” (Lee 2008, 
2).   
 
Organic coupling: Organic coupling denotes a process that takes place through a co-evolution of 
 
 
xii 
 
regional assets and global firms in the same region. For example, the rise of national champions 
and new lead firms due to a strategic government industrial policy (MacKinnon 2012). 
 
Strategic coupling: Strategic coupling refers to the “dynamic processes through which actors in 
cities and/or regions coordinate, mediate, and arbitrage strategic interests between local actors 
and their counterparts in the global economy” (Yeung 2009, 213). 
 
Structural coupling: Structural coupling concerns how states and their regions attract lead firms 
in global production networks based on proactive policies and strategies in which countries 
(often developing countries) provide competitive cost structures, fiscal and financial incentives, 
stable policy environment, and abundant labor supply (MacKinnon 2012; Yeung 2015).
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 2009, South Carolina state officials announced that Boeing had opted to establish a 
major site of assembly and delivery for the Boeing 787 Dreamliner in the region of Charleston. 
However, such a decision came at a price as South Carolina state officials committed to provide 
to Boeing nearly one billion dollars in incentives. The provision of incentives is not only 
common in the United States but also in less developed countries such as Brazil, where in some 
places the cost of incentives per direct job has reached the value of $340,000 (Oman 1999). Such 
a particularity has become more significant in the last four decades. The Fordist crisis in the 
early 80s and a consequent advance of neoliberal policies increased the liberalization of 
international trade, culminating in greater fluidity of multinational corporations (MNCs) across 
nations, who have gained power over national states (Featherstone & Mackinnon 2017). 
Nowadays, MNCs have greater ability to shift their operations, to leave their regions and to 
move to more profitable places in terms of production, an aspect that raises many concerns 
(Featherstone & Mackinnon 2017). One major concern regards how such a mobility has affected 
regional economies.  
Regions are put in a delicate position. They must become enterprisers and find ways not 
only to maintain the firms that are embedded in their communities, making such firms more 
competitive, but also to attract new ones, given that their development now is dependent on their 
capacity to do so (Hudson 2011). Not much different from an auction, firms announce their 
interest in certain places, and regions compete with one another through tax credits, land 
donations, incentives, loans at low rates, and provision of services such as training, amongst 
others (Markusen & Nesse 2007).  In such a context, regional economies have been pushed to 
find more innovative ways to outbid their competitors, since giving these incentives has become 
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the norm (Featherstone & Mackinnon 2017). In this regard, some foreign direct investment (FDI) 
studies and global production network (GPN) scholars have sought to analyze how states are able 
to attract and retain MNCs in their regions, but often through negotiations and initiatives that are 
not so beneficial for their regions, given that local states are subjected to the interests of such 
corporations (Mackinnon 2012; Rutherford et al. 2018; Markusen & Nesse 2007; Phelps 2000, 
2008; Pavlinek 2016; Dawley 2007; Almond et al. 2013). 
The influence of MNCs over the state has been conceptualized by many scholars as 
institutional or corporate capture (see Phelps 2000, 2008; Pavlinek 2016; Dawley 2007; Phelps & 
Fuller 2001). Corporate capture refers to the exercise of control or influence of MNCs over the 
interests of the business community and government (Pavlinek 2016; Phelps 2008; Berrón and 
González 2016). Regarding the labor market and training initiatives, scholars 
have analyzed corporate capture by exploring how MNCs are able to get cost-free public 
customized training packages, to distort local public skills agendas and strategies, to recruit the 
most talented labor force from the business community, and to hire workers from outside their 
communities (Phelps 2000, 2008). In such studies, the interests of governments are normally 
associated with the interests of their local business communities, and are explored in terms of 
their governments’ capacity to maximize spillovers in skills and technology transfers, foster 
industry cluster formation, and processes of externalization (Rutherford et al. 2018; Markusen & 
Nesse 2007; Grabher 1993; Christopherson & Clark 2007; Phelps 2008; Mackinnon 2012). 
One particular topic that this research seeks to engage with regards how FDI and GPN 
scholars have rationalized whether some states and their regional forms of governance are more 
prone to have processes of corporate capture than others (Rutherford et al 2018; Phelps 2008; 
Almond et al. 2017; Tregaskis & Almond 2017; Almond et al. 2014; Almond et al. 2013). For 
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example, researchers have associated liberal states and their regional forms of governance with a 
greater tendency of regions to have processes of corporate capture than regions within 
developmental states (Rutherford et al. 2018; Almond et al. 2014; Almond et al. 2013; Phelps 
2008, 2000). 
It is in this context, and in connection with such a literature that the main goal of this 
research was established. More specifically, the main goal of this research is twofold: First, this 
dissertation seeks to examine the existing processes of corporate capture related to Boeing South 
Carolina and Embraer in the regional training systems of Charleston, South Carolina, in the 
United States, and São José dos Campos, São Paulo, Brazil respectively. Second, this research 
seeks to investigate how Charleston’s and São José dos Campos’ (SJC) distinctive state and 
governance forms account for differences in the evolution of such processes. In this respect, 
three main research questions were established: (1) Do Boeing South Carolina and Embraer 
foster processes of corporate capture in the regional training systems of Charleston and Sao Jose 
dos Campos? (2) If so, how does the state in each region account for differences in how 
corporate capture evolves? (3) Do the local forms of governance of each region reinforce or 
minimize such processes of corporate capture? 
During Summer 2014, when heading to my preliminary fieldwork in Charleston and SJC I 
did not have a clear objective or goal regarding what my studies would consist of, but I did have 
an interest in studying the role of their states and local forms of governance in developing skills 
for their aerospace industrial clusters. This was specifically the case in relation to Boeing in 
Charleston and Embraer in SJC, both large and influential airplane manufacturing corporations. 
After collecting and analyzing my preliminary data, one major feature stood out: Embraer and 
Boeing South Carolina were intentionally exerting their power of influence over the state and 
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public educational institutions in order to get highly customized training services free-of-cost and 
free of bureaucracy. Moreover, the public interests of both local states in regard to education and 
training initiatives were often intermingled and blurred with the private interests of firms like 
Boeing and Embraer. Such features sparked my interest in studies of corporate capture. As 
discussed previously in this introduction, such features are not a rare or a new dynamic, but a 
global trend; nonetheless, both cases had their particularities with potential to bring some 
theoretical and empirical contribution to the field of economic geography.  
My interest in doing a comparative study between Charleston/Boeing and SJC/Embraer 
was not random. During my master’s degree study from 2011 to 2013 at UNESP in Brazil, I 
was part of a research group whose goal was to analyze the local forms of governance of 
different industrial clusters in the state of São Paulo. One major site of study was the aerospace 
industrial cluster of SJC, where Embraer is located. Embraer is the third largest aerospace 
manufacturing corporation in the world, behind only Boeing and Airbus. In SJC, the company 
manufactures small- and medium-size commercial airplanes and employs more than 13 thousand 
workers. Although I was not responsible for conducting interviews in SJC, this was enough for 
me to reflect upon the idea of doing a comparative study with Boeing in the United States. This 
idea was later expanded after many conversations with my advisor Dr. Tod Rutherford, who 
suggested a comparative study with Boeing South Carolina. Boeing had just established in 2011 
a plant in North Charleston, causing a great controversy due to the high incentives provided to 
the company. The case called our attention as a potential site for a comparative study. Boeing, 
although currently facing a critical moment in its sales due to the two 737 MAX fatal crashes in 
the last two years, is still the largest aerospace manufacturing company in the world (Cameron & 
Wall 2019). Boeing designs and manufactures not only commercial airplanes but also attack 
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aircrafts, missiles, satellites, and telecommunications equipment, among others (Boeing.com). In 
South Carolina, Boeing has one of its major sites of assembly and delivery for the Boeing 787 
Dreamliner. The company employs more than six thousand workers in the region (Boeing.com). 
The aerospace industrial clusters in Charleston and SJC were also selected for a 
comparative study due to specific similarities besides the fact that both regions are marked by 
processes of corporate capture in their regional training systems. At the national scale, both 
countries are politically decentralized, having subnational states and local states with certain 
degree of autonomy from their federal government. In both countries, therefore, subnational and 
local states have the ability to foster initiatives and design regional development policies. 
Furthermore, the Brazilian political decentralization—fostered with the 1988 Federal 
Constitution—was inspired by the US model (Dos Santos & Gomes 2015). At the local level, 
both places have influential—politically and economically—aerospace multinational 
corporations and several clustered suppliers, facing skills shortages. Additionally, both regions 
have developed workforce initiatives through state intervention and direct/indirect public-private 
partnerships with aerospace firms, not-for-profit institutions, and educational institutions. 
Similarly, both clusters have institutionalized forms of local governance, facilitating interactions 
among the main players regarding skill and training problems and possible solutions.  
Despite the similarities, there are some significant differences we must acknowledge. The 
aerospace industrial cluster in SJC started to emerge in the 1960s, being a more mature cluster 
than the cluster in Charleston. This also means that SJC has today a more significant skilled 
aerospace workforce presence and training institutions than Charleston. Such differences suggest 
that the challenges regarding workforce development and skills and their centrality in their local 
forms of governance and state actions may vary. This is the case of Charleston, where skill 
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deficiencies are much more drastic than in SJC, and thus, occupy a more relevant position in its 
agenda.  
Regarding my theoretical framework, this research takes a political economy approach to 
understand the state, MNCs, labor and local forms of governance, and processes of corporate 
capture in regional training systems. FDI studies and the GPN literature have explained corporate 
capture in regional training systems based on how national states have low levels of institutional 
coordination or based on how states and their regions lack assets that meet the strategic interests 
of MNCs. Such explanations of processes of corporate capture are based on problematically 
descriptive accounts, overlooking the underlying causes of such processes, and making broad 
claims based on national types of state. Therefore, I sought to develop a more refined theoretical 
framework that is capable to account for the political, economic and cultural mechanisms 
through which MNCs interact with the state and advance their interests over public educational 
policies and initiatives. The major influences over the development of this framework can be 
divided in two main groups.  
The first group is related to theories of the state and capitalism, and more specifically to 
neo-Marxist theories such as the variegated capitalism literature, Jessop’s strategic-relational 
approach, and the structural dependence of the state on capital. I have engaged with such 
theorists and literature in order to understand how the state—in its varying scales—capitalism, 
and MNCs function and relate. My goal was to contribute to the FDI and GPN literatures by 
establishing a more refined explanation of how corporate capture in regional training systems 
evolves in relation to different forms of  state. In this regard, I sought to demonstrate how the 
evolution of processes of corporate capture in Charleston and SJC is intrinsically related to how 
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their state accumulation strategies privilege and provide advantages to MNCs strategically 
advance their interests.  
The second group is linked to neo-Marxist studies related to labor and labor market 
governance, local inward investments, and critical pedagogy. By engaging with such studies, I 
sought to critique the GPN literature and to frame my understanding of labor and governance, 
and especially of how labor market governance operates and shapes workforce development 
systems in the context of GPNs and industrial clusters. Mainstream GPN scholars 
problematically approach governance as collective modes of coordination and as autonomous 
arrangements from the state. The formation and functioning of workforce development systems 
are also problematically theorized based on market relations according to the demand and supply 
of skills. Therefore, I sought to contribute to the GPN literature by revealing not only how local 
forms of labor market governance (and their tendency to reinforce processes of corporate 
capture) have to be understood according to their state form and type of state selectivity, but also 
by disclosing how workforce development systems operate and are shaped by different actors 
and unequal power relations, scales, and often revolve around class issues. Such a theoretical 
framework also led me to theoretically contribute to FDI and GPN studies, given that it led me to 
expand the understanding of corporate capture in regional training issues. As revealed, the 
concept of corporate capture is too narrow, and neglects important characteristics around class 
relations, scale, and issues of transparency/illegality. 
Therefore, by revealing the underlying causes of why state and MNCs relations often result 
in processes of corporate capture in regional training systems, my research directly addressed 
some of the GPN literature deficiencies, having the potential to advance and contribute to studies 
regarding the “dark side” of firm relations, i.e., in regard to how firms’ relations with other firms 
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as well as with the state, workers, and institutions, among others can result in negative outcomes 
not only for regions, but also for workers (see Mackinnon 2012; Coe & Hess 2011). As 
Rutherford et al (2018) and Werner (2018) stated, GPN research still tends to overlook the 
tensions that emerge from the differential powers of key actors, for example, in respect to the 
uneven power relations between MNCs and subnational states. 
Empirically, this research not only brings a rich empirical cross-national comparative 
analysis of state and MNCs relations around processes of corporate capture in two different 
countries, but also important insights that can be used by state managers, unions and community 
representatives, and other organizations to resist corporate influence and to foster better 
outcomes for workers in regard to policies of attraction and retention of MNCs. While states 
provide all types of incentives to attract corporations to their regions such as land donation, infrastructure, 
customized training and tax breaks, corporations rarely have to meet clear requirements (established by 
the state) regarding the jobs they will create, or regarding processes of externalization. In this regard, one 
major empirical contribution of my research was the elaboration of pro-worker requisites related to public 
workforce development initiatives (like cost-free customized training), which can be used as guidelines 
when regions are bargaining with MNCs, or when establishing training partnerships with businesses. 
This research is based on a qualitative cross-national comparative methodology, which 
contrasts the similarities and differences in the object of study in more than one country in order 
to examine social reality (Kohn 1987). According to several scholars, qualitative methods are 
used to answer questions based on the values and perspectives, experience and meaning of 
participants. By deploying such a methodology, researchers are able to access information that is 
not generally amenable to measurement (Kitay & Callus 1998; Hammarberg et al. 2016). As 
Rosenthal (2016, 510) stated, in general, qualitative methods are employed when researchers are 
“interested in understanding the “why” behind people’s behaviors or actions.”. 
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In regard to the present research, a qualitative approach was selected, given that this 
dissertation approached, and had to collect as well as to interpret information that are often 
informal, abstract, complex, variable, involving matters related to power relations, actors’ 
interactions, negotiations, experiences, values and perceptions, among others. Such an 
information can be hardly quantified, and as Rosenthal (2016) affirmed, qualitative methods 
enable researchers to gain an in-depth understanding of the “underlying reasons, attitudes, and 
motivations behind various human behaviors.” (p 510). Therefore, this research opted for a 
qualitative comparative method due to its valuable and well-established research method for 
industrial studies in topics such as workforce development and governance (Kitay & Callus 
1998).  
This research draws from fifty-nine semi-structured interviews. More specifically, I 
interviewed twenty-five representatives from educational institutions (twelve in Brazil and 
thirteen in the United States), six representatives from firms (three firms from each region), 
fourteen representatives from non-public institutions such as chambers of commerce, unions, 
agencies of development and research institutes, among others (seven in each region), and 
fourteen state managers (eight in Brazil and six in the United States). Participants were chosen 
on purpose based on their role and involvement in the phenomenon under study.   
Semi-structured questionnaires were developed according to the following participants: 
state managers, public educational institutions, firms, and not-for-profit institutions. The 
questionnaires had a mix of semi-structured questions, which were designed according to each 
group of participants. In general, the questions were designed to approach issues such as the 
creation and expansion of workforce development initiatives and programs in the aerospace 
sector; the existence and development of educational strategies and goals; local governance 
 
 
 10 
 
relation with workforce development strategies and initiatives; existence, development and 
functioning of public-private customized training partnerships related to Boeing and Embraer; 
the provision of subsidies and grants; workforce development challenges and firms’ issues in 
regard to skills and training deficiencies; questions related to the characteristics of processes of 
corporate capture in regional training systems, among others. 
Most interviews averaged one-hour in length, and in some cases were conducted more than 
once. The majority of the interviews were conducted face-to-face between 2014 and 2017, 
although in five cases (five firms’ representatives), interviews were conducted via telephone. 
Interviews were recorded, except in one interview with an educational institution representative 
in Charleston. Besides recording the interviews, field notes were taken. 
Using open code, I categorized and coded all the data according to their different themes 
and patterns. After coding and categorizing the data, patterns and connections across the 
interviews and documents were identified, analyzed, and information summarized. This was used 
to develop the research. Besides interviews, I collected and downloaded from the internet 
reports, studies, newspapers’ articles, and secondary census data, which were analyzed in the 
same way of the interviews. Using triangulation, I crossed different sources in relation to 
different interview statements (see Yeung 1997). Triangulation was important to provide 
consistency and validation of the statements given in the interviews. 
During fieldwork and in relation to the collection of data, this research encountered some 
challenges. One major challenge was to contact and arrange interviews with firms’ 
representatives. The use of phone recording machines by firms’ representatives made it difficult 
to directly contact them. However, some successful attempts and interviews were made, which 
was not the case for Boeing’s representatives. While in Brazil, Embraer’s staff was more than 
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willing to participate in this research, in Charleston, Boeing’s representatives, who were invited 
for an interview several times via phone calls, emails, and even in-person, declined all 
invitations. This represents one important limitation of this research, which made more difficult 
the task of directly comparing Embraer and Boeing, and of understanding Boeing’s workforce 
development strategy, labor/skill issues, and influence over South Carolina’s/Charleston’s 
educational agenda. To mitigate this issue, questions related to Boeing were directed to 
educational institutions’ representatives, state managers, and local governance actors. Such 
participants, who were in contact with Boeing in the region, were able to provide substantial 
information in this matter. 
In order to answer my research questions and to develop this research, my dissertation was 
structured in seven chapters. The second chapter is structured into two main parts. In the first 
part, I critically examine how FDI studies and the GPN literature have not only problematically 
conceptualized corporate capture but also insufficiently explained the relationship between the 
state, MNCs, and the evolution of processes of corporate capture in regional training systems. In 
the second part, engaging with Neo-Marxist theorists, I argue that the evolution of corporate 
capture should be understood according to how the selective institutional context of national 
and/or subnational states privileges MNCs, providing structural advantages to these companies 
to strategically advance their interests to a point known as corporate capture. 
In the third chapter, I turn my attention to whether local forms of governance are prone to 
reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in regional training systems. Critiquing the 
GPN/GVC approach to workforce development systems, I elaborate upon the concept of regional 
training systems to argue that the capacity of local forms of labor governance to minimize or 
reinforce processes of corporate capture in training has to be comprehended alongside with their 
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state form, accumulation strategy, and type of state selectivity. I conclude this chapter with a 
reconceptualization of processes of corporate capture in regional training systems. 
In the fourth and fifth chapter, this research looks at the empirical cases of Charleston and 
SJC. Each chapter was divided in three main sections. In the first part of each chapter, I 
demonstrate how the evolution of processes of corporate capture in their regional training 
systems is closely related to their state form and state accumulation strategy. However, the 
evolution of such processes, I reveal, takes place through different mechanisms and at different 
scales. In the case of Charleston, state managers1 have designed educational strategies and 
training initiatives intentionally targeted to be captured by MNCs. In this case, corporate capture 
evolves mainly at the subnational scale and is related not only to South Carolina’s manufacturing 
fraction of capital but also to single firms such as Boeing. In the case of SJC, I argue that the 
corporate capture of training initiatives fostered by Embraer evolves through an organic way at 
the local scale, based on synergistic informal one-on-one interactions. 
In the second part of each chapter, I explore the evolution and main characteristics of the 
processes of corporate capture in the regional training systems of both regions. In Charleston, 
corporate capture is examined in regard to how South Carolina manufacturing fraction of capital 
has influenced the educational strategy of the state as well as the creation of three programs: 
Apprenticeship Carolina, ReadySC, and Career Academies. Corporate capture is also 
investigated in regard to how Boeing was able to capture the institutional capacity of ReadySC, a 
program from the state of South Carolina that offers, free-of-charge, customized training services 
to firms interested in moving to the state. In São José dos Campos, processes of corporate 
 
1 According to Fred Block state managers are “those at the peak of the executive and legislative branches of the state apparatus” 
(Block 1987, 201). This includes the highest-ranking civil servants, advisors and administrators, and appointed and elected 
politicians. (Block 1987). 
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capture are analyzed in regard to how Embraer was able to influence two educational 
institutions: the Aeronautics Institute of Technology, where Embraer established the program 
called “Embraer Program of Specialization in Engineering”, and the São Paulo State 
Technological College, where the company established the program “Designer Embraer”. Both 
programs provide highly customized skills, free-of-charge to Embraer. 
In the third part of each chapter, I explore their forms of governance and whether they 
reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in its regional training systems. In the case 
of Charleston, I argue that Charleston’s local form of governance fosters a contradictory 
dynamic. It reinforces corporate capture by embracing, implementing, and expanding higher 
state scale programs and initiatives, while trying to minimize some of its detrimental outcomes. I 
also demonstrate how these attempts to minimize corporate capture are problematic, mostly due 
to a lack of power of local state managers and to local governance actors’ attempts to solve 
corporate capture based on market relations. In the case of São José dos Campos, I argue that its 
local form of governance has also reinforced corporate capture. I reveal that this is due to a 
combination of factors: How skill needs are identified and addressed based on clientelistic 
relations, how the existence of a local aerospace professional bond among local governance 
actors grants to firms easier access and cooperation with educational institutions, and how 
Embraer’s economic and political power allows the company to take advantage of such features. 
Finally, in the sixth chapter I compare the major similarities and differences between the 
processes of corporate capture of both cases. By putting the processes of corporate capture in 
SJC and Charleston regional training systems in comparison, greater details regarding corporate 
capture in regional training systems are revealed. In this regard, I present the major findings of 
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my research, exploring how processes of corporate capture are related to the state and scale, local 
forms of governance, and issues of class and uneven development. 
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Chapter 2: State-Capital Nexus and the Evolution of Processes of Corporate Capture 
This chapter is structured in two main parts. In the first part, I will analyze not only the 
concept of corporate capture but also how mainstream literature has explained the relationship 
between the state, MNCs, and the evolution of processes of corporate capture in regional training 
systems. In this regard, two bodies of literature are critically examined: FDI studies and the GPN 
literature. I argue that although both literatures provide interesting explanations, such 
rationalizations are too descriptive, overlooking the underlying causes of processes of corporate 
capture, and have a problematic approach to state, neglecting for example issues of scale2—more 
specifically state subnational variations—and class relations. In the second part, I proceed then to 
reveal how the variegated capitalism literature, Jessop’s strategic relational approach, and 
theories regarding the structural dependence of the state on capital can tackle these issues. My 
main argument in this part is that the evolution of corporate capture should be understood 
according to how the strategic selective institutional context of national and/or subnational 
states privileges MNCs, providing structural advantages to these companies 
to strategically advance their interests to a point known as corporate capture. Corporate capture, I 
reveal, is not just due to a lack of distinct assets, or low levels of public institutional coordination 
as the FDI studies or the GPN literature would argue, but mainly due to structural and intrinsic 
features of the capitalist state. 
 
2.1 The Concept of Corporate Capture: FDI Studies and Debates Around Development 
 
2 This research understands scale as a product of wider social, cultural, economic, and political processes rather than a pregiven 
arena which these processes unfold (Smith 1993; Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner 1998; MacKinnon 2011). It agrees with 
Swyngedouw which claims that “[s]patial scales are never fixed, but are perpetually redefined, contested and restructured in terms 
of their extent, content, relative importance and interrelations.” (Swyngedouw 1997, 141). This research uses the following 
terminologies to address state scale: national, subnational and local. Important to say, while in SJC the term local scale will refer 
to the dynamics at the city level, local scale in the region of Charleston will be used to refer to the dynamics of its three counties: 
Charleston, Berkeley, and Dorchester. 
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Intellectuals have theorized about the state for a long time. Many, mostly liberals, have 
assumed the state to be a neutral entity or a neutral arbiter of social processes (Glassman 1997). 
However, since the 1970s more and more scholars have acknowledged the fact that different 
actors, or groups of actors, influence and shape the state and its policies and behavior (Jessop 
2007). One particular stream of literature is related to foreign direct investments (FDI) studies 
and aftercare policies. In this literature, a small but growing body of scholars have sought to 
demonstrate how local states are able to attract and retain MNCs in their regions, and whether 
regions are able, with the attraction of FDIs, to maximize spillovers in skills and technology 
transfers, to foster industry cluster formation and processes of externalization (Rutherford et al. 
2018; Markusen & Nesse 2007; Grabher 1993; Christopherson & Clark 2007; Phelps 2008; 
Mackinnon 2012). In this context, some scholars have argued that when state managers negotiate 
or bargain with MNCs to attract them to their regions, the outcomes are not always so beneficial 
to regions, and often result in processes that have been conceptualized as corporate capture 
(Phelps & Fuller 2001; Phelps 2000, 2008; Phelps et al. 2005; Mackinnon 2012).   
Corporate capture has been defined as a process in which the values and interests of 
MNCs dominate local initiatives and economic strategies in relation to the interests of the local 
business communities and local states (Phelps 2000, 2008). The term also implies how private 
actors exert influence over local institutions through unidirectional bargaining processes with the 
state (Phelps & Fuller 2001; Phelps 2000, 2008; Phelps et al. 2005).  In more concrete terms, 
corporate capture occurs when MNCs influence and exploit the capabilities of local systems of 
governance, receiving great amounts of public subsidy in the form of financial assistance and 
human resources, support services, and customized packages of FDI support (Phelps 2000, 2008; 
Pavlinek 2016; Dawley 2007; Phelps & Fuller 2001). 
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Regarding corporate capture in regional labor markets, scholars have explored this 
dynamic in relation to: (a) how MNCs receive customized packages of training incentives; (b) 
how MNCs distort or influence local skills agendas and strategies, lacking wider business 
community involvement in education and training agendas; (c) how MNCs recruit from local 
suppliers and the local business community the most talented workers (the fast ramp-up of 
production can result in ‘off-the-shelf’ labor forces); (d) how MNCs recruit a significant 
proportion of workers from outside the locality; and (e) how MNCs try to minimize workers’ 
knowledge exchange or sharing (Pavlinek 2016; Phelps 2000, 2008; Phelps & Fuller 2001; 
Dawley 2007). 
In general, such studies contrast the interests of MNCs versus the interests of states 
versus the local business interests (see Stigler 1971; Young 2012; Dal Bó 2006; Phelps 2000, 
2008; Phelps and Fuller 2001). The interests of the state and of the local business community are 
in general understood as the willingness to foster externalities, spill-overs, and consequent 
development of industrial clusters, while the interests of MNCs are often matched with their 
desire to influence local governments, acquiring incentives, and thus, externalizing their costs 
(Phelps 2000, 2008; Phelps & Fuller 2001).  
In this context, researchers have been interested in understanding whether some forms of 
state are more prone to have processes of corporate capture than others. In this regard, in the 
field of economic geography, two main bodies of work have attempted to provide explanations. 
This subsection will focus on the first body of literature, which can be placed under the FDI 
studies literature.  
FDI scholars have sought to explain this relation mainly based on the levels and 
efficiency of coordination among state institutions, although some other factors have also been 
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taken into consideration. According to some scholars, processes of corporate capture occur due 
to asymmetrical relations between the state and MNCs, which puts the state in a weaker position 
when bargaining with MNCs (see Phelps 2008; Almond et al. 2014). Phelps (2008) claims that 
such asymmetries reside in five main factors. First, such an asymmetry is due to the fact that 
while MNCs have one single interest and target, which is to increase profit, subnational states 
have to balance different goals, interests, and policy objectives that put state managers in an 
inferior position when bargaining (Phelps 2008; see Boddewyn 1994). Second, while firms are 
efficient in coordinating with their internal parts as well as with their subsidiaries and suppliers, 
national governments often fail to efficiently coordinate initiatives among their subsidiary 
institutions. More specifically, national governments often fail to efficiently coordinate 
initiatives to ensure that FDI attraction will result in processes of externalization and 
consequently industrial cluster formation (Phelps 2008). Furthermore, government institutions at 
other scales can have dysfunctional behaviors from their national institutions (Phelps 2008).  
Third, MNCs have greater capability in coordinating activities at the international scale, 
while states often fail to do so within their boundaries (Phelps 2008). Fourth, MNCs are open to 
opportunism, i.e., these firms are not only professionals in protecting and internalizing ownership 
advantages, but also in taking advantage of opportunities from local states, which is facilitated by 
asymmetric information (Alfaro & Chauvin 2016; Phelps 2008; see Williamson 1975). For 
example, MNCs have more capacity to control the flow of information when negotiating with 
governments. Firms can inflate the number of jobs and benefits they plan to bring to regions, 
therefore influencing the size of the governmental incentive package (Weber 2002). Fifth, the 
liberalization of FDI policies and the transferring of certain powers and competencies by nation 
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states to supranational bodies have decreased the bargaining power of states while increasing the 
power of MNCs and regional competition for FDI. (Hudson 2011; Phelps 2008). 
In this context, as levels of coordination significantly vary among countries, scholars 
have contended that national states marked by low levels of institutional coordination such as 
liberal states are more likely to have processes of corporate capture than states characterized by 
high levels of coordination such as developmental states (see Phelps 2008; Bakir 2015). As 
Phelps (2008) points out, liberal states and developmental states vary in their densities regarding 
their coordination between central governmental institutions, in their coordination between 
central and decentralized governmental bodies, in their coordination between governmental 
institutions and domestic and foreign firms, and to the degree to which such a coordination is 
reinforced by different arms of government. Moreover, Phelps (2008) believes that corporate 
capture is less likely to happen in regions that have developmental states due to the existence of 
strong coordination that results in overall strategies and transparent strategy-making mechanisms 
to couple FDI, externalization, and cluster formation (see also Bakir 2015). 
To exemplify his argument, Phelps (2008) explores how the UK invests in FDI to attract 
MNCs and to create jobs in declining regions, but it has no significant initiatives or strategies to 
monitor its effects and to intervene, nor to develop industrial clusters. According to the author, 
the lack of horizontal and vertical coordination among national and subnational scale institutions 
increases intra-competition among subnational states and quasi-state agencies over a single FDI 
project, hindering negotiations in the part of the state (Phelps 2008). The author goes on to 
contend that in developmental states like South Korea, where the level of state coordination is 
much higher than in liberal states, incentives related to regional policy are concentrated on 
supporting domestic firms, which in turn are significant in fostering positive external economic 
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effects such as the creation of industrial clusters. The developmental state, thus, is able to 
coordinate initiatives with firms and other players in a better way, having a greater potential to 
foster externalization and cluster formation (Phelps 2008).  
Such approaches to explain the relationship between corporate capture and different state 
forms foster an important insight regarding how and why corporate capture may happen, but they 
have some issues. For example, although national state forms can play a crucial role in 
explaining corporate capture, subnational forms—especially in federalist countries such as Brazil 
and the United States—can also be important to understand such a process, given that 
subnational states can greatly vary in terms of coordination, models of growth, and strategies 
from their national forms (Peck & Theodore 2007; Zhang and Peck 2014; Schröder & Voelzkow 
2016; Crouch & Voelzkow 2009). Therefore, one also has to comprehend corporate capture 
according to the characteristics of local and subnational states.  
Additionally, the degree of coordination among government institutions, and between the 
government and firms per se is not enough to explain corporate capture. Corporate capture is also 
heavily present in developmental states, which supposedly have high levels of state coordination. 
For example, in Brazil, regional competition to attract firms has dramatically increased in the last 
three decades, resulting in excessively large incentives packages that are not often accompanied 
by processes of spillover, externalization, and cluster formation (see Rodriguez-Pose & Arbix 
2001; Varsano et al. 2002). As stated in the introduction, in Brazil, the cost per job created in 
forms of incentives has reached in the past the value of $340,000 (Oman 1999).  
Moreover, such an explanation is based on a binary vision, which contrasts the 
contradictory interests between states (willing to foster externalization) and MNCs (seeking to 
externalize costs through corporate capture). This has two issues. First, when scholars depict 
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regions as marked by processes of corporate capture, they tend to exclude the possibility that 
processes of externalization can be concomitantly present. Regions are marked by processes of 
externalization or by processes corporate capture, meaning that the existence of one process 
excludes the other. Second, by focusing on states’ and MNCs’ interests, researchers overlook the 
fact that bargaining events between states and MNCs heavily affect the working class and are 
intrinsically associated with workers’ interests. Analyses of corporate capture have barely 
addressed such a matter by giving priority to issues of poaching, skills and technology transfer, 
cluster formation, and incentives per se. As this research will demonstrate in the third chapter, 
processes of capture need to be analyzed with greater attention to class issues and can happen 
concomitantly with processes of de-capture and externalization at different scales. As I will 
reveal in the next subsection, this is not the only problematic explanation regarding how some 
forms of state are more prone to have processes of corporate capture than others. 
 
2.2 Strategic Coupling, State Theory and Corporate Capture  
The second body of work, which has attempted to explain why some forms of state are 
more prone to have processes of corporate capture than others is the GPN literature3. The GPN 
literature is an important stream of research which has sought to understand the formation, 
configuration, and/or upgrading4 of global firms and their suppliers across different countries and 
regions (Yeung & Coe 2015; Neilson et al. 2014; Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2011, Henderson et 
al. 2002; Barrientos et al. 2011). As this research will show in the following paragraphs, the state 
 
3 Global commodity chains, global value chains, and global production networks have been addressed in conjunction as part of 
the same literature. This research will address the three as the GPN literature. 
4 Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) identified four types of upgrading: 1) process upgrading, which refers to how firms are able 
to produce more efficiently by reorganizing the production system or introducing a superior technology; 2) product upgrading, 
when firms move into more sophisticated product lines; 3) functional upgrading, which entails firms acquiring new functions (or 
abandoning existing functions) such as design of their own product or marketing and branding abilities; 4) chain or inter-sectoral 
upgrading, where firms move into new but often related industries. 
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has become a central player in their analyses. 
In initial studies, the global commodity chains (GCC) approach focused on how global 
industries are formed, configured across the world, and capable of capturing, creating and 
enhancing value. Scholar gave attention to the types of relationships—or corporate 
governance5—that suppliers and their lead firms had as well as to the outcomes of such 
relationships in terms of value capture and upgrading (Gereffi 1994; Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 
2011; Henderson et al. 2002). As the focus of GCC scholars was on the relationship between 
firms, such a literature was criticized for fostering a firm-centric approach, ignoring the role 
played by other players like not-for-profit organizations and the state in firms’ value capture and 
upgrading (Henderson et al. 2002; Coe et al. 2008). This was because this approach emerged in a 
context when the state-centric analysis of the World-Systems literature was dominant (Smith 
2015). Moreover, this literature was developed in the 90s, when neoliberalism was in vogue and 
MNCs had gained power while national states were being weakened (Hudson 2011). 
Consequently, the state had a less significant position than firms in their analysis, being analyzed 
more in the realm of industrial and trade policy and regulation (Smith 2015; Mayer and Phillips 
2017; Horner 2017). 
GVC studies, drawing from the GCC literature, started to give greater attention to 
institutional structures. Scholars recognized that forms of public–private governance were also 
important for the formation and configuration of GVCs as well as to the processes of value 
capture and upgrading (Smith 2015). However, scholars focused mostly on not-for-profit 
organizations and private corporate players, lacking an adequate understanding of institutions 
 
5 The initial paper was written by Gereffi (1994), where the author explores the relationship between firms and their suppliers, 
identifying two forms of corporate governance: Producer-driven chains (for example, how producers in the automobile industry 
coordinate their value chain) and buyer-driven chains (for example, how large retailers, marketers, and braded manufacturers play 
a main role in their chain). 
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regarding their role in the corporate forms of governance of GVCs (Smith 2015; Mayer & 
Phillips 2017; Horner 2017). 
In this context, geographers, influenced by GCC and GVC studies, sought to put the state 
back in the agenda and to develop a more nuanced approach to questions of power, space, and 
scale. At the end of the 1990s, when the neoliberal project seemed to have failed, GPN scholars 
started to break away from the firm- and chain-centered analysis of GVC, giving greater 
attention and importance to institutional contexts at different spatial scales (Smith 2015; Mayer 
& Phillips 2017; Horner 2017; Henderson et al. 2002; Coe et al. 2008). One particular topic that 
reflected such a break concerns studies related to strategic coupling. 
Strategic coupling refers to the “dynamic processes through which actors in cities and/or 
regions coordinate, mediate, and arbitrage strategic interests between local actors and their 
counterparts in the global economy” (Yeung 2009, p. 213). For example, strategic coupling 
occurs when regional actors are able to bargain and attract MNCs to their localities, or to how 
local firms are able to become suppliers or global buyers of foreign firms inserted in global 
production networks. Processes of strategic coupling are marked by a dependence on intentional 
strategic actions, by time and space contingency, given that it involves the construction of 
temporary coalition between groups of actors, and by a transcendency of territorial boundaries, 
given that it brings actors across different spatial scales (Coe & Hess 2011; Yeung 2009; Yang 
2013). 
GPN scholars have distinguished the existence of three modes of strategic coupling6: 
 
6 Mackinnon (2012) goes further to demonstrate how strategic coupling should be understood along with the concepts of decoupling 
and recoupling. The author claims that a coupling process may point to a decoupling process somewhere else, as a result of regional 
selection and abandonment processes. Therefore, regional development and uneven development happen simultaneously with its 
processes of coupling, decoupling and recoupling (MacKinnon 2012). The author stresses that to understand processes of coupling, 
decoupling, and recoupling there is a need to recognize ten key dimensions, as one can see in the table above. 
 
 
 
 24 
 
strategic (or international partnership); organic (or indigenous innovation); and structural (or 
production platform) (MacKinnon 2012; Coe et al. 2004; Yeung 2016). Strategic coupling 
happens when regional actors and domestic firms—who serve as strategic partners—establish 
linkages with lead firms in GPNs (Yeung 2016). Organic coupling denotes a process that takes 
place through a co-evolution of regional assets and global firms in the same region. For example, 
the rise of national champions and new lead firms due to a strategic government industrial policy 
(MacKinnon 2012). Structural coupling is based on proactive policies and strategies in which 
countries (often developing countries) provide competitive cost structures, fiscal and financial 
incentives, stable policy environment, and abundant labor supply to attract lead firms in GPNs 
(MacKinnon 2012; Coe et al. 2004; Yeung 2015). 
 
Table 1: Key Dimensions of Coupling Between GPNs and Regions 
Dimensions Scenarios 
Mode of entry Greenfield, repeat investment, merger/acquisition 
Status of TNC affiliates Autonomous – dependent 
Type of region Source, host 
Regional assets Distinctive – generic 
Type of coupling Organic, strategic, structural 
Degree of coupling Full – none 
Depth/layering of recoupling Deep – shallow 
Power relations Symmetric – asymmetric 
Regional development outcomes Development – dependency 
Exposure to decoupling Low – High 
Source: Mackinnon 2012, 240. 
 
According to Yeung (2006, 2016), in the East Asian context, three relational processes 
and mechanisms have facilitated the strategic coupling of local firms with lead firms in GPNs: an 
emergence of a transnational elite community of professionals and entrepreneurs that are able to 
learn best management and manufacturing practices, and to develop strong links with their 
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former employers; a fragmentation of production and vertical specialization in global industries 
that provide opportunities for domestic firms to engage with GPNs through subcontracting and 
partnerships; and state institutions fostering initiatives to meet the interests of firms (Yeung 
2006, 2016; Coe et al. 2004). In regard to the state, the main task of GPN scholars has been to 
analyze the role7 of different national and regional state policies and institutions in providing, 
creating, and/or transforming regional assets in order to meet the needs of trans-local firms in 
GPNs and foster a strategic, organic, or structural coupling  (Yeung 2006; Coe et al. 2004; 
Mackinnon 2012; Smith 2015; Horner 2017). 
Although GPN researchers have not explored the concept of corporate capture, these 
scholars have acknowledged the existence of power asymmetries and how coupling processes 
can result in detrimental outcomes such as the exclusion of some parts of civil society, uneven 
resource allocation, the disarticulation of existing regional economies, and growing gender 
inequalities, among others (Coe et al. 2004; Coe & Hess 2011; Dawley 2011; Mackinnon 2012). 
While FDI studies claim that national states are in an inferior position when bargaining with 
MNCs due to information asymmetries and lack of coordination, GPN academics believe this to 
happen when their regional assets are not complementary to the strategic needs of MNCs (see 
Mackinnon 2012; Coe & Hess 2011; Yeung 2016).  For example, regions are in a better position 
when bargaining with firms when they possess highly specialized and distinctive regional assets, 
like pools of knowledge and expertise, which match the interests of the firms. Coupling 
processes are considered symmetrical when based on partnerships and reciprocity, or 
asymmetrical when it involves the corporate capture of institutional capacities (Coe & Hess 
 
7 For example, Dicken (2011) sees the nation-state as having four main roles regarding the formation, configuration, upgrading of 
GPNs: Container of laws and practices, regulator, competitor, and collaborator. Lee et al. (2014) claims that the South Korean state 
acts not only as a container of laws and practices, but also as an inter‐scalar mediator, a constructor of regional innovation systems. 
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2011; Mackinnon 2012). Therefore, the GPN literature would explain processes of corporate 
capture as a result of states lacking specific or distinctive regional assets that are of the interest of 
firms. This lack of specific assets, as GPN scholars would assert, puts states in an inferior 
position when bargaining with firms, and thus, vulnerable to having their institutional capacity 
captured8. However, such an explanation of corporate capture is problematic. 
Such an explanation of corporate capture is purely descriptive, lacking a theorization that 
addresses its underlying or fundamental aspects within a context of social relations. The 
insufficiency of strategic coupling approaches to comprehend and explain the underlying causes 
of power asymmetries and processes of corporate capture lies in three main factors. One major 
issue is that, as Glassman (2011) has argued, GPN studies have been based on a neo-Weberian 
national–territorial conceptualization of the state, which sees national states and policies as 
external to markets, to global production networks, and to the economy. Such a view of the state 
directs scholars to focus on isolated state initiatives and policies, overlooking the fact that GPNs’ 
processes may be linked to broader national, subnational, and international political-economic 
features, and related to specific state accumulation strategies (Smith 2015). This issue is also 
related to the fact that GPN researchers have mostly based their analysis on an actor-network 
approach, which relies on a thick description of the objects of study, overlooking their 
underlying causes (see Yeung & Coe 2015). Through this approach, academics have placed 
greater attention on human and non-human agency, overlooking the totality of social structures 
(Sayes 2017). 
Another concern is that their conceptualizations of strategic coupling overlook its link to 
class relations, and approach labor in a human-capital perspective. For example, GPN scholars 
 
8 As Phelps (2008) stated, the capture of the institutional capacity of regions is rarely full. So, corporate capture is always a 
process in which the institutional capacity of states is only partially captured. 
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focus on the importance of state policies in generating sufficient skilled labor force for firms (or 
on the presence of a skilled labor force) to foster strategic, organic or structural coupling 
processes (Selwyn 2016). As Selwyn (2016) points out, formulations related to strategic, 
structural and organic coupling processes overlook their relation to the existence and formation 
of an exploitable working class, which are normally established and disciplined by state actions 
and endeavors to leave zones of labor militancy (Selwyn 2016). Labor markets are explained 
based on market forces of supply and demand, ignoring how the labor force was established 
originally (Selwyn 2016).  
In conclusion, GPN strategic coupling studies explain why some states are more prone to 
processes of corporate capture than others based on the lack or presence of specific regional 
assets that meet the strategic needs of firms. The lack of regional assets creates power 
asymmetries, which in turn puts states in an inferior position when bargaining with firms, thus, 
increasing its tendency to have corporate capture. Although approaches to strategic coupling 
recognize the detrimental outcomes that coupling processes can generate, they still lack a 
theorization that explains well the underlying causes behind it. This is because of its actor-
network approach, which prioritizes the description of phenomena, its Neo-Weberian approach 
to the state, and its approach to labor as human-capital. 
 
2.3 Variegated Capitalism, The Strategic Relational Approach and State Structural 
Dependence on Capital: Rethinking Corporate Capture 
In the previous two sections, this research demonstrated that neither GPN analyses of 
strategic coupling nor FDI studies deliver a satisfactory rationalization regarding how different 
forms of state relate to processes of corporate capture. This research highlighted the need for an 
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approach to the relationship between corporate capture and the state that: (a) recognizes the 
subnational variances of national states, and approaches corporate capture as phenomenon that  is 
associated to multiple state scales; (b) further explores the underlying causes of corporate 
capture, going beyond descriptive approaches; (c) expands the binary view of corporate capture 
(states’ interests versus MNCs’ interests; corporate capture versus externalization). In this 
regard, in the following three subsections (2.3.1-2.3.3) this research will draw from the 
variegated capitalism literature, Jessop’s strategic relation approach, and theories of state 
structural dependence on capital in order to address these two first issues. Regarding the last 
issue (c), this research will address such a problematic only in the third chapter. 
 
2.3.1 Variegated Capitalism and Subnational Models of Development: Processes of 
Corporate Capture as a State Multi-Scale Dynamic 
In this section, this research will demonstrate how the variegated capitalism literature can 
provide a more refined explanation to understand the relationship between the state and 
corporate capture. The variegated capitalism literature reveals how national states can have 
deviating subnational modes of regulation and accumulation strategies. This means that 
processes of corporate capture have to be understood according to these state particularities and 
in consideration to states’ multiple scales. 
The variegated capitalism (VC) literature has been developed in the last years, delivering 
an interesting conceptualization of how states and capitalism function. Drawing from Marxist 
theories and from the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature, the VC literature has a refined 
approach and explanation not only in regard to how and why national states vary from one 
another across the globe but also in regard to how national states are marked by internal 
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variations. Before turning in depth into this literature, it important to analyze the VoC literature, 
given its influence over the VC literature. Therefore, first we will analyze the VoC literature and 
critiques of the approach, and how the VC studies have been developed in an attempt to address 
these matters. After discussing the main points of the VC literature, I will explore whether it can 
be deployed to corporate capture studies. 
The varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature has fostered an interesting approach for cross-
national comparative studies. Bringing firms into the center of analysis, VoC demonstrates how 
national institutional frameworks are important features that influence or condition firms’ 
performance. VoC explores how institutions improve the capacities of firms to coordinate with 
other actors and consequently to solve their problems (Hall & Soskice 2001; Schneider 2009). 
According to Hall and Soskice (2001), for firms to develop, produce, and distribute goods and 
services profitably, they have to resolve problems of coordination in five main spheres: 
1) Industrial relations: Firms have coordination problems with workers and unions related to 
bargaining over wages and working conditions. At stake are wage and productivity levels that 
condition the success of the firms as well as the rates of unemployment in the economy. 
2) Vocational training: Firms have coordination problems with educational institutions in regard 
to securing a workforce with suitable skills, and with workers who face the problem of deciding 
how much to invest and in what skills. At stake is the fortune of individual firms and workers, 
and the skill levels and competitiveness of the overall economy. 
3) Corporate governance: Firms have coordination problems with investors related to how to 
access financing and to assure returns. 
4) Inter-firm relations: Firms have coordination problems with suppliers and clients regarding the 
sharing of proprietary information, and the risk of exploitation in joint ventures. 
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5) Employees: Firms have coordination problems with employees concerning how to ensure that 
employees have the desirable competencies and cooperate well with one another to advance the 
objectives of the firm. Problems relate to moral hazards, adverse selection, and information 
sharing (Hall & Soskice 2001; Schneider 2009). 
In this context, Hall and Soskice (2001) developed an approach that compares national 
economies according to how the problems in these five spheres are resolved. The authors, in 
their initial study, developed an analysis of two types of national economies. On one side of the 
spectrum, there are liberal market economies (LMEs) like the US and the UK, while on the other 
side of the spectrum, there are coordinated market economies (CMEs) such as Germany and 
Japan. Other scholars have added other types of national economies. For example, researchers 
have examined how Latin American countries have types of national market economies that do 
not conform with the LMEs or the CMEs models. Brazil is termed as a hierarchical market 
economy (HME) (Schneider 2008, 2009; Saucedo et al. 2015). 
In LMEs like the US, firms resolve their coordinating problems via competitive market 
arrangements, or through price market and formal contracts, where supply and demand is 
responsible for fostering equilibrium outcomes in the five spheres (Hall & Soskice 2001; 
Schneider 2009). In HMEs, firms rely on hierarchical arrangements to solve their coordinating 
problems and reach equilibrium. More specifically, business groups and MNCs unilaterally 
organize coordinating problems via overall non-market hierarchical relations in order to reach 
equilibrium (Schneider 2008, 2009). 
 
Table 2: Liberal Market Economies and Hierarchical Market Economies 
 LME: United State of America HME: Brazil 
Industrial 
relations 
- Firms’ relations with workers 
are based on market relations.  
- Firms’ relations with workers are 
structured by top-down regulations issued 
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- Managers have unilateral control 
over the firms and has freedom to 
hire and fire. They have no 
obligations with trade unions for 
example.  
- The market controls wages as 
well as inflation although 
macroeconomic policies also pose 
an important role. Few unions. 
by national governments and enforced by 
labor courts.  
- Employees lack formal grievance 
procedures and representation. Workers 
lack voice because many jobs are 
temporary.  
- The state and employers set the wages. 
Few unions. 
Vocational 
training 
- Focus on general skills, firms 
not willing to have 
apprenticeships, given that they 
have no guarantee that other firms 
will poach their apprentices. 
Greater amount of in-housing-
training. Short on highly 
specialized skilled workers. 
- Post-secondary or on-the-job 
training is based on the market. 
- Labor markets are fluid because 
firms can hire and fire according 
to their strategies. Therefore, 
workers are encouraged to acquire 
general transferable skills. 
- Post-secondary or on-the-job training is 
often unilaterally decided by firms or 
business associations and financed by the 
state. 
- Low productivity due to slow progress in 
education, the failure of training systems, 
poor labor relations, and the absence of 
compensation mechanisms for workers who 
stand to lose their jobs. Workers have few 
incentives to invest in sector or firm 
specific skills, and invest, if they do invest, 
in more general skills. 
- Low skills due to the fear of poaching, 
which discourages investment, but this 
problem sometimes is surpassed by public 
investment. 
Corporate 
governance 
- Firms are encouraged to be more 
attentive to earnings and the price 
of their shares. Regulatory 
regimes are tolerant of mergers 
and acquisitions.  
- Access to finance depends on 
their valuation in equity markets, 
where investors depend on 
publicly available information. 
Firms focus on profitability and 
performance. 
 
- Most firms are directly controlled and 
managed by their owners, either prominent 
families or foreign firms. Diversification 
and family control introduce hierarchy into 
corporate governance. Without multiple 
owners or stakeholders there is no need to 
negotiations. 
- Diversified business groups and MNCs 
were the key conduits for organizing access 
to capital, technology, and markets through 
Coasian internalization and hierarchy. 
Access to capital through public financing. 
Inter-firm 
relations 
- Based on market relations and 
formal contracts. Mediated by 
antitrust regulations to avoid the 
control of prices.  
- Firms get little assistance with 
relational contracts. Technology 
transfer then takes place with 
scientists and engineers that move 
from firm to firm, which a fluid 
- Sometimes they are competitive, but some 
sectors are oligopolistic, and others 
regulated by the state. Inter-sector relations 
of same firm group owners. 
- Most inter-firm coordination focuses on 
politics and policies rather than narrower 
issues of sectoral governance. 
- Because firms are too large, relations with 
competitors, suppliers, and clients are often 
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labor market facilitates. They also 
rely on sale of innovation.  
- Research consortia and inter-
firm collaboration play a less 
important role in technology 
transfer. 
vertical, unequal, and imbued with a hint of 
coercive hierarchy. 
- Firms in general have little coordination 
capacity to foster collaboration with other 
firms, and to have processes of technology 
transfer. 
Employees - Corporate structures that 
concentrate authority in top 
management make it easier for 
firms to release labor when facing 
pressure from financial markets 
and to impose a new strategy on 
the firm to take advantage of the 
shifting market opportunities that 
often present themselves in 
economies characterized by highly 
mobile assets.  
- Atomistic and fluid/short term links.  
- Unions have little influence on hierarchies 
within the firm given that so few workers 
are unionized and where unions do exist, 
they are often distant from the shop floor.  
 
Source: Hall and Soskice 2001; Schneider 2008, 2009; Saucedo et al. 2015. 
 
For Hall and Soskice (2001), institutions, organizations, and culture9 are important 
because they provide support for firms to resolve their coordination problems. The authors state 
that the institutional structure of national economies provides comparative advantages for firms 
to engage in specific types of activities, allowing them to be more competitive. In this respect, 
different modes of coordination develop different clustering of institutional complementary10.  
For example, LMEs have labor market arrangements that allow companies to easily cut 
costs in an economic down-turn by firing labor. Such a labor market arrangement is 
complementary to financial markets, given that a firms’ access to funds depends on profitability, 
and thus, rapid responses to economic downturns. Educational arrangements that privilege 
general rather than firm-specific skills are complementary to these highly fluid types of labor 
 
9 Hall and Soskice (2001) understand culture as shared understandings that accumulates from experience, or the ways things are 
done usually. 
10 Two institutions can be complementary if the presence of one increases the returns from the other (Hall & Soskice 2001). 
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markets, where such a labor mobility is complementary to technology transfer among firms, and 
benefits economies based on innovation. In the context of a legal system that works against 
relational contracting, licensing agreements are also more effective than inter-firm collaboration 
on research and development for effecting technology transfer (Hall & Soskice 2001). 
Another example can be seen in HMEs. HMEs have general training skills that are 
complementary to its short-term fluid labor market, where MNCs are able to poach skilled 
workers from domestic firms, and the wages do not significantly increase according to levels of 
skills. It is also complementary to the political and economic volatility and uncertainty of HMEs 
countries, where high employee turnover and low unionization discourage firms to invest in 
training since workers may not work for too long. The lack of unions, which could negotiate 
distribution of gains over time for workers investing in training, discourages training as well. 
Low skills discourage domestic firms to upgrade to higher technology sectors and encourage 
them to operate in lower ones where skills are abundant. Such a characteristic, i.e., an abundant 
labor market marked by workers with low skills and low wages, is complementary to commodity 
production, which relies on fairly standard technologies and prices (Schneider 2008; 2009). 
Changes in a national institutional framework are explained according to exogenous 
shocks like liberalization and technological change, which disrupt the existing equilibrium 
reached by firms in their relationships with the five main spheres already described. Firms 
challenge this now problematic institutional structure; institutions change in one sphere, 
consequently affecting the other spheres, and therefore, restore equilibrium (Hall & Soskice 
2001; Peck & Theodore 2007). 
Although fostering a rich and stimulating explanation of how national market economies 
vary across space, the VoC literature has been criticized for five main reasons. First, VoC 
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literature initially deployed an ideal-type reasoning which has two poles: liberal market 
economies and coordinated market economies. The problem here resides in the fact that liberal 
market economies are portrayed as the locus of ideal market relations as a disembedded self-
regulating market (Peck & Theodore 2007). However, national market economies are not 
characterized by market coordination or by non-market coordination, but by a combination of 
both. Markets demand social, institutional, and political structures to function (Peck & Theodore 
2007). In this regard, this pushes this research to adopt the conceptualization of the United States 
as a “hidden developmental state”11 instead of liberal state. This does not mean that the US 
behaves as a classical developmental state like Brazil12 from the 1930s to the 1980s (see Bresser-
Pereira & Theuer 2012). The US has been conceptualized as a “hidden developmental state” due 
to its significant role in the economy, but not in “import-substitution” but in advancing, through 
public-private partnerships, new technologies and innovation (Block 2008). 
Second, VoC literature has a problematic explanation regarding institutional change. In 
their perspective, harmonious agglomeration of institutions is the norm, where there is a steady 
state or there is a state in change. However, institutional discordance and disequilibrium is much 
more usual due to the contradictory nature of capitalism (Jessop 2014). VoC literature overlooks 
processes of experimentation and cumulative transformation in relation to institutional change 
 
11 Weiss (2014) argues that the US does not have a liberal and market-coordinated economy, but a “hybrid state” in which 
institutional networks accommodate strategic policies fostering high-tech and defense related sectors and addressing emergent 
shortcomings from liberal capitalism. Weiss (2014) and Block (2008) argue the US acts similar to a developmental state. Block 
(2008) uses the term “hidden” because the US, different from developmental states, has not a clear formal industrial policy in which 
investments, partnerships, goals are described. 
12 The developmental state refers to states that are (or were) financially tied to industrialists, having a collective national 
developmental goal. In the Brazilian case, the developmental state was in place from 1930s to late 1980s. In Brazil, the state used 
its finance as a conduit of industrial policy to achieve industrialization through import-substitution. To do so, the Brazilian 
developmental state established an institutional compromise with its industrial elite, urban workers, and with the non-exporter 
agricultural elite in order to foster a project of development. To stimulate internal production, Brazil not only created many 
national firms but also supported private businesses by establishing high import-taxes, socializing risks through low-interest 
loans, inflationary refinancing and non-performing loans to bail firms out, and by expanding its share equity of banks to write off 
bad loans ( Bresser-Pereira and Theuer 2012; Fine 2008; Woo-Cumings 1999). More details of the Brazilian case will be 
provided on chapter 5. 
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and disregards that institutions can be hierarchically organized, where some spheres are more 
important than others for reforms (Peck & Theodore 2007). Moreover, institutional change is not 
only fostered by external shocks. For example, neoliberal reforms are gradual and take place 
from within (Peck and Theodore 2007; Jessop 2011; Jessop 2014). 
Third, the rise of neoliberalism has pointed to a convergence in models of capitalism, 
which challenges VoC scholars, given that there is an inclination in CMEs to lean towards the 
market. VoC literature places neoliberalism under the LMEs, failing to comprehend how both 
LMEs and CMEs converge towards neoliberalism (Jessop 2011). Therefore, there is a need for 
VoC scholars to take into consideration the structural complementarities, connecting threads, 
commonalities, and family resemblances in neoliberal restructuring programs; although 
differences are expected even in deep neoliberalization (Peck and Theodore 2007; Jessop 2014).  
Fourth, VoC privileges the political economy at the national scale, but studies concerning 
the rescaling of political economic relations and state forms have demonstrated the existence of 
models within models, trans-local spaces, and that national states are porous and interconnected. 
In this regard and through the lenses of uneven development, geographers have rich theorizations 
regarding the economic and political relations at the subnational and transnational scales (Peck & 
Theodore 2007; Jessop 2011, 2014).  
Fifth, when looking at states and their multiple scales, there is also a need to add 
historical trajectories, class relations, and the development of capitalism as a world system, 
moving beyond the pluralization of capitalism and reified enclosed sets of models. This takes 
researchers to examine the principles, sources and dimensions of capitalism’s variegation, 
addressing the causes and forms of capitalism’s dynamic polymorphism (Peck & Theodore 2007; 
Jessop 2011, 2014).  
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Facing this problematic, scholars have sought to foster a similar, but different analysis 
regarding how capitalism differs. Peck and Theodore (2007) have argued for an approach that 
draws from institutional theories of uneven development of capitalism, regulationist treatments 
of accumulation and regulation, and Polanyian notions of institutional embeddedness. It would 
approach not only the state at its national scale, but also at other scales (Peck & Theodore 2007). 
In the same direction, Bob Jessop argues for an approach that considers capitalism as 
contradictory and as an object of regulation. Jessop (2011, 2012) theorizes capitalism as a set of 
social relations that due to the commodification of labor, permanently generates conflicts. This 
characteristic of capitalism requires the state to establish modes of reproduction, regulation and 
governance that ensure a smooth, crisis-free course (but temporary) for capital accumulation, or 
spatio-temporal fixes when there is no stability (Jessop 2011). 
By pointing to the contradictory nature of capitalism and to how it requires regulation, 
Jessop (2011) challenges the VoC problematic view of equilibrium and institutional change. 
While the VoC literature assumes that accumulation and equilibrium are likely to happen, Jessop 
(2011) demonstrates that both are unlikely because of the inherent contradictions of capitalism. 
The author states that when stability occurs, it will be related to zones of instability elsewhere 
and/or to postponing problems into the future (Jessop 2011, 2014). In this regard, VC goes 
further to analyze how zones of relative stability are related to instability inside or outside these 
national economies in an ecology of accumulation regimes and modes of regulation. 
Jessop (2011, 2014), in order to address the problems presented in the VoC literature, 
argues for the adherence of four main concepts: variegation, compossibility, ecological 
dominance, and the world market. For Jessop (2012) capitalism functions in a world market that 
encompasses an ecology of economic spaces that interact and produce the uneven dynamic of 
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accumulation on a world scale (Jessop 2012, 5). In this regard, the world market, as a totality of 
production, fosters an uneven and combined development that integrates branches of capitalist 
production and their respective social supports. 
If national states are part of an integrated world market, VoC literature cannot explain 
variation based on isolated and singular models of market economies such as liberal and 
coordinated. National forms of market economies have to be understood according to their 
interrelations as a series of hybrid variegations as global forces interact with local institutions 
and actors (Jessop 2012; Sphar 2016). 
In this sense, variegation attempts to go beyond the pluralization of capitalism and reified 
models to investigate the principles, sources, and dimensions of capitalism variegation (Peck & 
Theodore 2007; Jessop 2012). Through variegation, attention is turned to the structural coupling, 
co-evolution, complementarities, rivalries, and antagonisms among national economies within 
the world market (Jessop 2011). Due to competing in a world market, variegation happens 
through co-evolution and co-dependency among national economies, not in isolation (Sphar 
2016)  
In order to explore variegation, Jessop turns his attention to the concepts of 
compossibility and ecological dominance. Concerning compossibility, based on the work of 
Leibniz, Jessop (2011, 2014) points that the VoC literature took into consideration 
compossibility, but only within national market economies. Compossibility refers to how 
individual nation states exist together in the global market and can contradict or mutually 
reinforce one another (Jessop 2011). Raising the issue of compossibility between different 
varieties of capitalism, the author asks: “[…] to what extent can different varieties co-exist in the 
same economic space and, if they are compossible rather than incompossible, does their co-
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existence have benign, neutral, or negative effects on their individual and collective economic 
performance?” (Jessop 2011, p.4). One example is the co-dependent relationship between the US 
and the Chinese state, or the Eurozone, which has been developed on the basis of compossible 
relations under the leadership of the German model (Jones & Jessop 2010; Peck & Theodore 
2007, Jessop 2011, 2014).  
Concerning ecological dominance, Jessop (2011, 2014) notes that different varieties of 
capitalisms are not just due to their “relative economic efficiency as models of rational 
capitalism”, but also due to their articulation to different forms of political capitalism. In this 
regard, the author claims that variegated capitalism exists under the influence of hegemonic 
projects like neoliberalism. This is because the world is marked by differential global power 
hierarchies and core-periphery relations in which some variegations are more influential than 
others. Jessop’s (2011) concept of ecological dominance, therefore, considers the uneven 
development of capitalism in a world system, bringing the idea that national states are porous 
and interconnected at the transnational scale, as Peck and Theodore (2007) have also pointed out. 
The VC literature allows this research to explore and explain state/processes of corporate 
capture relation in more depth. The VC concurs with the FDI studies literature in regard to the 
understanding that corporate capture is partially an outcome of asymmetrical relations between 
MNCs and states due to trends in liberalization in the world economy (see Phelps 2008; Almond 
et al. 2014); however, the VC provides a deeper explanation in regard to how processes of 
corporate capture are related to variegation and the ecological dominance of neoliberalism. As 
Jessop (2011) stated, the world economy is marked by an ecology of states that interact and 
produce an uneven and combined dynamic of accumulation. Variegated forms of capitalism 
emerge through a coevolution and codependency among national and subnational states (Jessop 
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2014). Under the ecological dominance of neoliberalism, states have been influenced by certain 
policy descriptions marked by liberal practices and commonalities across countries. These 
practices and commonalities can be identified, for example, in regard to the creation of markets 
in areas that did not exist before related to land, water, education, health care, social security, or 
environmental pollution (Harvey 2005). In this context, processes of corporate capture can be 
understood as a particularity of the capitalist state and its relationship to MNCs, a commonality 
across states part of the neoliberal world hegemonic project. Corporate capture emerges due to 
how states interact with MNCs and other states in a context in which accumulation—through the 
attraction, retention, and development of firms—happens based on an uneven and combined 
development. This means that all types of state such as developmental states and liberal states are 
prone to processes of corporate capture, but this is not to deny that some states will give greater 
attention to matters of externalization and have less drastic degrees of corporate capture than 
others. Moreover, this researcher believes, as later will be discussed, that processes of corporate 
capture and externalization can concomitantly happen at different scales.  
Another important aspect of the VC approach is its explanation regarding how states 
cannot be typified according to their levels of coordination—coordination versus market—, 
given that even the so-called liberal states function based on social, political, and institutional 
structures, which allow the market to function. This means that, as Poulantzas (1978) argued, all 
states are required to have high levels of state coordination (“intervention”13) due to capitalism’s 
contradictory nature. Therefore, it is theoretically problematic to analyze corporate capture in 
relation to levels of coordination, given that what differs from state to state is not their levels of 
 
13 Poulantzas (1978) claims that the economic sphere is not exterior to states and does not automatically reproduce itself. This 
means that term state “intervention” is problematic, given that the state and the economy are mutually constituted (Poulantzas 
1978). 
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coordination, or degree of intervention, but how states structure their institutional apparatuses in 
attempts to foster accumulation and to maintain their economies free of crisis (Jessop 2011). In 
this regard, I argue that the relation between different forms of state and processes of corporate 
capture should be conceptualized according to their accumulation strategies. However, before 
developing such an argument, I have to explore how and why national states can have 
subnational modes of development or accumulation strategies that drastically differ from their 
national models. This is important because it will provide a framework which allows me to relate 
processes of corporate capture to state accumulation strategies in its multiple scales. 
 
2.3.2 Variegated Capitalism, Sector, and Scale  
Researchers have also demonstrated the need to expand VoC discussions in scalar and 
spatial terms, building a cross-scalar interpretation of the VoC approach. Under the variegated 
capitalism rubric, some studies have pointed out how firms are enveloped not by a single 
institutional national framework, but by a range of institutional layers at different scales. As 
Jessop (2011) revealed, the state is built on subdivisions with certain political and administrative 
powers as well as on some autonomy from the national state apparatus within which political 
power is exercised to achieve policy objectives (Jessop 2011). In this regard, the VC literature 
has called attention to the possibility of the existence of autonomous subsystems and governance 
structures on the sectoral or local levels, what have been conceptualized as regional sub-models 
of capitalism (Peck & Theodore 2007; Zhang & Peck 2014). Such an approach can be of great 
use for this research to foster a more nuanced approach to analyze the relationship between the 
state and corporate capture. 
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Zhang and Peck (2014) claim that under capitalism and inside national states, industrial 
expansion happens through an uneven development that is reinforced by an unequal distribution 
of resources and linkages to the outside world. Such an internal, uneven development results in a 
range of regional models of capitalism marked by political struggles—and shaped by firms—
over the design of policies. To exemplify their argument, Zhang and Peck (2014) analyze the 
existence of different subnational models of development within China. These variations are 
related to how such models of development are forged translocally and transnationally (different 
insertions into the global market) through an uneven development. For example, the subnational 
state of Sunan, China has a local state corporatism model of development, where local 
governments were heavily supportive of collective township and villages enterprises through 
guaranteed loans, favoring collective enterprises and ignoring private firms. As township and 
village enterprises were privatized and integrated into GPNs, Sunan started to invest in the 
creation of industrial parks, giving incentives to attract firms mostly from Taiwan. This became 
the new source of investment. In the VoC style, the authors go on to explore and compare in 
detail the five spheres of several Chinese subnational states (Zhang & Peck 2014, p.74). 
Similarly, Rutherford et al. (2018) analyzed how two Canadian provinces, Ontario and 
Quebec, have different models of development. More specifically, the authors explore the 
accumulation strategies of these provinces in order to understand their outcomes for regional 
development. The authors revealed how the accumulation strategies of Ontario and Quebec have 
significant and differential outcomes in regard to policies to maximize FDI spillovers. As the 
authors argue, the accumulation strategy of Quebec, a developmental state, has more power to 
foster externalization in relation to FDI than the province of Ontario. 
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In the same line of thought, Brenner (2003) has claimed that since the Fordist crisis, 
many national states have transferred the responsibility of economic development to their 
subnational states, which have to promote their local and regional economies. Therefore, the 
national economy of many countries has been fragmented among local and regional economies, 
which are in charge of developing their own glocalization strategies, and thus, their own place-
specific assets and developmental trajectories (Brenner 2003). The author claims that subnational 
glocalization strategies can vary within national states, given that such strategies are conditioned 
by their state structure (unitary/federalist), inherited economic arrangements, 
national/subnational political regimes, and processes of industrial restructuring. Moreover, such 
glocalized state spaces emerge through an uneven development of state regulation, and intensify 
intra-national socio-spatial polarization, given that economics assets, industrial capacities, and 
infrastructure investments are concentrated in the most powerful regions (Benner 2003). 
In the same direction, Schröder and Voelzkow (2016) describe why subnational state 
variances exist. The authors go further to reveal how subnational variances do not stem only due 
to their national structure (unitary/federalist) but from the interplay between national, sectoral, 
and regional forms of governance. Therefore, subnational states and their strategies may differ 
not only by country due to differential institutional legacies and distributions of national political 
power, but also due to dynamics related to specific industrial sectors and regions. According to 
the authors, firms competing in the world market search for regional economies that offer an 
optimal regulation of their activities. What is optimal varies according to each sector. 
Consequently, local states with specific industrial clusters have sought to offer an optimal 
regulation to their sectors in order to attract and develop firms. Their models of development are 
structured around such needs. Thus, it is not uncommon for local states to deviate from their 
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national governance when national regulation challenges their sectors (Schröder & Voelzkow 
2016). 
In this regard, Schröder and Voelzkow (2016) argue that local states will replicate their 
national institutions if their clusters are in the sector that is supported by its national institutions. 
For example, regional economies with high technology clusters based on radical innovation will 
mirror their national institutions if their national market economies are LMEs. The same goes for 
a regional economy with a cluster in a sector based on incremental innovation and a CME. But if 
they differ—LMEs with clusters based on incremental innovation—then regions will deviate 
from their national states, adapting their own institutions to meet the necessities of the sector. For 
example, in London, where there is a media cluster based on incremental innovation, 
coordination around training and financing is higher than what is normal for a liberal market 
economy (Schröder & Voelzkow 2016). 
Variances between national and subnational states are also related to the autonomy that 
national states give. Almond et al. (2012, 2013) analyzed the characteristics and behaviors 
related to FDI initiatives of several liberal and coordinated market economies. One of their major 
conclusions is that subnational states in these countries vary in their degree of autonomy, factors 
that influence their degree of FDI focus, their responsibilities for FDI—for example in some 
places, private or not-for-profit institutions are responsible for FDI, rather than the state—and in 
their politics and developmental orientations. According to Almond et al. (2012, 2013), 
subnational states with a low degree of autonomy means that FDI policies are entirely managed 
by their national government, while a high degree of autonomy means that subnational states 
have substantial power within the national framework to foster initiatives related to FDI. For the 
authors, subnational states with a high degree of autonomy are more likely to embed MNCs and 
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to reach positive outcomes such as externalization and cluster formation (Almond et al. 2012, 
2013). 
The VC analyses regarding the internal variations of national states bring a valuable 
approach to the state and can greatly contribute to studies concerning the relationship between 
the state and corporate capture, addressing some of the insufficiencies of the GPN and FDI 
literatures. In this regard, the VC approach can contribute to questions of state/corporate capture 
as follows. 
As revealed, the FDI studies literature does not satisfactorily examine the relationship 
between corporate capture and the state due to its analysis based on levels of coordination at the 
national state scale. This is not only theoretically problematic, as pointed out before, but it also 
overlooks the existence of state internal variations within national states in terms of 
administrative, economic and political power (degree of autonomy), and accumulation strategies. 
Understanding states according to the VC approach allows this research to analyze corporate 
capture and in its relation to the state at multiple scales. For example, bargaining events with 
MNCs as well as the design of policies of FDI attraction and aftercare do not always take place 
at the national state scale, they can take place at other state scales such as the subnational and 
local, or at multiple scales concomitantly. Therefore, processes of corporate capture—as well as 
de-capture—can happen at multiple scales, and this is dependent on the degree of autonomy and 
power of subnational and local states within specific national states. Such an approach allows 
this research to break with corporate capture studies based on a binary view, whether there is 
corporate capture or there is externalization. 
Moreover, as this research will explore in the next subsection, subnational states can have 
different accumulation strategies from their national states. For example, while policies of FDI 
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attraction can prevail in the economic development strategy of some national states, their 
subnational states can foster strategies that privilege the development of small and medium-size 
firms or the creation of start-ups. While processes of corporate capture can happen at the 
subnational or national state scale, local states, which receive these firms, can direct their 
initiatives to foster externalization, processes of de-capture, which mostly target and prioritize 
the local business community. 
Furthermore, bargaining events can result in significant and different degrees of corporate 
capture according to the position national states occupy in the global economy as well as 
according to the position subnational states occupy within national economies, as Brenner (2003) 
has stressed. The GPN literature is correct in asserting that the lack of specific regional assets, 
which would meet the strategic interests of firms, places states in an inferior position when 
bargaining with firms. This can be linked to how the uneven development of state spaces in 
which some subnational states and regions are privileged—and thus more powerful—and able to 
concentrate economics assets, industrial capacities, and infrastructure investments. This view, 
along with an approach to state accumulation strategies can provide some underlying explanation 
of the too descriptive GPN approach. 
Furthermore, by approaching the national and subnational states through the VC lenses, 
this research can analyze strategic coupling processes and corporate capture not only as a 
consequence of single isolated bargaining events between MNCs and the state, as the GPN 
would claim, but also part of broader models of development that play a crucial role in GPN 
processes14. While the GPN literature claims that corporate capture happens when there is a lack 
 
14 Smith (2015) has demonstrated how GPNs are articulated to particular national modes of development—which vary according 
to their model of insertion in the world market, the accumulation strategies which are at the heart of this insertion, and how the 
state regulates this mode of insertion and accumulation strategies. To illustrate his argument, the author demonstrates the 
importance of the Tunisian “exportism” national model of development, which was crucial to attract GPN firms. 
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of specific regional assets meeting the strategic needs of firms in processes of structural or 
strategic coupling, this research goes beyond to acknowledge that corporate capture is related to 
broader aspects, including the accumulation strategy of states at different scales, as this research 
will explore in details in the next subsection.  
 
2.3.3 State Power and Strategies, State Dependence, and the Underlying Causes of 
Corporate Capture 
In this subsection, I will advance the argument that the evolution of corporate capture 
should be understood according to the state accumulation strategies of regions. I will reveal how 
the evolution of corporate capture is related to how the strategic selective institutional context of 
states and subnational states privileges MNCs, which in turn, have structural advantages to 
advance their interests to a point known as corporate capture. As disclosed before, there is a need 
to further explore the underlying causes of corporate capture. To do so, this research will draw 
from Jessop’s strategic-relational approach and theories regarding the structural dependence of 
the state on capital.  
Bob Jessop is today one of the most influential scholars regarding state theory. Jessop’s 
theorization, despite its high level of abstraction, has been disseminated in many different 
disciplines such as geography, sociology, and economics. Jessop started to develop his state 
theory and strategic-relational approach in a context where Marxist instrumentalist and 
structuralist views of the state were under heavy criticism (Hay 1999). In this scenario, Jessop, 
instead of elaborating a theory of the capitalist state, sought to develop a Marxist approach that 
combines structure and agency in order to analyze state power (Jessop 1996, 2001).  
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For Jessop, the state is a social relation and strategically selective in regard to its actions. 
Understanding the state as a social relation means that there are complex relations underneath 
state actions and strategies, which go beyond the state system and its capacities. State managers 
are not isolated from wider society, and their behavior is not purely for their own sake, but 
according to their links to the wider balance of forces (Hay 1999; Jessop 1990, 2007; Kelly 
1999). In other words, state initiatives and strategies are founded on a configuration of social 
forces and institutionalized compromises that underpin state support for particular policy 
directions (Smith 2015). 
Jessop (2014) believes that the state is not a neutral terrain, where political forces 
compete with equal chances to pursue their interests and reach their goals. According to the 
author, state action and strategies are always developed within a pre-existing structure—i.e., an 
institutional context—that is selective and may privilege some actors, some spatial and temporal 
horizons, some strategies, some paths, and some identities over others (Jessop 2001; 2014). For 
example, states do not tend to pursue long-term, “patient capital” strategies oriented to strong 
competition in a neoliberal regime that privileges short-term, hypermobile, superfast flows of 
speculative capital (Jessop 2004; Gough 2004). 
This strategic selectivity of the state15 favors the articulation of certain strategies and 
tactics at certain time but does not entirely determine them. This is because while the 
institutional context encourages specific paths of action, and influences the articulation of 
strategies, actors within and without the state also behave strategically, having the ability to 
reflect upon the conjunctural moment and to articulate their strategies and tactics according to 
their capacities, assumptions, and knowledge (Jessop 2001; Hay 2002). This ability has been 
 
15 As Hay argues “the strategically selective context is also discursively selective in that it is accessed through perceptions, 
misperceptions and representations of the existing context” (Hay 2002, p.44).  
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termed by Jessop (1996, 2007) as strategic calculation. In this sense, state policies, initiatives, 
and strategies also rely on how actors strategically analyze the opportunities and constraints that 
exist in a strategic selective institutional context.  
In summary, the exercise of state power—i.e. its actions, initiatives, policies, and 
strategies—is not explained by state managers taking isolated decisions according to their sole 
interests and perceptions. Actions, initiatives, policies, and strategies are seen as an outcome of 
the interplay between a specific, strategic, selective institutional context and actors’ strategic 
calculations. The balance of forces and struggles of such actors play a crucial role in determining 
which actions, initiatives, policies, and/or accumulation strategies will be fostered by the state. 
Out of such struggles, the state will strategically select and privilege some actors, some actions, 
and some strategies rather than others (Jessop 2002; Sphar 2016; Smith 2015). The figure below 
summarizes Jessop’s strategic relational approach. 
 
Diagram 1: The strategic-relational approach can be summarized as follows. 
Source: Hay (2002, 131). 
 
Therefore, how can one explain the underlying causes of corporate capture drawing from 
Jessop’s strategic relational approach? As this research pointed out before, corporate capture 
happens when the values and interests of MNCs dominate local economic strategies and 
initiatives in relation to the interests of local business communities, workers, and governments 
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(Phelps & Fuller 2001; Phelps 2000, 2008). Therefore, if state action and initiatives are 
dependent on the interplay between a specific strategic selective institutional context and 
strategic actors advancing their interests, then the underlying causes of corporate capture reside 
in two main points.  
First, it resides in understanding how or through which mechanisms MNCs and their 
allied forces are able to strategically advance their interests over the interests of other forces. 
Second, it resides in acknowledging how and why a strategically selective institutional context 
may privilege such forces. In this way, corporate capture will not only be explained based on a 
lack of specific regional assets, and/or low levels of state coordination that result in power 
asymmetries and regions being in an inferior position when bargaining with MNCs. Corporate 
capture will also be understood according to the interplay above described; thus, capture and 
power asymmetries can be viewed as being structurally inscribed in the state. 
Regarding the strategic selectivity of states, as stressed before, state action and strategies 
are always developed within a pre-existing institutional context that is selective and privileges 
some actors and actions, some spatial and temporal horizons and certain articulation of 
strategies, and some paths, over others (Jessop 2001; 2014). As national and subnational states 
vary, it is expected that privileged actors and strategic calculations can also differ. Some states 
can be prone to privilege accumulation strategies related to inward investments, others to 
developing start-ups, domestics firms, and/or industrial clusters. The accumulation strategy of 
states plays an important role in understanding why some regions are more disposed to have 
more drastic forms of processes of corporate capture than others. 
For example, since the crisis of the Fordist regime of accumulation, the world has seen an 
intense process of neoliberalization that allowed many national states to be more integrated into 
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the world market (Harvey 2005). The deregulation of national states has enabled capital to 
become more mobile than ever (Hudson 2011; Featherstone & Mackinnon 2017; Yeung 2016). 
Such a deregulation has occurred in parallel to processes of national states’ decentralization 
through which subnational states have received more economic responsibilities (Martin 2010; 
Brenner 2003). This shift has left regions in a critical position (Florida & Jonas 1991). As MNCs 
become more mobile, regions are challenged to find ways not only to retain their existing firms, 
but also to attract new ones (Hudson 2011; Featherstone & Mackinnon 2017). In this context, in 
many countries, subnational states have adopted inward investment strategies in which MNCs 
are seen as the route to economic salvation (Wood 2003; Phelps & Wood 2006). In these places, 
the strategic selectivity of states tends to encourage regions to address regional competitiveness 
by adopting specific paths of action or strategies that will mostly privilege MNCs (see 
Rutherford et al. 2018; Smith 2015; Brenner 2003). 
According to Rutherford et al. (2018), the state, through its accumulation strategy, selects 
and privileges certain segments of global value chains, designs policies to foster FDI spillovers, 
determines the rules for regions to compete for investments, and empowers and arbitrates among 
different actors in the dynamics of attraction and retention of FDIs (Rutherford et al. 2018). Such 
characteristics are highly important to understand why and how processes of corporate capture 
happen. These accumulation strategies influence whether some states may have pure inward 
investment agencies, developing strategies solely related to attracting MNCs; while other states 
may have agencies that mix FDI approaches with cluster development, and have strategies 
extended to wider regional development. This can result in major differences with regard to 
corporate capture (Almond et al. 2013). But as stated before, the presence of forms of 
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governance with wider developmental goals does not exclude the possibilities of corporate 
capture being fostered. 
As observed, the VC literature reveals that subnational states can differ their models of 
development from their national states, and in degrees of autonomy. In this regard, the strategic 
selectivity of states and their effects over processes of corporate capture have to be analyzed in 
consideration to such variances. In this regard, Rutherford et al. (2018), comparing the 
accumulation strategies of Ontario and Quebec have revealed how the strategic selectivities of 
Ontario are likely to privilege MNCs over the interests of other actors such as small- and 
medium-size enterprises (SMEs).  
But as Jessop (2007) and Hay (2002) indicate, the strategic selective institutional context 
is not the only factor that will shape or determine how the state will act. Actors, within and 
outside the state, strategically calculate and articulate their strategies and goals (Jessop 2007; 
Hay 2002). Some forces will be more likely to advance their interests, influencing the state, due 
to their strategies, tactics, and goals (Jessop 2011). In this sense, if corporate capture is to be 
understood in this view, i.e., according to the balance of forces shaping and determining state 
initiatives and accumulation strategies, where MNCs and allied forces are able to advance their 
interests over other actors, then, there is a need to explore how and why—or through which 
mechanisms—MNCs and their allied forces are able to strategically advance their interests over 
other forces to the point of capturing the institutional capacity of the state. 
Departing from the assumption that MNCs have structural advantages over other actors 
like state managers, SMES, local business communities, and the working class, among others in 
the balance of forces behind state initiatives and strategies, this research will explore four main 
mechanisms: state managers’ self-interest in power, prestige and a healthy economy; specific 
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techniques used to advance their interests; the emergence of a transnational class and inward 
investment regimes; and cultural hegemony. 
Fred Block (1987) develops an interesting analysis of the rationalization of capitalist 
system in which state managers are seen as a distinct class. According to the author, there are 
two subsidiary mechanisms and one fundamental mechanism that influence the state to privilege 
individual capitalists such as MNCs. The fundamental mechanism resides in state managers’ 
self-interest in maintaining their power. For the author, in order for state managers to maximize 
and maintain their own power, prestige, and wealth, they depend on the existence of a healthy 
economy, given that a state’s capacity to finance itself through taxation or financing is based on 
its economic levels. When the economy is not doing well, capitalists are led to decrease their 
investments, states tend to have a lower tax income, resulting in state managers having 
difficulties to behave effectively and successfully, and ultimately in a decline in business 
confidence. In this scenario, state managers’ public support can decline, and may result in state 
managers being removed from their jobs, or not being re-elected (Block 1987; Rooksby 2010). 
Therefore, in general, state managers and MNCs have converging interests, resulting in MNCs 
having advantages over other actors such as labor in the formulation of state policy (Hirsch 
2010). State managers will likely favor segments of capital that can generate more tax income 
and/or jobs than others perceived to produce less. This is even more important as capital has 
become more internationally mobile and can play off different locations against each other. 
In this context, state managers—where inward investment strategies prevail and where 
states are highly dependent on FDIs/MNCs,—tend to pursue policies and initiatives that will 
assure investment in their localities, meeting as much as possible the interest of MNCs, even if it 
means having their institutional capacities captured. As Phelps and Wood (2006) claim, the 
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interests of states and MNCs have become more and more mutual and coincident, transcending 
the separation between public and private sectors. State managers move backwards and forward 
between the public and private sector further blurring the two spheres (Phelps & Wood 2006). 
State managers will be interested in not only having attractive assets, but they will also be 
willing to develop policies that meet the needs of MNCs in order to increase business 
confidence, easing and encouraging investments (Block 1987; Przeworski & Wallerstein 1988). 
So, MNCs are not only able to capture existing institutional capacities, but they are also able to 
capture institutional capacities in-the-making. MNCs propose, elaborate and demand state 
initiatives that do not exist, and which still require institutionalization. This is because individual 
capitalists base their decisions not only on fixed assets such as infrastructure, but also on their 
evaluation of the general political/economic climate—such as stability, control of the working 
class, taxes, business freedom, growth estimations, potential opportunities and constraints, etc. 
(Block 1987; Rooksby 2010). Therefore, the power of states when bargaining with MNCs does 
not only reside in the existence of specific or distinct regional assets, as GPNs scholars would 
argue. It also exists in relation to its trustworthiness, flexibility, fluidity, and the willingness of 
state managers to meet present and future MNCs’ interests by changing, adapting, and 
innovating their institutional capacities and arrangements as well as by intervening in their 
locality in order to create new assets. 
Such a view that state managers act according to their self-interest in power, prestige, and 
wealth has been backed by other scholars. Studies have shown that state managers, who seek to 
keep their power and jobs, are more motivated in attracting inward investments than growing 
their own industries and supporting SMEs because it creates a local buzz that brings fast name 
recognition, calling public attention (Wolman & Spitzley 1996; Markusen & Nesse 2007). 
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Moreover, state managers want to appear proactive in economic development. This is because 
they are concerned that denying deals to FDIs will provide reasons for their political opponents 
to contest their work in future elections and may give the region a bad reputation among site 
consultants (Reid & Gatrell 2003; Wolman 1988; Markusen & Nesse 2007). 
The other two subsidiary mechanisms refer to how MNCs are able to directly influence 
the state, fostering their interests. These mechanisms are also able to explain how and why 
processes of corporate capture may happen (Block 1987; Rooksby 2010). The first subsidiary 
mechanism is related to how individual capitalists pursue their interests through various means 
such as campaign contributions, lobbying activities, and favors to state managers. Such 
techniques increase the receptivity of state managers to capitalists’ interests and goals (Block 
1987).  
Academics have demonstrated how the representation of firms’ interests to the state is 
unavoidably uneven. Firms depend on their capacity and resources to represent themselves to 
others and especially to the state (Rutherford 2006), where major inward investors have more 
opportunities and representativeness to influence politicians than SMEs or the local community 
businesses. Small firms lack representation to push their agendas, and do not have the same 
access to state representatives to shape or determine their actions and strategies as MNCs do; 
thus, MNCs have higher chances to influence the state and dominate its economic development 
strategies and initiatives (Phelps et al. 2005). 
Moreover, individual capitalists are able to influence state managers through informal 
mechanisms such as forums or committees, clubs, and meetings outside the workplace (Phelps et 
al. 2005). Through such means, individual capitalists such as MNCs are able to apply pressure on 
 
 
 55 
 
the state for certain kinds of bargain, for certain kinds of incentives and actions, investments, 
training initiatives, strategies, and attitudes towards workers, among others. 
Nevertheless, such a receptivity goes beyond these actions. The existence of a 
transnational class as well as subnational inward regimes have become an important factor in this 
matter (Sklair 2002; Phelps & Wood 2006). The term transnational class refers to globalizing 
professionals, state managers such as bureaucrats and politicians in different spheres of the 
state16, non-state actors like merchants, the media, representatives of private or not-for-profit 
organizations, site consultants, and those that control and own MNCs. These actors see one 
another as allies, have similar beliefs, and are willing to meet the interests of MNCs (Sklair 
2002). 
In this regard, as Jessop (2007) and Poulantzas (1978) would point out, the state has 
certain subdivisions that tend to favor particular forces like MNCs while other branches might 
have a close proximity with other forces such as representatives of different businesses, or the 
working class, among others. MNCs and their allied forces encounter great receptivity and work 
closely with such state subdivisions and actors. 
In particular, the emergence of site consultants as a third party in bargaining events 
between firms and states and in such local inward regimes is a key element to understand why 
states provide great amounts of incentives and subsidies, or why processes of capture may 
happen. These site consultant firms behave as brokers and have been able to foster better deals 
for MNCs, enhancing the rate of return for their clients (Thomas 2000; Markusen & Nesse 2007; 
Phelps & Wood 2006). As site consultants work for MNCs and for regions, they acquire 
 
16 Although, in any case, state managers who sympathize with a specific force, interpret their demands and interests in terms of a 
particular ideology – that of the ‘neutral state’ (Poulantzas 1978). State managers do not look at policies from a perspective of the 
ruling class, but from the perspective of state managers (Block 1987). 
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knowledge about firms’ priorities—that state managers do not have—as well as about 
governments’ fiscal situation and economic development strategies. The problem is that site 
consultants earn their fees on a commission basis, where the higher the subsidy package and tax 
break, the higher their commission. In this sense, site consultants will explore such information 
asymmetries in order to get the best deal for MNCs, given that they have parallel interests. Yet, 
site consultants are seen by state managers as gatekeepers to jobs (Reid & Gatrell 2003; Wolman 
1988; LeRoy 2005; Markusen & Nesse 2007). 
Finally, the other subsidiary mechanism through which individual capitalists directly 
influence the state is linked to cultural hegemony. Individual capitalists such as MNCs use the 
media and organizations to strategically foster their interests and to push state managers to accept 
unwritten rules about what are legitimate state activities (Block 1987). Wood (2003) states that 
institutions, practices, political and economic actors have been mobilized to reproduce a material 
and discursive terrain that idolizes inward investors and advances their hegemony as a route to 
economic salvation (Wood 2003). This is critical in shaping state managers’ perceptions of “best 
practices” regarding how to attract and how much incentives to provide to FDIs as well as of the 
public. As Rutherford et al. (2018) revealed, part of the process of attracting FDI is to secure 
political legitimacy and consent, or more specifically, to draw in workers and the public into 
viewing the attraction of FDIs also as being of their interests, for example, due to the generation 
of jobs.  
In this respect, MNCs and organizations related to inward investments have fostered the 
establishment and institutionalization of practices that push states to accept ideas, unwritten 
rules, conducts, and norms regarding bargaining events, inward investments, and inward 
strategies (Phelps and Wood 2006). States have been educated by such corporations and 
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organizations through several initiatives such as “business climate” rankings of regions, 
conferences regarding inward investments and strategies, magazines like the “Corporate 
Location and Site Selection”, and organizations such as the World Association of Investment 
Promotion that exhibit why certain regions are more successful than others in attracting 
investments due to their regional assets and initiatives, way of functioning, etc. (Raines 2003; 
LeRoy 2005; Markusen & Nesse 2007). Such practices are not particular of one country like the 
US but have also disseminated to many countries (Raines 2003). As Peck and Theodore (2015) 
argue, due to the deepening of transnational interconnectedness among countries, policy 
practices often exist in relation to near and far relatives, meaning that models of policy, such as 
of FDI attraction, are often imported from “successful regions” and adapted in other contexts, 
thus having many resemblances. 
Such discursive construction also influences state managers’ perception of what is too 
much in terms of giving MNCs incentives and subsidies. State managers’ perception in terms of 
initiatives to attract inward investments relies mainly on the technical knowledge derived from 
site consultants and bargaining outcomes of other regions (Lee 2011; Markusen & Nesse 2007). 
For example, MNCs require states participating in bargaining processes with them to maintain all 
the negotiations in secret (LeRoy 2005). As pointed out before, MNCs have more control over 
the flow of information when negotiating with governments, and act opportunistically, taking 
advantage of this aspect (Phelps 2008).  
Researchers have demonstrated that state managers rarely have precise information 
regarding investors’ real intentions, and that firms are able to inflate the number of jobs and 
benefits they plan to bring to regions, and require confidentially over the bargaining process 
(Weber 2002; Bachelor 1997; Markusen & Nesse 2007). As Phelps and Wood (2006) reveal, 
 
 
 58 
 
local political coalitions spread and disseminate such practices and ideologies, given that such 
actors adopt a process of modelling to attract inward investment. 
MNCs, through the media, stress the supposedly grandiose benefits of their investments 
to the region, seeking to capture the regional popular perception and to legitimize the deal, while 
compelling states to maintain in secret, the public investments required for it (Phelps & Wood 
2006; Block 1987). All these initiatives and material as well as discursive constructions have 
resulted in inward investment strategies to become hegemonic in many countries and regions, 
where MNCs are privileged over other forces (Wood 2003). 
Nonetheless, state managers establish economic development strategies and plans that 
legally approach all firms as equals despite their sizes. In general, subnational and local states 
base and justify their initiatives, incentives, subsidies, and strategies to attract and retain firms to 
their regions on a legal system that specifies the incentives that are given to firms according to 
the compensation that they will bring in number of jobs and/or size of investments. So, corporate 
capture is not always so apparent in regions’ economic development strategies and plans. In 
other words, as Phelps (2008) noticed, regional strategies and plans of economic development 
may not explicitly place MNCs at their center, dominating their goals and interests. This is 
related to how states are also dependent on other actors, having multiple goals. 
State managers even approve economic development strategies that explicitly favor 
smaller firms (Dewar 1998; Luger & Bae 2005; Wolman & Spitzley 1996). However, in reality, 
when MNCs bargain with regions, such legal systems are ignored by state managers, where 
incentives are bargained in secret and greatly exceed the amounts legally established in the 
economic development plans of these localities (LeRoy 2005; Markusen & Nesse 2007). State 
derivation debate scholars as well as Poulantzas (1977) have demonstrated how—due to class 
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struggles—capitalism requires the existence of a juridical form that embodies the principle of 
generality or universality of law and equality of subjects. Nevertheless, it does so under the false 
ideology that all individuals, such as capitalists and the working class, are equals and have the 
same rights under the law. (Poulantzas 1978; Clarke 1991; Hirsch 2010). In processes of 
corporate capture, where MNCs interact with the state, this false ideology is revealed, given that 
some forces are privileged. Therefore, in processes of corporate capture, the bargaining events 
between states and MNCs in general are guided by a special institutional system that circumvents 
and works in parallel to a more general one.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, this research sought to analyze not only the concept of corporate capture 
but also how mainstream literature has explained the relationship between the state, MNCs, and 
the evolution of processes of corporate capture in regional training systems. In this regard, two 
bodies of literature were critically examined: FDI studies and the GPN literature. I argued that 
although both literatures provide interesting explanations, their rationalizations 
are too descriptive, overlooking the underlying causes of processes of corporate capture, and 
have a problematic approach to state, neglecting for example issues of scale—more specifically 
state subnational variations—and class relations.  
In the second part, I proceed then to reveal how the variegated capitalism literature, along 
with Jessop’s strategic relational approach, and theories regarding the structural dependence of 
the state on capital can tackle these issues. Corporate capture, I revealed, is not just due to a lack 
of distinct assets, or low levels of public institutional coordination as the FDI studies or the GPN 
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literature would argue but are also due to structural and intrinsic features of the capitalist state, 
and thus, part of broader social relations.  
My main argument was that the evolution of corporate capture can take place at different 
state scales and should be understood according to a twofold dynamic: how the 
strategic selective institutional context of national and/or subnational states privileges MNCs, 
and how MNCs have structural advantages over the state to advance their interests. To 
demonstrate how MNCs have structural advantages over the state, this research examined four 
main mechanisms: state managers’ self-interest in power, prestige and a healthy economy; 
specific techniques used to advance their interests; the emergence of a transnational class and 
inward investment regimes; and cultural hegemony. 
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Chapter 3: Local Labor Market Governance and Tendencies to Corporate Capture 
This chapter will examine whether different forms of local governance reinforce or 
minimize processes of corporate capture in regional workforce development systems. Focus will 
be given to processes of corporate capture in regard to public training initiatives. It would be 
insufficient to understand the evolution of corporate capture only by examining the state and its 
relationship to firms. Researchers have in the last decades revealed how local governments have 
shifted towards local forms of governance, where other actors have gained centrality in policy 
design and public decisions (Lovering 2011; Florida & Jonas 1991; Peck & Tickell 1992; Painter 
& Goodwin 1995). This chapter will be divided in four main parts. 
In the first part (subsections 3.1 to 3.1.3), I establish my approach to and understanding 
of labor, labor market, and to what is termed regional training systems. This is crucial, given that 
the goal of this chapter is to analyze whether local forms of governance reinforce or minimize 
corporate capture in training initiatives. To do so, I start with a critique of the GPN approach to 
workforce development systems, demonstrating how it is problematically based on market 
relations, and thus insufficient to analyze corporate capture. I then theorize the concept of 
regional training systems, which I believe provides a better explanation of why regional training 
systems exist including their main characteristics and how they function. 
In the second part (subsections 3.2 to 3.2.2), the concept of local market governance is 
explored and its main connection to regional training systems revealed. Local forms of 
governance are examined and presented as crucial in regard to how regional training systems are 
established, function, and are shaped. Then, I move to the third part (section 3.3) to argue that the 
capacity of local forms of governance to reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture of 
regional training systems has to be understood primarily according to its state form, 
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accumulation strategy, and type of state selectivity. I also argue that even in regions where their 
forms of governance tend to minimize processes of corporate capture, MNCs are still able to 
partially capture the institutional capacity of regional training systems due to their economic and 
political power, but in different forms and degrees. 
Finally, in the fourth part (subsection 3.4), I conclude this chapter by demonstrating how 
conceptualizing workforce development programs and initiatives as regional training systems, 
prompts this research to rethink the concept of corporate capture. In this part, I provide a 
reconceptualization of what should be understood as corporate capture in regional training 
systems, exploring in detail the characteristics of corporate capture related to training initiatives 
and to class. 
 
3.1 Global Production Networks, Labor, and Regional Training Systems 
As this research discussed in the second chapter, the GPN literature was initially 
concerned with analyzing the dynamics and relationships between firms and their upgrading 
processes (e.g. Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; Coe et al. 2004). However, in the last decade, there 
has been a significant emergence of studies regarding the relationship between labor and GPNs. 
Currently, the main GPN literature on labor studies has focused on three main topics. The first 
topic treats labor as an object and is concerned with how processes of upgrading in GPN firms 
affect labor (Smith et al. 2018; Bair & Werner 2015; Coe 2015). For example, academics have 
analyzed how upgrading in different countries results in improvements of the labor force in terms 
of wages, work safety, etc. (see Lee 2016). 
In the second topic, researchers approach labor as an agent, and consider how the labor 
process—its form and content—is constitutive of GPNs. In this case, studies have demonstrated 
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how workers can foster collective actions to pursue an increase in their share of surplus (Bair & 
Werner 2015; Coe 2015; Smith et al. 2018). Social upgrading has been explored as being a 
consequence of workers’ collective organization, and not only as top-down firms’ processes of 
upgrading as in the first topic (Bair & Werner 2015; Selwyn 2011; Coe 2015).  
One important aspect of this literature stream is that labor and processes of social 
upgrading or downgrading—when working conditions and wages are degraded—cannot be not 
solely understood according to the GPN dynamics, or the networks that workers are part. For 
example, as if the formation of a secondary labor force based on temporary, low-paid immigrants 
and women workers was only due to buyers’ demands in the supply chain (Bair & Werner 2015). 
As an alternative, academics have incorporated in their analyses the broader social relations 
shaping the conditions under which labor is able to be exploited, or to take collective action 
(Smith et al. 2018; Bair & Werner 2015; Coe 2015). Thus, studies have demonstrated how tight 
labor markets, national and regional labor regulations, political conjunctures, everyday practices, 
and struggles, among others can play a crucial role in labors’ agency and social up/downgrading 
processes (Bair & Werner 2015; Coe 2015; Smith et al. 2018; see Baglioni 2017; Azmeh 2014). 
One concept that has been explored in this topic is labor control regimes (Smith et al. 
2018; Baglioni 2017; Coe 2015; Azmeh 2014). In this regard, researchers have analyzed how 
different actors, intersecting in GPNs dynamics, shape local labor control regimes in order to 
exploit and discipline workers through different forms, such as employing informal practices, 
fostering gender and nationality segmentation and subordination, among others. Forms of 
workers’ resistance have also been explored. In this regard, researchers have moved beyond the 
workplace to show how production in firms inserted in GPNs functions and depends on broader 
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spaces of labor control, with which the spheres of production and reproduction are intersected 
(see Baglioni 2017; Smith et al. 2018; Azmeh 2014). 
The third topic, which this research seeks to engage with, has also been marked by 
scholars addressing labor as an object. GVC theorists have analyzed how processes of structural 
and strategic coupling as well as firms’ upgrading trajectories in GVCs are followed by changes 
in skills and workforce initiatives. In other words, how structural/strategic coupling and different 
stages of firms’ upgrading processes demand different types of skills, and thus, workforce 
development initiatives. Scholars have also been interested in understanding the role that 
workforce development systems play in the insertion of underdeveloped countries in GPNs 
(Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2016; De Vries et al. 2016; Chin & Liu 2014). 
For example, Fernandez-Stark et al. (2011) analyzed how Chilean firms inserted at the 
entry-level of the chain of the global fruit and vegetable industry—producers that grow fruits and 
vegetables—are marked by an unskilled labor force, which does not require training or related 
training programs. However, when firms upgrade from producing to packing, storage, and/or 
processing (making juices for example), then they require a skilled labor force with formal 
education and training, and thus, workforce development initiatives and programs.  
In this respect, the GVC approach to workforce development consists of describing how 
firms evolve through different stages of upgrading, requiring at each stage different skills and 
consequently workforce development programs and initiatives (see Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 
2016; Vries et al. 2016; Chin and Liu 2014; Psilos & Gereffi 2011; Fernandez-Stark et al. 2011; 
Christian et al. 2011; Gereffi et al. 2011). Focus is placed on how state policies can generate a 
sufficient skilled labor force for firms, and the existence of a labor force is explained by market 
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forces of supply and demand, ignoring how the labor force was established originally (Selwyn 
2016). Diagram 2 summarizes the GVC approach to workforce development. 
 
Diagram 2. Workforce Development Scheme Developed by the GVC Literature. 
 
Source: Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2016; Vries et al. 2016; Fernandez-Stark et al. 2011. 
 
In this regard, the GVC approaches to workforce development systems, as Selwyn (2016) 
points out, overlook the existence and formation of an exploitable working class, which are 
normally established and disciplined by state actions (Selwyn 2016). As Gutelius (2016) argues 
“the presence of a desired labor pool and the terms of inclusion for workers have been taken for 
granted” (Gutelius 2016, 42). In other words, the labor market is approached without any 
consideration to how it is socially constructed and reproduced in the form of an asset.  Thus, 
GPN scholars have given attention to labor agency in networks, but the labor market and its 
production has been largely under-explored (Gutelius 2016; Coe 2015; Bair & Werner 2015).  
Even studies which treat labor as having agency and consider other external conjunctural 
factors besides the GPN network, have overlooked the fact that social upgrading in certain 
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industry sectors involves and requires uneven workforce development practices. Practices that 
are marked by class-based and segmented training systems, in which the best training courses 
and consequently the best job positions are mostly accessible to the elite. Therefore, how can one 
approach and analyze the relationship between GPNs, the labor market, and workforce 
development programs and initiatives, moving beyond market relations? That is the task of the 
next section.  
 
3.1.1 Labor, Labor Control Regimes, and Regional Training Systems 
In this section, this research will draw from labor geography, and FDI studies in order to 
explore the concepts of labor, labor control regimes, and regional training systems. My main 
goal is to demonstrate how regions are based on segmented and class-based training systems, 
which are required in order to commodify, discipline, and develop an employable and 
exploitable workforce as well as to serve as assets to recruit and retain businesses. This will be 
an attempt to break with GPN conceptualizations of workforce development initiatives based on 
market relations. To do so, this section will be divided in two sub-sections. First, I conceptualize 
my understanding of labor, and the labor market. Second, I will develop the concept of regional 
training systems. 
 
3.1.2 Labor and the Labor Market 
This research, influenced by institutionalists and neo-Marxist approaches, departs from 
the assumption that labor should not be understood as a simple commodity, given that it does not 
behave as one in the market as orthodox liberal economists would claim, but rather as a fictitious 
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commodity (Polanyi 1957). In this regard, the market seeks to subordinate and discipline labor as 
if it was a mere commodity, but it is not capable of doing so for several reasons.  
First, different from any other commodity, labor supply is independent from demand, 
being a product of extra-market processes such as demographic and socio-economic processes 
and institutional rules of human reproductive activity. Second, market recognition of acquired 
human skills cannot be the sole factor to explain the allocation of labor. This is because certain 
social groups are in disadvantage in the labor market despite their achieved skills. Third, a 
balance between consent and control in the workplace is not only due to a matter of wages, but 
also due to the existence of constant negotiations. Fourth, the sphere of social reproduction is an 
important part of the labor market and processes of production, where the supply of labor is not 
regulated only by wages (Peck 1996).  
The main point in this regard is that labor markets are not self-regulated by the market 
according to the demand and supply of workers as if labor was just another commodity. Labor 
markets result from the interplay of supply-demand as well as ideological, cultural and political 
forces in opposition to the neoclassical view that education, training and workers’ formation in 
general function via market clearing (Storper & Walker 1989). But these are not the only reasons 
that require labor to be regulated through ideological, cultural, and political forces.  
As Jonas (1996) revealed, the need for labor and the labor market to be regulated also 
resides in contradictory aspects of capitalism. Due to capitalists’ need to increase their surplus 
value by exploiting workers in a global exchange of labor power, there is a social need for capital 
to foster reciprocities between places of production/consumption and labor reproduction in local 
labor markets (Kelly 2002; Baglioni 2017, Jonas 1996). This means that to ensure capital 
accumulation, capitalists have to develop place-based initiatives that encourage the participation 
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of workers in production, and that influences the conditions under which labor power is 
reproduced and integrated into the labor process (Kelly 2002; Baglioni 2017, Jonas 1996). 
These place-based initiatives are needed because, while capitalists have potential power 
to control labor at the level of production, they do not have control over workers’ consumption 
or labor reproduction (Kelly 2002). Therefore, capitalists seek to influence the conditions under 
which workers enter the labor market (Mackinnon 2017; Jonas 1996). To foster such local labor 
markets reciprocities between production, consumption, and reproduction, local states develop 
what Jonas (1996) has termed “local labor control regimes”. Such local labor control regimes 
emerge in periods of crisis, not through the market but as part of an institutional fix, and allow 
struggles to periodically go through periods of social and economic stability, and thus, ensure the 
conditions for capital accumulation (Kelly 2002; Baglioni 2017, Jonas 1996). 
A labor control regime is understood as a historical, cultural and spatial process that (1) 
smooths the transition of labor from labor market to the site of production, (2) reproduces 
productive labor, (3) coordinates conditions of pay and consumption, (4) and facilitates 
conditions of accumulation (Jonas 1996). Social divisions of consumption and reproduction are 
important in this framework and are marked by patterns of segmentation and territorial 
segregation based on income, race, ethnicity, and gender (Coe & Kelly 2006; Baglioni 2017, 
Jonas 1996). In this context, workers also have an important role in shaping local labor control 
regimes, where resistance takes place not only at the workplace, but also through consumption 
and reproduction. For example, threats to consumption can make labor struggle in production 
(Jonas 1996). 
One important feature in this framework is that strategies and discourses are understood 
to play a crucial role in reproducing the local labor market (Coe & Kelly 2006). Business in this 
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regard get involved with local players in order to foster their initiatives. Fractions of capital that 
are not so mobile are interested in developing labor market conditions through strategies of local 
involvement while mobile factions seek to transform labor conditions, co-opt resistance, and 
smooth the process of spatial restructuring (Jonas 1996; Coe & Kelly 2002). 
As stated before, GPN scholars have recently engaged with this framework to analyze 
labor (Smith et al. 2018; Baglioni 2017; Coe 2015; Azmeh 2014; Coe & Kelly 2002). However, 
focus has been placed on the intersection between GPN firms’ employment practices and 
workers’ gender and immigrant status as well as household and informal dynamics17. Even 
though Jonas (1996) does stress in his labor control regime framework that education and 
training are important elements in the reproduction of workers, the “making” of the labor force—
i.e. workforce development programs and initiatives—has so far been largely ignored in GPN 
studies. 
In this regard, in the next sub-section, this research will further explore how regional 
training systems are important place-based assemblages—part of labor control regimes—where 
segmented and class-based training programs and initiatives are established and shaped in order 
to commodify, discipline and develop an employable and exploitable workforce and to serve as 
assets to recruit and retain businesses. 
 
3.1.3 Regional Training Systems and the Commodification, Disciplining, and Development 
 
17 For example, Smith et al. (2018) analyzed how the competitive strategies of clothing lead firms to influence its supply chain in 
Moldova, and consequently, its labor control regime. According to the authors, clothing lead firms in Europe have based their 
activities on contracts that establish the prices, quantities, and a fast-speed delivery time of production. Such a strategy has 
limited the profit of its suppliers, encouraging Moldovan suppliers to foster a labor regime where employers pay low wages based 
on piece rate norms and bonus payments, employ informal payment practices, and where social reproduction can only be secured 
by working overtime. In this labor regime, workers’ resistance, although present in workers migrating to other countries, is 
limited due to a lack of labor representation in the clothing sector, and a national state committed to liberal practices and to 
employers’ associations (Smith et al. 2018; see Baglioni 2017; Azmeh 2014).  
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of Workers 
Several scholars have demonstrated that the labor market and training capacities of 
regions are a crucial asset to attract and retain firms, and thus, to determine where they are 
located (Coe 2015; Ron 2010; Christopherson & Clark 2009). However, as revealed in sub-
section 3.1, GPN studies have lacked a more nuanced approach concerning how the production 
of workers’ skills intersect with GPN firms. In this regard, in this section, after presenting and 
critiquing VoC studies of skill formation systems, this study will theorize the notion of regional 
training systems. 
One important stream of the varieties of capitalism literature concerns its analysis to how 
different forms of national economies are marked by different types and education practices. As 
demonstrated in chapter two, the VoC literature categorizes models of capitalism according to 
specific dimensions of which education is one18. One of the main critiques to the VoC approach 
was that the differentiation between education types and practices in liberal and coordinated 
countries was based on a very broad category of general versus specific skill systems, and thus, 
failed to account how the same models of national economies can have different types of skill 
regimes. For example, how such skill regimes vary among coordinated market economies 
(Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012; Thelen and Busemeyer 2012). More recent accounts of VoC 
scholars have sought to advance such analysis, which has been termed “skill formation systems” 
(Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012; Thelen and Busemeyer 2012). 
According to the VoC literature, the skills formation systems of national economies are 
 
18 For example, according to Hall and Soskice (2001) educational institutions in liberal market economies such as the US are 
marked by general skills (general education) that are complemented with on-the-job-training in the firm. Coordinated market 
economies such as Germany are marked by educational institutions that foster more specific skills (vocational training) due to its 
vocational schools combined with workplace-based training (Hall and Soskice 2001; Emmenegger and Seitzl 2018; Busemeyer 
and Trampusch 2012).  
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designed and established according to the political struggles that take place in four main political 
arenas: (1) The balance of power and interests among different fractions of capital, where some 
sectors and firms have more power to influence educational and training reforms than others. (2) 
The political power of trade unions and their consequent influence over political and industrial 
relations, as well as, their potential preference for certain types of training such as school-based 
training or apprenticeships. (3) The balance of power between labor and business. Employers 
seek a high level of autonomy in the provision and implementation of training, so they can invest 
in firm-specific skills as well as influence training institutions to do so, while workers and their 
representatives seek to have investments in transferable and polyvalent skills with certification, 
skills that can be employed in other firms. (4) The dynamic of state structure such as in 
federalism and its consequent partisan competition (US for example has a two-party system), and 
engagement with certain fractions of capital and/or labor (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011). 
Such political struggles influence and determine (1) who will provide skills; (2) who will 
finance training; (3) the level of firm autonomy in training and the degree of public oversight in 
the firm training process/content; and (4) the degree of connection between vocational training 
and the general education system. The results are also dependent on the current existing juncture, 
such as neoliberalization, which puts countries on certain trajectories in terms of their skills 
formation systems (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011). VoC scholars have identified several skill 
formation systems such as liberal, segmentalist, collective, and statist, which are summarized in 
the table below. 
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Table 3. Skills Formation Systems and their Main Characteristics 
Liberal In liberal skill formation systems in countries like the US, the market provides 
skill formation in the general education system. In this case, the general 
education system delivers generic educational qualifications to individuals that 
are often accompanied with internships, summer jobs during training, and 
finally more specific on-the-job training. Vocational tracks at high schools are 
considered less important in contrast to preparation for college admission. In 
general, vocational skills are disconnected from high schools, being mainly 
provided by vocational colleges, which demand students to pay tuition and do 
not have a strong institutional linkage to the labor market.  
Segmentalist The difference to the liberal skill regime is that the willingness of firms to 
invest in the formation of their employees’ skills is much higher. A sizable 
share of a typical youth age cohort enters the internal labor markets of large 
firms immediately after leaving the general school system and subsequently 
undergoes an intensive process of skill formation that entails job rotation 
schemes and off-the-job training courses in in-house training centers and 
vocational schools. Japan is a prominent case of a segmentalist skill formation 
regime. 
Statist In contrast to both the liberal and the segmentalist skill regimes, public 
policymakers are much more committed to supporting vocational and 
educational training as a viable alternative to academic higher education in 
order to promote the integration of young people with weak academic 
qualifications into education and employment. Vocational and educational 
training is fully integrated into the general education system, which allows and 
encourages people with vocational qualifications to pursue tertiary education. 
As a corollary, the involvement of employers in the process of skill formation 
is very limited. The statist skill formation system is best exemplified by the 
Swedish or French educational system. 
Collective They are characterized by a strong commitment of both the state and firms to 
invest in the formation of vocational skills. It combines strong involvement of 
firms in training and high public commitment of the state to support vocational 
training. This skill formation system is best exemplified by countries such as 
Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and Austria. 
Source: Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011, 13-14. 
 
Studies of skill formation systems have some major issues despite developing an 
interesting approach to the relationship between different forms of national economies and 
vocational and educational training. First, similar to the VoC approach to models of national 
economies (Hall and Soskice 2001), studies of skill formation systems tend to conceptualize their 
skill models based on levels of market relations. Such a categorization, as the VC scholars have 
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demonstrated, is problematic (Jessop 2014). For example, liberal market economies are 
characterized as marked by a skill formation system, where the market delivers skill formation 
through the general education system. However, markets require social, institutional, and 
political structures to work properly (Peck & Theodore 2007), and this is not different for 
education. The production and consequent delivery of workers’ skills are not decided based only 
on market relations, but they also involve ideological, cultural, and political forces, as this study 
demonstrated in the last section, including strong state intervention. 
Furthermore, such categorizations are limited and enclosed, explaining the formation and 
the changes in skill formation systems based on the national internal relationships among firms 
and their representatives, unions, and the state. Such a literature neglects the fact that national 
economies and their skill formation systems are not isolated, but part of an ecology of variegated 
forms of capitalism, which are integrated in a world market (Jessop 2012). This global 
integration has important effects on vocational and educational training, and therefore, on the 
formation, shaping, and ongoing transformations of skill formation systems, and regional 
training systems. Non-liberal skill formation systems such as the collective skill formation 
system have converged towards the market due to the ecological dominance of neoliberalism 
over educational policies and initiatives (Jessop 2014; Lakes & Carter 2009; Thelen & 
Busemeyer 2012; Emmenegger & Seitzl 2018). Neoliberalism as the dominant world hegemonic 
project influences the formation and transformation of training systems in particular ways, where 
there is a need to consider the existing commonalities and differences across space, as Peck and 
Theodore (2007) have demonstrated in their critique to the VoC literature. 
Second, researchers have overlooked the internal variation in skill formation systems 
within national models (see Emmenegger & Seitzl 2018; Busemeyer & Trampusch 2012; Thelen 
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& Busemeyer 2012). Such a categorization is problematic because it is based on a high level of 
generalization, which disregards the important ways that subnational states can deviate from 
their national skill formation system model. Third, the skill formation systems approach is 
indifferent to class relations, and to issues of uneven development (Streeck 2012). In this regard, 
there is a need to understand how such skill formation systems play a role as important 
mechanisms to the uneven reproduction of capital. 
To address the problematics above discussed, in the next section, this research will 
develop an approach based on the concept of regional training systems. This approach will go 
beyond the goal of simply identifying and comparing how different national economies have 
different skill formation systems in terms of training and skill types. To do so, first, this research 
will explore the concept of local forms of governance, and how it influences and shapes regional 
training systems. Second, this research will analyze the main features of regional training 
systems. I will engage with theories of uneven development, regulationist approaches to 
accumulation and regulation at the regional scale, and critical pedagogy studies.  
 
3.2 Local Governance, Regional Training Systems, and Uneven Development 
In today’s economy, the processes of production have become highly complex, requiring 
in many job-positions a high skilled labor force that can only be prepared through years of 
formal studies (Busemeyer & Trampusch 2012). More and more, employers manifest their 
discontent regarding how the labor market has not met their skill needs, pushing the public 
agenda to meet their demands (Cappelli 2015). 
In the last decades, local forms of governance have emerged, playing a crucial role in 
how regional training systems are established and transformed. In this regard, labor market 
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governance studies have demonstrated how training systems cannot be understood solely as the 
result of domestic firms’ and workers’ representatives, and the state at the national scale. Such an 
approach pays greater attention to the subnational scale, firms’ strategies and/or interests—be it 
single firms or their representatives—, states and their accumulation strategies, and other actors 
such as educational institutions, among other. Outcomes are understood according to the 
differential and hierarchical power relations among actors in governance forms, or their balance 
of forces, as some scholars of the skill formation systems approach claimed (see Busemeyer & 
Trampusch 2012). 
Different forms of governance started to emergence during the late Fordist period, when 
there was a public disenchantment with government performance due to the world economic 
crisis and fiscal pressures, which led governments to have budget deficits (Lovering 2011; 
Painter & Goodwin 1995). In this neoliberal context, private actors started to participate in 
regional planning decisions that before were exclusively public (Peck & Tickell 1992; Masson-
Vincent 2008). As such, regions become quasi-individuals forced to find their own ways to 
development, where many actors such as governments, academics, consultants, private 
entrepreneurs and lobbyists, among others, started to work collectively to develop suggestions 
about how local policies might be better elaborated (Lovering 2011; Painter & Goodwin 1995).  
Mainstream literature has regarded and theorized local forms of governance as collective 
modes of coordination, where the relationships of governance actors are predominantly marked 
by trust and reciprocity, shared power and interests, and as having a strong autonomy from the 
state (Blanco 2015). However, some studies have called our attention to the divergent and 
contradictory sides of such relationships, which are often characterized by strong state 
intervention and hierarchical power relations (Davies 2011, 2014, 2015; Davies & Spicer 2015; 
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Blanco 2015). Davies (2011, 2014) for example, claims that governance practices are in general 
part of the hegemonic neoliberal ideology as well as part of local ideological hegemonic blocs 
seeking to legitimize and justify their actions through network ideology. 
In this regard, this research adopts the concept of “regional service class”, which 
approaches governance as mechanisms through which fractions of capital—normally represented 
by a few powerful local firms—present and foster their interests, and are supported by the 
creation of new regional institutions, programs, networks, and associations (Lovering 2011). For 
Lovering (2011), such fractions of capital are generally unrepresentative of their regions and rely 
heavily on state intervention.  
Such an approach, although giving importance to fractions of capital in directing 
governance actions, also acknowledges that other actors such as state managers, educational 
institutions, and not-for-profit organizations have a crucial role in such mechanisms, being able 
to present and foster their interests (Lovering 2011). Under this view, governance is also 
understood as an important instrument in the construction of new imaginaries around regional 
identities and plays an important role in the consolidation of a professionalized political class, 
and of policies intended to persuade the local public rather than represent it (Lovering 2011).  
One issue, however, is that the regional class approach, by emphasizing local fractions of 
capital, gives little attention to the role and interests of state managers and international actors, 
and to how regional governance is not isolated from other forms of governance at different 
scales. As this research stated in the last section, it is crucial to have an approach that considers 
how regional training systems are not only established and shaped according to national/internal 
dynamics as the skill formation systems’ approach has stressed. 
In this regard, first, it is important to acknowledge that state managers constitute a 
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distinct class (Block 1987), have their own interests, seek to develop their regions, and are 
increasingly more concerned with not only attracting firms to their places, but also with 
developing and employing their local workforce in opposition to businesses hiring out-of-state 
workers. Thus, state managers have a central role in local forms of governance. Second, local 
forms of governance, involved with FDI policies can behave as subnational territorial coalitions, 
which “translate the interests and ideologies of transnational capital and more local sets of 
interests and agents” (Woods & Phelps 2006, 494). More specifically, Phelps and Wood (2006) 
reveal how governance actors19 act as coordinating actors, or mediators, on behalf of inward 
investors with local actors. Such actors transmit and translate the material and ideological 
interests of MNCs’ agents to local institutions, facilitating their attraction to local states (Phelps 
& Wood 2006). Adding this component to the concept of regional class service, governance is 
interpreted not solely as representing the interests of local fractions of capital, but also as 
mediators or translators of transnational capitalists. 
 
3.2.1 Governance and the Establishment and Shaping of Regional Training Systems 
The implication of such a view is that this approach allows this research to understand the 
development of regional training systems according to the balance of forces and interests among 
actors such as the state, educational institutions, and capital at different scales such as 
international, national and local. In this regard, regional training systems are not only socially, 
but also spatially constituted (see Peck 1996). Training systems are territorially constituted and 
vary across space and time where particular forms of training practices are established, 
naturalized, and predominant. Such differences depend on several factors such as global 
 
19 Such actors vary from state managers, a transnational class, consultants, economic development and inward investment 
agencies, firms and their representatives to educational institutions, among others (Phelps & wood 2006). 
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production networks and regional fractions of capital that these regions are part of, the labor 
processes and internal training they adopt, their national skill formation system, and their state 
form and accumulation strategy, among others (see Schneider & Karcher 2010; Tregaskis & 
Almond 2017; Almond et al. 2014; Christopherson & Clark 2009; Phelps & Fuller 2001). 
Even though national formation systems are important to understand the functioning and 
characteristics of regional training systems, local governance dynamics can result in regional 
training systems greatly differing from their national formation systems. Schröder and Voelzkow 
(2016) demonstrated that although regional forms of governance have gained power in the last 
decades, they do not outplay national models of governance. In reality, national, sectoral, and 
regional forms of governance have to be understood as an outcome of their interplay, given that 
these forms interact and influence one another. For example, as firms in a world market search 
for regional economies that offer an optimal sectoral regulation to their activities, regional 
economies (with specific industrial clusters) have sought to offer an optimal regulation to their 
sectors in order to attract firms (Schröder & Voelzkow 2016). In this respect, regional forms of 
governance shape and are shaped by sectoral and national forms of regulation, where regions can 
deviate or conform to their national form of governance. Regional deviation of local forms of 
governance is common when the national forms of governance challenges the sector in which the 
region is specialized (Schröder & Voelzkow 2016). 
The same idea, this research believes, applies for regional training systems. Regional 
economies can be marked by fractions of capital, strong sectoral specialization such as industrial 
clusters, and by influential MNCs. Such features can demand regional training systems to deviate 
from their national skills formation system. For example, Tregaskis and Almond (2017) 
demonstrate how forms of governance are an important channel through which MNCs interact 
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and influence labor market skill actors, and attempt to at least partially take ownership of the 
resources of local labor markets. This can result in regional training systems drastically differing 
from their national skill formation system (see Schneider 2009). But it is important to notice that 
the levels of deviation are dependent on the degree of autonomy of states, where for example, 
variations can be more frequent in federalist states (Almond et al. 2004).  
Therefore, this research concurs with the skill formation literature, when scholars argue 
that some sectors and firms have more power to influence educational and training reforms than 
others, fostering some types of training (Busemeyer & Trampusch 2012). However, this study 
goes further to recognize that such power relations in local forms of governance are able to foster 
variations at the local level. 
As the skill formation literature demonstrated, the power relations at the national level 
will decide: (1) who will provide training; (2) who will finance training; (3) the level of firms’ 
autonomy (i.e., having internal training without any public supervision, or content requirements); 
(4) how much vocational training and the general education system will be integrated. Firms are 
interested in having educational institutions delivering firm-specific skills, and in having 
autonomy to internally train their workers without any state intervention, so they can also deliver 
highly firm-specific skills. In contrast, workers and their representatives seek to have 
investments in training that are transferable and with polyvalent skills with certification 
(Emmenegger & Seitzl 2018; Busemeyer & Trampusch 2012). But, how can one interpret, or 
understand this dynamic at the local level in regional training systems?  
At the local level, the power relations concerning regional training systems are mostly to 
decide: (1) which skills are provided; i.e. which programs, courses, training initiatives are 
established, offered, and/or expanded, and how curriculums are designed. The state as well as 
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workers are interested in having transferable skills that attend the business community in general, 
while single MNCs and fractions of capital are interested in fostering regional training systems 
that provides narrow specific types of skills that attend mostly their needs and reduces their 
costs. Educational institutions thus encounter themselves intersected in this twofold interest 
(Holborow 2012).  
The existence of regional training systems resides in the fact that education is a capitalist 
social form, whose goal is to produce a particular pseudo-commodity, labor power (Rikowski 
1995). In this way, the profits of educational institutions as well as the existence and functioning 
of workforce development programs, courses, and initiatives rely on their capacity to produce a 
labor power that meets the skill needs of employers, and thus, can be hired in the market 
(Slaughter & Rhoades 2010). Therefore, educational institutions, seeking to maximize their 
profits/success and to keep their own programs/initiatives’ functioning, are opened to attend to 
the interests of fractions of capital and single MNCs—through offering highly customized 
courses and designing their courses and curriculums around their interests—as well as to the 
interests of the local business community through generic types of training skills based on 
industry sectoral assessments. As long as MNCs are hiring the students attending customized and 
highly specific (skills) training initiatives, educational institutions can have their institutional 
capacity captured. 
Generic/customized skill provision is established and delivered according to how 
representatives of educational institutions access labor market needs, according to the power of 
actors to represent their needs in local forms of governance, and according to the form of the 
state and governance in which it takes place. As Phelps and Wood (2006) demonstrate, MNCs 
transmit their interests to state institutions in local forms of governance through a complex range 
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of actors at different scales, where local actors translate the interests of transnational capital, but 
still take in consideration their own (Phelps & Wood 2006). 
Such a specificity makes regional training systems to be characterized as dual training 
systems, which refers to how regions develop general workforce skills training practices 
(occupational skills) in conjunction with firm-specific skills20 training practices (see 
Emmenegger & Seitzl 2018; Thelen & Busemeyer 2012; Phelps et al. 2005). In the past, firm-
specific training was offered by firms, internally, but there is a tendency in which educational 
institutions are increasingly building customized21 training programs and practices in partnership 
with firms, not only as part of incentives packages to attract MNCs, but as something more 
permanent for MNCs that are embedded in certain regions (see Long 2009; Andrade et al. 2005). 
Customized training programs and their practices involve the development of curriculum 
and training according to the needs of firms, employers co-teaching disciplines, provision of 
instructors to teach on-the-job, reimbursement of companies’ costs for their workers training, 
travel funding to get training in other plants, and the use of the institutional apparatuses of 
educational institutions for employers to have their workers trained, among other initiatives. 
Such a phenomenon takes us to the second main feature, (2) Who finances training.  
Power relations at the regional level are also to decide who will finance training. 
Although decisions of who will finance training—the state, firms, workers, and/or a mix them—
are heavily decided at the national level (national skill formation system), at the regional level, 
fractions of capital and single MNCs are interested in influencing the state and educational 
 
20 This research considers general workforce skills as the ones that are transferable or portable and goes beyond the firm level, 
thus, training initiatives provide training above the needs of single firms. Company-specific skills are understood as skills that are 
non-transferable, provided to attend the needs of single large firms (Emmenegger & Seitzl 2018; Thelen & Busemeyer 2012). 
21 “By definition, customized training is instruction for workers and job seekers provided by education and training institutions 
working closely with employers. The training curriculum is developed or adapted to meet the education and training needs of the 
specific firms, which often belong to a particular sector” (Long 2009, 2).  
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institutions in order to have cost- and bureaucracy-free customized training and services. At the 
regional scale, such power relations regarding who finances training take place at two fronts: 
training initiatives to attract firms, which are temporary and dependent on the bargaining event 
between the firm and the state—where a specific number of workers receive cost-free training 
for firms—and training initiatives that are permanent, independent of bargaining events, which 
function regularly as a way to retain existing firms and also according to the interests of 
educational institutions (see Andrade et al. 2005). 
Therefore, power relations at regional training systems are also around firms pushing the 
state and educational institutions to offer costs- and bureaucracy-free training programs and 
initiatives that deliver highly firm-specific skills, and thus, decreases internal training and costs. 
As stated, educational institutions are interested in offering such courses as long as it maximizes 
their profits, and/or success. 
Local economies, or more specifically state managers, also have their own interests. In 
this regard, state managers see regional training systems not only as important assemblages that 
provide skills to local workers, but also as relevant assets that serve to recruit and retain 
businesses. Local economies have developed, as part of their regional training systems, 
institutionalized programs and initiatives that offer customized, cost- and bureaucracy-free 
training services as a way to attract firms and to provide aftercare services (Nesse & Markusen 
2007; Dawley 2007). Such programs and initiatives are used as a way to compete for firms in the 
global market and have become a must-have asset for regions to be global players. In this 
context, regions develop economic development plans, approved by their regional/municipal 
councils, under which parameters are established regarding the types and amounts of workforce 
development incentives available for firms according to their potential investment and creation 
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of jobs in the region.   
As revealed in the last chapter, capitalism demands the existence of a juridical form 
based on the principle of universality of law and equality of subjects. However, this juridical 
form fosters the false ideology that all individuals, such as capitalists and the working class, are 
equals and have the same rights under the law (Poulantzas 1977; Clarke 1991; Hirsch 2010). 
This same principle explains how regional incentive or economic development plans function. 
Regions, by law, equalize all firms—be it small, medium, and large corporations—by providing 
institutionalized plans of incentives according to the amount of investment of firms and the 
number and specification of the jobs they will potentially generate. However, the interaction of 
MNCs with local economies reveals such ideology to be false (Mascaro 2013). MNCs 
circumvent economic development plans and are able to get training incentives that are way 
above the established parameters, reaching a degree of incentives to which the local business 
community has no access. In this regard, regional training systems, as regional assets to attract 
firms, often disrupt such a false ideology by privileging MNCs (see Phelps et al. 2005). In other 
words, MNCs push subnational states to have a parallel juridical form that benefits MNCs, which 
should be considered in analyses of processes of corporate capture. 
Third and finally, the power relations at the regional level are also to decide (3) how 
much vocational training and the general education system will be integrated. However, at the 
local scale, power relations are related to how single MNCs and dominant fractions of capital are 
more influential in terms of which vocational courses will be offered at the secondary level. 
Nonetheless, this feature also depends on the degree of autonomy of subnational states to 
structure and rule their own educational institutions. But fractions of capital and single MNCs 
have a great interest in integrating vocational training and the general education system, mostly 
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at middle schools and high schools. To do so, MNCs have established partnerships with schools 
in order to foster the development of STEM courses, and sectoral related-path careers (Lakes & 
Carter 2009; Beder et al. 2009). 
According to some scholars, in the current neoliberal period, schools are being 
encouraged to be entrepreneurial and to have public-private partnerships, which advance 
curriculums that are seen to bring competitive advantages for schoolers according to their 
individual merits. Therefore, schools are going through a process of corporatization, where 
business and state leaders work together to establish curriculum, testing standards, and 
pedagogical practices (Baltodano 2012; Bender et al. 2009).  
Fractions of capital and single MNCs are interested in integrating vocational training and 
the general education system in order to influence which career training or skills schools foster, 
given that prevalent skill training at the secondary level influences students, and their decisions 
toward their future education and career-path. In this regard, schools are more and more tied to 
the development strategies of regions, where the goals and strategies of schools and businesses 
have been increasingly integrated (Baltodano 2012; Lakes & Carter 2009; Bender et al. 2009). 
Therefore, regional training systems are highly influenced by neoliberal policies in which 
schools are increasingly influenced by capital, and at the local level by fractions of capital and 
single MNCs, which seek to establish partnerships and, in this way, to convince students to 
follow specific career-paths that meet their interests and guarantee enough labor supply. 
 
3.2.2 Regional Training Systems and Uneven Development  
The labor market as a regulatory space, and its correspondent schooling and workforce 
development programs and initiatives, are crucial for the reproduction of capitalism. Local 
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economies, under the influence of such capitalists and other actors, develop regional training 
systems, which attend the interests of the actors involved. Such assemblages are established in 
order to commodify, discipline, and develop an employable and exploitable workforce (see 
Rikowski 2000, 2004), and to serve as assets to recruit and retain businesses. 
Under capitalism, regional training systems have three main purposes and characteristics. 
First, it seeks to socially produce desired workers that meet the skill needs of employers. 
Employers’ needs are basically a necessity for certain labor power attributes such as certain skills 
and personality traits within a laborer who has the potential to deliver them (Rikowski 2000, 
2004). As the value of a commodity is based on the socially necessary labor-time taken to 
produce it (Marx 1867), schooling and training play a crucial role in firms’ competitive 
strategies, given that changes in skills and consequently in productivity allow capitalists to 
produce their commodities at a lower value, and even temporally sell them at a lower price than 
the average price of the market. Moreover, schooling and training have an important role 
regarding the quality of the commodities produced by workers (Rikowski 2000; 2004). 
In this regard, education and training, as capitalist social forms, are the main processes 
responsible for socially producing desired workers (Rikowski 2000, 2004), and therefore, it is 
vital to understand how education and training function and are structured in relation to global 
production network processes such as value creation, upgrading, strategic coupling, etc. 
Capitalist schooling and training produce the most essential commodity, i.e. labor power. The 
term social production of labor power refers to processes of compulsory education as well of 
training (on- and off-the-job), of different forms of personal development programs through 
schools, colleges, higher education, computer-based training, informal labor knowledge 
exchange, among others (Rikowski 2000). 
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Second, regional training systems are marked by processes that foster segmented 
practices and class22-based inequalities. This means that even when regions go through processes 
of firm and social upgrading, it involves and requires uneven workforce development practices 
marked by class-based and segmented training systems.  For example, it is not rare to find 
regional training systems, where the best training courses and consequently the best job positions 
can be mostly accessible to the elite. 
Marxist and neo-Marxist theorists have greatly contributed to understanding the role of 
education in our society (Bowles & Gintis 1976; Willis 1977; Giroux 1980; Reay 2018). One of 
the major contributions concerns how the values learned at school correspond to the values 
required at the workplace, and how schools influence working class students into working class 
jobs (Bowles & Gintis 1976; Willis 1977). Some of the main roles of schools are to form a 
reserve army of skilled labor and to produce docile workers – regarding social relationships of 
dominance and subordination that take place at workplaces. For example, students’ learning to 
accept the authority of teachers corresponds to accepting the authority of managers. Another 
important role of schools explored by the authors is related to how schools reproduce class 
inequality (Bowles & Gintis 1976; Willis 1977). 
The above authors, directly criticize the prevailing US view of human capital theory and 
that success is based on people’s educational merit related to degrees, credentials and years of 
schooling, exploring how educational institutions (like schools) foster inequality. The authors 
 
22 This research adopts a relational conception of class, and understands class according to three main factors: (1) the ownership of 
the means of production, (2) authority, and (3) skills and expertise (Wright 1997). In relation to authority, it understands that labor 
positions with higher remuneration and power over other workers at work are tied and closer to the interests with those of the 
capitalist class. Regarding skills and expertise, labor with such features can have higher salaries and more autonomy over their 
work and their co-workers, resulting in a proximity with the capitalist class. This means that positions with greater authority, and 
skills and expertise are more prone to be influenced by capitalist interests within this class position. These positions are in 
contradictory locations within class relations (Wright 1997; Nylund 2012). Therefore, this study differentiates wage labor positions 
according to their relation to the means of production as well as the attributes of their position, i.e., their authority, and skills and 
expertise. 
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show that the middle class has cultural and material advantages in relation to the working class, 
being in a better position to guarantee that their children go to the best schools and consequently 
get the best education and jobs, whereas working class children have access to poorer education 
and low wage working class jobs. In this regard, the authors reveal how schools function in order 
to shape students according to capital’s purposes and to legitimate class inequality (Bowles & 
Gintis 1976). 
In the same direction, Levin (1987) claims that in the workplace, “the most remunerative, 
powerful, and highest status positions are generally occupied by person who themselves have 
considerable educational advantages and come from higher social class origins” (p.149). 
According to the author, in general, people from less advantaged backgrounds get less education 
and schooling of poorer equality than students from more advantaged backgrounds and are 
normally geared toward basic and vocational preparation. But different from Bowles and Gintis 
(1976), Levin (1987) understands that schools are also an arena of struggle, where students 
create independent dynamics, breaking with the correspondence between the schools and the 
workplace. In this regard, Giroux (1991), although seeing great value in the Bowles and Gintis 
(1976) analysis, criticizes the authors for not acknowledging that working class students are not 
fully shaped by the capitalist system, being able to resist what they are taught. Moreover, Giroux 
(1991) points out that education is not always in the service of capitalism, given that it can also 
harm the bourgeoisie. 
To date, the “correspondence theory” of Bowles and Gintis (1976), which strongly 
stresses the sense of passive obedience by students/workers is no longer fully applicable. This is 
because workers have recently been pushed to behave as entrepreneurs, being required to be 
more creative and active in their tasks. However, their view on how schools reproduce class 
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inequality, legitimating it through the myth of meritocracy, is still valid and reveals a current 
phenomenon: educational achievement and job positions still have a strong correlation to 
workers’ social class background (Reay 2018; Giroux 1991). 
Strengthening the argument made by Bowles and Gintis (1976), in the last few decades 
several labor segmentation studies have demonstrated how the segmentation of labor has been 
broadened. Scholars have explored how production, social reproduction, and consumption are 
characterized by patterns of segmentation and territorial segregation based on income, race, 
gender, ethnicity, migrants, and disabled people, among others (Smith et al. 2018; Bair & 
Werner 2015; Coe 2015; Jonas 1996; Peck 1996). For example, Estévez-Abe (2012) reveals how 
the dual apprenticeship training model of the German collective skill formation system has 
obstacles for women. Young women hesitate to adhere to this type of training due to the risks of 
becoming unemployed after family-induced breaks in their career. Moreover, employers are less 
inclined to recruit women for vocation training due to the potential loss of skill investment if 
they decide to leave the workforce (Estévez-Abe 2012; Streeck 2012). 
Some forms of regional training systems, highly influenced (or not) by industrial clusters 
inserted in GPNs, can excluded or prioritize some workers according to their gender, race, 
migrant status, and to the labor processes that firms adopt. For example, firms can base their 
production on low-wage female workers, whose salary is a supplement income for households, 
in order to produce competitive products (see Azmeh 2014). In this case, regional training 
systems can be heavily based on informal training practices, and/or on-the-job, which prioritizes 
women.  
Third, in the current neoliberal context, as more firm-specific types of training 
increasingly gain importance, the distance between academic and vocational routes are made 
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more explicit. In this context, the major focus of vocational training is on the mismatches 
between what employers need and what students learn. Thus, in vocational training more general 
subjects have been considered less important. This poses issues to job mobility, and to questions 
of who has the power to consider what counts as relevant knowledge and the power that 
knowledge itself can provide (Nylund 2012). While education and training to the working class 
are based on narrow curriculum, which delivers a knowledge that is problematic to transfer and 
employ in different contexts, education and training for privileged classes are based on a 
curriculum with less context-bound knowledge, which provides more space and time for 
reflections concerning matters that are less apparent and regarding possibilities, features that are 
crucial for critical thinking to exemplify. Vocational training, thus, considers theoretical and 
critical thinking as irrelevant. Nonetheless, this type of knowledge is important for individuals 
who will be positioned in vulnerable and subordinated positions (Nylund 2012).  
One important difference between education and training is that training seeks to fit a 
person towards a specific goal or end, and denies students other abilities such as critical thinking 
and independent learning, or the role of work in society or about their rights, while education 
aims at comprehending the reasons behind things. “The more employers influence and shape 
education the more it will tend towards worker training and away from citizen education” (Beder 
et al. 2009, 248).  
In sum, narrow and firm-specific education in vocational training can prevent the 
working class to access knowledge that stimulates a critical view of society and its political and 
economic organization. Therefore, it contributes to the “unequal distribution of power and 
knowledge between classes… [and] neutralizes the question of who gains the power to decide on 
what counts as important knowledge in vocational programs.” (Nylund 2012). 
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For workers, industry-specific23 training also poses additional problems. Often such skills 
are not transferable to other industries, and when workers are able to switch industries, they 
undergo wage losses (Smits 2007; Müller & Schweri 2015). In this regard, there is a conflict of 
interest between capitalists and the working class. Firms are interested not only in having 
educational institutions providing narrow firm-specific skills—given that they increase 
productivity, and production quality—, but also in having general training skills as little as 
possible because it gives the workers greater outside opportunities and pushes firms to pay 
higher salaries. Workers, on the other hand, are interested in having not only firm-specific skills 
training, but also generic skills training, which have wider transferability and applicability across 
firms and industries, and thus, sectoral mobility (Smits 2007; Emmenegger et al. 2018). For 
example, firm-specific training (or customized training) prioritizes the needs of certain firms and 
results in limited mobility for workers (Emmenegger and Seitzl 2018). Customized training is 
often detached from general academic education, and therefore, in overall does not provide the 
opportunity from continuum education and mobility from vocational training certification to 
academic education. It further emphasizes the idea of working-class education for the working 
class. When specific and general training offer a great number of general subjects and thus 
eligibility of integration with higher education, it avoids dead ends and gives students more equal 
 
23 “Generic skills will be defined as skills that have higher value outside the industry or occupation the worker is trained for than 
within the industry. These may be skills that are directly applicable in another industry or occupation or skills that facilitate the 
acquisition of the skills required in the new industry. Both types of skills increase the labor market flexibility of the worker. A first 
group of skills that have a higher value outside the industry than within the industry are skills that are used in several industries or 
occupations, but in different combinations and with different weights attached to them. For example, a hairdresser may need some 
selling skills to sell the client hair care products after the hair cut but selling skills will have a higher value in other occupations 
and industries such as a shop assistant in a drugstore or a sales representative in the hair care industry. A second group of skills that 
may have a higher value outside the industry than within the industry are cognitive skills such as reading, writing and Mathematics, 
problem solving skills and learning skills. Workers with a higher level of generic skills, which they define as a combination of 
learning abilities, analytical abilities and problem solving abilities, have a higher change to work in an occupational field which 
does not match their field of study and that in this case, the wage impact of generic skills is highest.” (Smits 2007, 655). 
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opportunities after finishing higher-secondary education (Nylund 2012). Diagram 3 summarizes 
the concept of regional training systems. 
 
Diagram 3. The Establishment, Shaping, and Characteristics of Regional Training Systems 
 
Source: Author. 
 
3.3 The Ability of Local Forms of Governance Actors and Institutions to Lessen or Amend 
Corporate capture 
Several studies have exhibited how varying state forms have different modes of 
subnational governance, approaches to FDI, and outcomes regarding processes of externalization 
(see Rutherford et al. 2018; Almond et al. 2017; Pavlinek 2016; Tregaskis & Almond 2017; 
Almond et al. 2014; Almond et al. 2013; Almond et al. 2012). Such studies have sought to 
demonstrate how local forms of governance can reinforce or minimize processes of corporate 
capture. One particular explanation regards how these scholars have associated the capacity of 
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local forms of governance to reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture to their forms 
of state–types of coordination and state organization such as federalist and unitary systems–as 
well as to their state accumulation strategies.  
For example, Almond et al. (2014) claim that local forms of governance in liberal 
subnational states such as Madrid and Ontario have a less active coordination with FDIs than 
Asturias and Quebec, and thus, are less successful in embedding corporations, and consequently, 
in maximizing spillover processes and cluster formation. On the other hand, the subnational 
states of Asturias and Quebec possess a more coordinated approach to economic development 
and have higher degrees of political consensus and more potential to create positive outcomes 
such as meeting the needs of the business community in general regarding skills (Almond et al. 
2014). Almond et al. (2013) also acknowledge that local forms of governance and their 
approaches to FDIs (and extent such as pure FDI agencies or agencies with wider developmental 
goals) vary according to the level of autonomy of their subnational states. According to the 
authors, countries with greater levels of subnational state autonomy (like federalist countries) 
have local forms of governance that are more active in attracting and embedding firms than 
countries with less autonomous subnational states. 
Moreover, Almond et al. (2013) assert that more coordinated economies have local forms 
of governance with wider regional development goals, more likely to have positive outcomes 
when bargaining with MNCs than the ones found in more liberal economies. In this sense and 
with regard to how subnational states behave to attract, retain, and embed MNCs, Almond et al. 
(2017) categorizes two types of approaches of regional forms of FDI governance – but 
understands that in the real world such approaches can blend: market and state (or associational-
centered).  
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Market-centered governance of FDI relies on a passive dependence on locational 
competitive advantages. The state is mainly absent and does not foster industrial policies of any 
kind. State action is limited to elaborating regulations that allow firms to effectively compete in 
the market. State-coordinated governance indicates heavy interventions into the region and seeks 
to increase firms’ international competitiveness. States seek to establish relationships with 
foreign direct investors not only to attend to their needs, but also to foster processes of 
externalization that develop the region (Almond et al. 2017). Such a relationship can entail the 
political leadership of associational governance. Associational governance refers to the capacity 
and desire of local actors to engage with local MNCs in ways that improve location-specific 
advantages. In such cases, the provision of grants can be followed by requirements to embed 
firms within the region, fostering cooperative practices between MNCs and local actors such as 
SME, research centers, educational institutions, etc. (Almond et al. 2017). But what is not clear 
in the above theorizations is why such forms of FDI governance have the shape they present and 
behave differently.  
In this regard, Rutherford et al. (2018) demonstrated that governance actions aimed at 
maximizing FDI spillovers are related to state accumulation strategies through which some 
sectors, firms, and institutionalized compromises are empowered and prioritized. According to 
the authors, Quebec’s developmental state has stronger initiatives to maximize FDI spillovers, 
and this is connected to its accumulation strategy, marked by an industrial policy that supports 
domestic firms, and involves workers’ representatives. For example, Quebec’s subnational state 
provides funds to develop regional patient capital and has unions with an active role in training 
and in long-term collective agreements (Rutherford et al. 2018). In other words, workers’ as well 
as domestic firms’ representatives have substantial power of representation in Quebec’s form of 
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governance due to the centrality the state gives to such actors in its accumulation strategy. 
Therefore, the form of national and subnational states, their accumulation strategies and 
their consequent policies to economic development play a crucial role in determining the types of 
local forms of governance and their approaches to attract, embed, retain, and develop firms as 
well as in determining the developmental outcomes of such FDI policies.  In this regard, the 
capacity of local forms of governance to reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture 
has to be understood primarily according to its relationship to its state form and accumulation 
strategy, along with the unfolding consequences it has. These consequences have to be thought 
of in terms of governance autonomy, its financial and political power, the magnitude of FDI 
institutions to engage in aftercare of new investors and with already existing MNCs, and the 
nature of FDI institutions as pure inward investment agencies or agencies with wider regional 
development powers/goals. 
As this research demonstrated in the second chapter, state accumulation strategies 
prioritize certain actors and their strategic needs and demands (Jessop 2015), and influence the 
outcomes of FDI policies. Consequently, the capacity of local forms of governance to reinforce 
or minimize processes of corporate capture has to be comprehended along with an understanding 
of which actors have their interests prioritized in state accumulation strategies. In other words, 
the degree of corporate capture of regional training systems depends on the balance of forces and 
consequently the power of representation of actors such as the working class and their 
representatives, MNCs, fractions of capital, and educational institutions, among others at their 
forms of governance. 
As discussed before, local forms of governance are not marked by shared power and 
interests, a collective mode of coordination, or a strong autonomy from the state but by a strong 
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relation to the state, hierarchical power relations, and function as an instrument for capitalists to 
foster their interests (Davies 2011; Lovering 2011). In this regard, as local forms of governance 
are important mechanisms for firms and other actors to present their interests to the state in 
regard to securing the commodification of workers, and thus, the development of training 
programs, state educational policies and strategies, local forms of governance have to function 
and are consequently shaped by their type of state selectivity in order to effectively present their 
interests. This also reveals how the state shapes local forms of governance as well as why they 
reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture. 
According to Claus Offe (1984), the capitalist state has an apparatus that is capable of 
attending to multiple interests from different actors such as single capitalists, the working class, 
business representatives, and fractions of capital. To receive and attend to different interests, 
states have particular forms of selectivity, which are classist and tend to attend the interests that 
will allow the valorization of capital (Offe 1984). Offe (1984) understands the concept of state 
selectivity as how states establish an internal institutional configuration with criteria and 
selective processes responsible for choosing which interests are mutually compatible with their 
own interests and with the interests of capitalists (Offe 1984; Seibel & De Oliveira 2006). In 
other words, states have mechanisms of selection that function as filters, which shape how 
policies are formulated and implemented, how actors present their interests to state managers and 
which interests are selected and prioritized (Seibel & De Oliveira 2006). Hay (2002) adds that 
habitual practices, routine, and intuition can play a key role in how actors strategically present 
their interests to the state. This means that the institutional legacy and political culture of local 
states play a crucial role in how actors’ coordination and interactions function, as well as in how 
initiatives and strategies are elaborated and fostered. For example, the subnational and local 
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states of some countries are marked by highly professionalized and tenured non-partisan 
bureaucrats and technocrats, while in other countries, they are characterized by patronage and 
partisan staffs, or are a Weberian bureaucracy based on meritocracy (Banfield & Wilson 1966; 
Evans 2008). Such differences can result in different types of behaviors regarding how actors 
pursue their interests. 
In this regard, local forms of governance tend to be shaped by such mechanisms of 
selection in order to present and have their interests attended. Forms of state selectivity lead local 
forms of governance to function in certain ways in order to present and have their interests 
selected. For example, some states like South Carolina select and foster initiatives based on 
formal relations, studies, and lobbying activities, which lead local forms of governance and their 
actors to formulate and present their interest through these ways and mechanisms. As we will see 
in the cases of Charleston and São José dos Campos, their forms of state selectivity have 
important outcomes to how and whether their local forms of governance reinforce or minimize 
processes of corporate capture. As state selectivity privileges capitalists (Offe 1984), even in 
regions where local forms of governance and state accumulation strategies prioritize SMEs and 
processes of externalization, and/or the working class, MNCs are still able to influence and 
capture public training programs and initiatives (see Rutherford et al. 2018). 
According to Peck and Theodore (2015, 31) the world has seen a “deepening 
transnational interconnectedness, in which local policy experiments exist in relation to near and 
far relatives, to traveling models and technocrat designs, and to a host of financial, technical, 
social, and symbolic networks that invariably loop through centers of power and persuasion.” 
where models are imported and adapted.  In this context, as Phelps and Wood (2006) revealed, 
there has been a spread of ideologies and practices to attract inward investments. Such ideologies 
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and practices have been replicated across the world and benefits the interests of MNCs.  
For the authors, although the transnational capital has not general interests, the processes 
in which their interests are translated or mediated by actors of local forms of governance present 
certain patterns. Such patterns are converging “toward neoliberal national and local modes of 
regulation and interest representation” (Phelps & Wood 2006, 498), and translate a degree 
of convergence in pressures and challenges that test and bend existing rules at the state level. 
Therefore, practices understood as characteristics of corporate capture have been replicated 
across the world, even in regions which their state and forms of governance privileges domestic 
firms and externalization. 
This is not only due to states providing packages of training incentives, but also due to 
the direct relationship between firms and educational institutions, and their mutual interest in the 
commodification of education and workers. Representatives of educational institutions 
frequently assess labor market studies and interact with firm owners, recruitment agencies, and 
other labor market intermediaries in order to determine which skills are in need (see Almond et 
al. 2017; Clark & Christopherson 2007). Thus, educational institutions, concerned in maximizing 
their profits/success24 and to keep their own programs/initiatives’ functioning, are interested in 
concomitantly attending the interests of single MNCs25 (given their political and economic 
power as well as scope of employment) through highly customized courses as well as the local 
business community through generic types of training skills (see Emmenegger & Seitzl 2018; 
Phelps et al. 2005). However, the opening, design, and expansion of MNCs-related courses and 
programs are often prioritized over the needs of other sectors. 
 
24 Meeting the skills needs of employers means that students will be hired, which in turn increases enrollment in programs. 
25 In many cases, firms find difficult to articulate or define medium- or long-term skill needs, giving to educational institutions 
some relative autonomy to design courses, meaning that educational institutions are not so heavily influenced by corporations. 
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To conclude, the capacity of forms of governance to reinforce or minimize processes of 
corporate capture has to be understood primarily according to its relationship to its state form, 
accumulation strategy, and type of state selectivity. This is because the state form and its 
accumulation strategies shape the way forms of governance function and the initiatives and goals 
they foster. Importantly, the type of state selectivity of states influences who receives centrality 
in mechanisms of representation like local forms of governance, and how governance actors 
represent their needs to state managers—formal strategies, studies, informal interactions, etc.—
which in turn influences whether some forms of governance reinforce or minimize processes of 
corporate capture. 
 Moreover, even in regions where their forms of governance tend to minimize processes 
of corporate capture, MNCs are still able to influence and capture regional training systems 
despite subnational states’ accumulation strategies and local forms of governance prioritizing 
domestic firms or SMEs. This is related to the multiple interests of governance actors involved in 
the commodification of education and workers, as well as, the economic and political power of 
MNCs. Therefore, processes of corporate capture in regional training systems have to be 
understood in a different perspective, taking into consideration power relations and initiatives at 
different scales, as this study explains in the next sub-section. 
 
3.4 Rethinking Corporate capture in its Relation to Regional Training Systems 
In this section, this research will reframe the notion of corporate capture. Conceptualizing 
the GPN approach to workforce development systems as regional training systems prompts this 
research to rethink corporate capture. As this study will reveal, processes of corporate capture in 
regional training systems have to be understood in a different perspective, taking into 
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consideration the power relations and initiatives at different scales, and in relation to uneven 
development and not sole externalization. 
To do so, first I will briefly summarize the main discussions of corporate capture of the 
labor market. As this research focuses on the capture of regional training systems and not the 
labor market per se, there is a need to lay emphasis on capture in this matter specifically. 
Therefore, second, in this section, this research will expand the literature in the topic of corporate 
capture, but specifically regarding regional training systems. 
Studies regarding institutional or corporate capture of the labor market have 
demonstrated how MNCs are able to impose their values and interests, influencing and 
sometimes dominating the initiatives and strategies of local governments. Scholars understand 
that corporate capture happens when the relationships between MNCs and local governments are 
marked by unilateral negotiations, i.e., MNCs fostering their private interests over public 
regional general interests. The regional or general interests of governments are pictured as their 
willingness to maximize the benefits that a MNCs can bring to regions aside the generation of 
jobs. For example, in return for subsidies, regions can push MNCs to have a certain percentage 
of suppliers at the local level, thus, encouraging their embeddedness and the development of 
industrial clusters. 
Therefore, for researchers, corporate capture happens when regions provide human 
resource and support services, and subsidies to attract or retain MNCs to/in their places, but do 
not receive a same-level return from such firms in terms of externalization such as spillovers. 
MNCs basically influence and exploit the institutional capabilities of regions, making their 
private interests to prevail over the public interests of regions (Phelps 2000, 2008; Pavlinek 
2016; Dawley 2007; Phelps & Fuller 2010). 
 
 
 100 
 
Thus corporate capture occurs when MNCs receive (1) customized training packages, (2) 
are able to distort local skill agendas and strategies, which thus, lack wider business community 
involvement, (3) recruit most talented workforce from the local business community and from 
outside the region, and/or (4) avoid knowledge sharing/exchange. However, how can this 
research approach, analyze, and understand processes of corporate capture specifically related to 
regional training systems? In this regard, this research will argue that corporate capture should be 
understood according to three main aspects. 
First, this research will, as studies of corporate capture have argued, analyze corporate 
capture of regional training systems according to which skills are provided at the regional level, 
and to who finances training services and initiatives. Regarding which skills are provided, this 
research will analyze how MNCs are able to influence the state and educational institutions to 
receive customized training.  In this regard, processes of corporate capture in training systems 
should be understood in relation to the existing degree of duality in regional training systems, i.e. 
the existence of firm-specific customized training initiatives and general initiatives. It also 
requires looking at the types of skills that are taught in customized programs; do they provide 
very narrow firm-specific skills, or a mix of specific and general?  
It demands as well examining how MNCs are able to control, develop and design courses 
and curriculums in partnership with the state and educational institutions, to place their staff as 
part of the teaching staff, and to establish a contract that identifies such students as their workers. 
Regarding who finances training services and initiatives, corporate capture also has to be 
analyzed in relation to how MNCs influence the state and educational institutions in order to 
receive cost- and bureaucracy-free incentives for customized training initiatives and services, 
which involves not only free training, but other practices such as free provision of instructors to 
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teach on-the-job, reimbursement of companies’ costs for their workers training, travel funding to 
get training in other plants, and the free use of institutional apparatuses of educational 
institutions for employers to have their workers trained. 
This research will differentiate two types of corporate capture through customized 
training initiatives: Temporary26 and permanent capture. Temporary capture of customized 
training programs refers to how regions provide customized training in order to attract firms to 
their localities. In general, this happens when regions are bargaining incentive packages with 
firms. Such a capture is momentary and exists until states train the number of workers 
established in the negotiation with the firms. Permanent capture of customized training denotes 
how embedded firms capture the institutional capacity of educational institutions, establishing 
customized types of training initiatives that are perennial and intended to last as long as 
companies and educational institutions are mutually interested (see Andrade et al. 2005). 
Corporate capture in this regard would be understood as happening at some scales—for 
example, customized training can be provided by the subnational state, or by the national state—, 
for some industry sectors, and for specific firms, where training is focused on specific-firm skills 
and based on customized programs, courses, and initiatives. However, it does not mean that the 
whole training capability of educational institutions will be captured. As stated in chapter two, 
corporate capture is always partial (see Phelps 2008). The existence of customized training 
programs and initiatives is given in conjunction with generic skill training programs and 
initiatives. This conjunction is also related to the fact that firms can have difficulties to predict 
their long-term skill needs.  
This also involves analyzing the level of integration between customized vocational 
 
26 Momentary forms of capture can be renegotiated and renewed, thus, lasting many years. 
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training and the general education system, and how MNCs have influenced public educational 
policies and agendas at different scales, fostering their skill agenda, and/or influencing schools to 
advance their interests through training programs. However, this is not to deny that educational 
institutions have autonomy, given that their interests must also be taken in consideration. 
Second, corporate capture of regional training systems has to be understood according to 
how MNCs are able to circumvent the juridical form of national, subnational, and/or local states 
in regard to established institutionalized training incentives for the business community in 
general. In this respect, it would require looking at how MNCs influence the state and 
educational institutions in order to receive more training incentives than the regional 
institutionalized training incentive plan has established for the business community in general. 
Such an approach involves, understanding how capture also involves low levels of transparency 
in the bargaining incentives given to MNCs and accountability. 
Third, corporate capture of regional training systems has to be analyzed in relation to 
processes of uneven development and not only in relation to processes of externalization as 
mainstream literature has done. While mainstream literature has predominantly stressed how FDI 
does or does not result in wider cluster benefits, in benefits to the business community in general, 
focusing on uneven development will enable researchers to analyze the state MNCs nexus, and 
their outcomes to education and training initiatives as well as to issues of class, gender, and race, 
among others. In this respect, this research proposes to explore three main features. 
First, how the processes of corporate capture of regional training systems reinforce, or 
aggravate the segmentation of the labor market, and class-based inequalities through training 
initiatives and practices. In other words, how the influence of MNCs over schools and colleges 
result in training programs and initiatives that further unequal class relations and labor 
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segmentation. As pointed out, some types of training programs and initiatives as well as their 
provision of knowledge are designed for the working class, while others for the ruling class. For 
example, when subnational states agree to recruit and train a number of workers for MNCs—as 
part of their incentive package—, it may require state managers to persuade students and workers 
to take a certain career path, what often involves convincing the working class—and their 
children—to get working class training and jobs.  
Another example concerns how regional segmented labor markets are marked by the 
existence of a secondary workforce based on gender, race, migrant status, with temporary 
positions and low-paid wages (see Bair and Werner 2015), workers who are excluded from 
receiving certain types of education such as academic, but not from others like vocational, and 
excluded from opportunities delivered by public customized training initiatives due to their 
gender for example. Such features take us to the second point, which consists analyzing whether 
the provision of public cost-free customized training and training services for MNCs are 
followed by prerequisites, and how customized training is designed. 
 Do customized training initiatives involve the state requiring MNCs to pay competitive 
wages, to have career plans, to be gender, race, and ethnical inclusive, and to have benefits for 
workers such as health insurance and paid vacation? In other words, does the state demand 
MNCs to provide benefits for workers in exchange of the cost- and bureaucracy-free training 
incentives they receive? This aspect is important to evaluate whether the institutional capacity of 
regional training systems is captured by MNCs. Moreover, are the design and content of the 
curriculum of customized training initiatives broad enough to provide transferable skills? Does 
the content of such training initiatives provide opportunities for continuum education in 
vocational and academic education, thus offering possibilities for social mobility in terms of 
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education? 
It is important to notice that processes of institutional de-capture are also possible to take 
place at regional training systems. For example, while states develop training initiatives at 
regional training systems to attract firms, state managers at the local scale can develop initiatives 
that seek to reverse such capture by fostering more inclusive, permanent, and generic training 
initiatives that target the local business community and the working class. For example, Phelps et 
al. (2005, 575) demonstrated how processes of capture create “an associated counter-movement 
in which public sector agencies are obligated, to some extent, to broaden these benefits to other 
parts of the business community.” Moreover, as the working class are able to advance their 
interests, and influence education strategies and policies, processes of corporate capture can be 
reversed (see Streeck 2012). 
The examination of the three features above presented requires one to look at processes 
of corporate capture at regional training systems through a multi-level approach to governance 
that considers its different scales. It allows this research to understand how processes of capture 
can happen at some scales but not in others, and how it can be followed by processes of de-
capture.  
To conclude, examining corporate capture based on the notion of regional training 
systems, prompts this research to explore such a process in a different perspective. A perspective 
that (a) considers its multi-scale nature, (b) breaks with its dualistic view of capture or 
externalization, (c) takes in consideration the hierarchical power relations and interests among 
governance actors, and (d) acknowledges the connection between capture and class relations. 
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Table 4. Main Characteristics of Corporate capture of Regional Training Systems. 
 
Source: Phelps 2008. Author. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to examine whether different forms of local governance reinforce or 
minimize processes of corporate capture in regional training systems. Critiquing the GPN/GVC 
approach to workforce development systems, I elaborated upon the concept of regional training 
systems to argue that the capacity of local forms of labor governance to minimize or reinforce 
processes of corporate capture in training has to be comprehend alongside with their state form, 
accumulation strategy, and type of state selectivity. 
In regard to the state form, it was explored how countries can attribute different degrees 
of autonomy to their subnational states, which can affect the role, relevance, and extent—like 
pure inward investment or wider developmental goals—of local forms of governance in the 
attraction and retention of FDIs and MNCs. Concerning the accumulation strategies of states, I 
argued that they shape the way forms of governance function and the initiatives and goals they 
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foster. Importantly, I asserted that the type of selectivity of states influences who receives 
centrality in mechanisms of representation like local forms of governance, and how governance 
actors represent their needs to state managers, which in turn influences whether some forms of 
governance reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture. 
Moreover, it was also claimed that even in regions where their forms of governance tend 
to minimize processes of corporate capture, MNCs are still able to influence and capture regional 
training systems despite subnational states’ accumulation strategies and local forms of 
governance prioritizing domestic SMEs. This is due to the multiple interests of governance 
actors involved in the commodification of education and workers, as well as, the economic and 
political power of MNCs. 
This understanding regarding why local forms of governance may reinforce or minimize 
processes of corporate capture demanded this research to reconceptualize how corporate capture 
is understood. Therefore, in the last subsection of this chapter, this study sought to conceptualize 
corporate capture in regional training systems as a process that goes beyond the binary view of 
states’ interests versus MNCs’ interests, or corporate capture versus externalization. This 
research sought to expand what is understood by corporate capture and to frame it as marked by 
uneven development and uneven class relations, which is related to different state scales and 
multiple outcomes. 
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Chapter 4: Variegated Forms of Corporate Capture: The Case of Charleston, South 
Carolina and Boeing 
In the last decades, the state of South Carolina, in the United States, has been able to 
attract several manufacturing corporations. Bosch, BMW, Boeing, Mercedes-Benz, and Volvo 
are just a few examples. In this regard, the region of Charleston (composed by Berkeley, 
Dorchester and Charleston counties) has gained attention for receiving many of the newly 
established companies in the state. One well-known example regards how the state of South 
Carolina was able to attract Boeing South Carolina to the region of Charleston through the 
provision of nearly one billion dollars. To be able to attract such corporations, state managers 
have designed several mechanisms and initiatives—many related to training incentives and 
programs—which have definitely positioned the state in a competitive position when bargaining 
with firms. Amidst such aggressive policies of FDI attraction, processes of corporate capture 
related to training initiatives are expected to take place. 
In this context, this chapter will be divided in three main sections. In the first section, I 
argue that the evolution of processes of corporate capture related to South Carolina’s educational 
strategies and some training initiatives is related to how the state, theorized as a “hidden 
developmental state”, has established a strategic selective state apparatus that privileges 
manufacturing MNCs and their interests. I reveal that state managers have designed educational 
strategies and training initiatives intentionally targeted to be captured by MNCs. Attention will 
be given to the following initiatives: Career Academies, Apprenticeship Carolina, and ReadySC.  
In the second section, the structural coupling process between Boeing and South Carolina 
will be analyzed, where I will disclose how Boeing captured the institutional capacity of 
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ReadySC, a state program that provides customized training free-of-charge for firms. This 
section will comprehensively study the particularities of such a capture.  
Finally, in the third section, this research will determine whether Charleston’s local form 
of governance has reinforced or minimized processes of corporate capture in its regional training 
system. I argue that Charleston’s local form of governance has reinforced corporate capture by 
embracing, implementing, and expanding its higher-scale state initiatives and educational 
agenda. Although, attempts have been made to minimize corporate capture. I explore how such 
attempts to minimize capture are related to how the region’s formal sector-level strategy named 
One-Region, reduces single-firms’ influence, such as Boeing over Charleston’s local regional 
training systems. Moreover, I demonstrate how these attempts to minimize corporate capture 
have been problematic, mostly due a lack of power of local state managers and to local 
governance actors’ attempts to solve corporate capture based on market relations. 
 
4.1 South Carolina’s State Form, Accumulation Strategy and Relationship to Corporate 
Capture 
This section will reveal how processes of corporate capture related to public training 
initiatives in South Carolina have evolved as intrinsically related to its accumulation strategy. As 
this research will show, structural coupling processes lie at the center of South Carolina’s 
accumulation strategy, revealing the specificities of processes of corporate capture in three 
training initiatives—Career Academies, Apprenticeship Carolina, and ReadySC. I argue that 
South Carolina has established and designed training programs and initiatives, such as ReadySC 
to be intentionally captured by MNCs. Nonetheless, classical processes of corporate capture 
continue to occur in the state through bargaining events between state managers and MNCs.  
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As revealed on the second chapter of this dissertation, the varieties of capitalism (VoC) 
literature has classified different countries based on firms’ ability to solve coordinating 
problems, categorizing the United States as a liberal market economy (Hall & Soskice 2001; 
Schneider 2009). However, this framework has held problematic. One issue concerns its 
disregard to how national states can have subnational variations. Thus, the variegated capitalisms 
literature has demonstrated how subnational states can have sub-models of capitalism with 
diverging coordination and accumulation strategies from their national states (Rutherford et al. 
2018; Peck & Theodore 2007; Schröder & Voelzkow 2016; Zhang & Peck 2014). Such 
variations challenge theorizations that claim liberal national states to be more likely to engender 
processes of corporate capture than developmental states, and stress the importance of scale (see 
Phelps 2008).  
South Carolina exemplifies how subnational states can vary from their national 
economies if one classifies the United States as a liberal market economy. South Carolina 
resembles a developmental state, and as its “hidden developmental” national state form (Block 
2008) is highly interventionist. Nonetheless it has significant similarities with the classical 
developmental states. As developmental states do (see Fine 2008; Woo-Cumings 1999), South 
Carolina has consciously enacted economic changes employing industrial governmental policies, 
which opposes the idea of having a free market economy. Moreover, as in developmental states, 
high institutional coordination levels mark South Carolina, where state managers continue to 
focus strategically on specific sectors to establish growth policies. 
Subnational internal variations in the United States, such as the one in South Carolina, 
have resulted from the US federal system, which grants significant policy design autonomy to 
subnational states. Moreover, the historical uneven expansion of industries in the country has 
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resulted in varying subnational states in terms of policies and models of development. The 
uneven process of industrialization in the US was mostly significant during the late 19th Century, 
when some northern states, such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois developed their 
manufacturing industries while several southern states such as South Carolina lagged behind. 
South Carolina maintained their agricultural economy, and specialized its industry in textiles and 
apparel, which were based on a low-wage nonunionized labor force (Rees 2016). Nonetheless, 
after the Second World War, attempting to transform its economy into a manufacturing 
powerhouse, as the northern states, South Carolina adopted an accumulation strategy based on 
attracting mature industries interested in relocating to lower operating-cost regions (Ford & 
Stone 2007; Porter 2005). As Jessop (2014) has argued about the nature of the state, South 
Carolina started to develop a selective institutional apparatus, centered on attracting large 
manufacturing corporations to foster accumulation and development. As Rutherford et al. (2018) 
revealed, states can select and focus on various global value chains segments to design 
developmental policies. In the case of South Carolina, state managers have established attractive 
pro-business mechanisms and initiatives, such as low taxes, land donation, low wage workforce 
provisions, right-to-work state policies, training incentives, minimum government regulation, 
and heavy subsidies and financial incentives to privilege, and thus, attract manufacturing 
corporations (Ford & Stone 2007; Porter 2005; Villa 2010). Therefore, structural coupling 
processes laid pivot around its accumulation strategy. Indeed, as some interview participants 
articulated, subsidies and incentives were, and remain, vital to South Carolina accumulation 
strategy. One interviewee from the Berkeley Chamber of Commerce declared: 
[..]South Carolina was a poor state, so what they did is that they put their money in what 
they think would get the best outcome […]. We did not have any industry until…our first 
industry was in 1973. Part of that was the lobby. They state decided “that is all we got, 
we need to get the most for this”, and doing that we can try to bring big industries to 
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bring jobs and get rural South Carolinians up. So, we have already been growing since 
1950. It is a short time especially compared to other areas. But before that very poor. 
 
While still in place, this strategy has altered since the 1980s regarding its sophistication 
and mechanisms employed to foster structural coupling processes. Such changes are related to 
the neoliberalizing process that the US has been undergoing since the late 1970s, which has 
fostered and shaped interactions among state managers and manufacturing MNCs subnationally 
(Harvey 2005). Interactions that have advanced in South Carolina, a pro-business institutional 
apparatus and programs crucial to foster structural coupling processes. The neoliberal movement 
gained prominence in the end of 1970s when the US Keynesian state encountered increasing 
problems due to the crisis of Fordism. By the early 1980s, President Reagan promoted American 
neoliberalism as a new economic orthodoxy (Harvey 2005), resulting in three processes:  
1. Statehood denationalization, reorganizing US national state apparatus functioning on 
subnational, national, supranational, and trans-local levels (Jessop 1997). 
2. “Destatization” of its political system, where the private sector becomes a key political actor 
in public decisions and strategies (Jessop 1997). 
3. Internationalization of its policy regime (Jessop 1997), meaning that the US state apparatus 
increased its orientation toward facilitating internationalized investors’ accumulation 
(Glassman 1999). 
Due to these three processes, the US Schumpeterian Workfare emerged (Jessop 2002). 
This new US state form started to place greater attention on policies that could advance 
technological development, innovation, enterprise, and human capital (Jessop 2002). Due to the 
internationalization of its policy regime in the 1980s, competition from low-wage offshore 
countries increased, challenging South Carolina’s developmental strategy.  
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In the 1990s, the augmented international competitiveness manifested in primary South 
Carolina industries, with textiles and apparel losing half their employees. Until the end of the 
1990s, South Carolina stayed at nearly 80 percent of the national per capita income average, 
making one of the ten poorest states in the nation (Ford & Stone 2007; Porter 2005). Thus, South 
Carolina altered its state accumulation strategy in the 2000s, becoming much more aggressive 
and embracing a developmental project that could competitively situate the state in the new 
knowledge-based global economy (Ford & Stone 2007; Vila 2010).  
Topics such as human capital and science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM), innovation, and research became central in South Carolina’s political agenda. But this 
state agenda was difficult to accomplish given the state’s under-funded and deficient public 
education system, lack of innovation and patents, the absence of tier-one research universities, 
and overall poor skill levels (Ford & Stone 2007; Porter 2005). South Carolina state managers, 
MNCs and their representatives, and Michal Porter’s cluster-based developmental plan 
influenced the design of this agenda. This new accumulation strategy maintained its heavy 
reliance upon subsidy provisions and incentives but developed more sophisticated and aggressive 
mechanisms and initiatives to attract and retain firms, representing significant shifts. This will be 
explored in the three following subsections. 
 
4.1.1 Flexibility, Inter-Scale Fluidity, and Efficiency 
 First, South Carolina has established mechanisms or an institutional apparatus flexible 
and efficient in attending to the interests of MNCs. As this research demonstrated in previous 
chapters, state managers, as a distinctive class, tend to pursue policies and initiatives that will 
result in investments in their localities (Block 1987; Rooksby 2010). This pursuit of policies and 
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initiatives constantly results in institutional apparatus experimentations and shifts. Hence, South 
Carolina has not only made the provision of fixed assets such as infrastructure, low taxes, and 
incentives an important instrument to attract and retain MNCs to their regions but has also 
developed an institutional apparatus that commits to “in-the-making” necessities and 
possibilities, or potentialities. In other words, state managers are open and eager to develop 
initiatives for MNCs that do not exist, that may be needed in the future, requiring or not new 
processes of institutionalization. Such openness and willingness reduce uncertainty for potential 
investors. Individual capitalists, such as MNCs base their decisions not only on fixed assets when 
examining where to invest, but also on their evaluation of the general political and economic 
environment of localities (Block 1987; Rooksby 2010). In South Carolina’s case, state managers 
have acknowledged this fact.  As one representative from the South Carolina Department of 
Commerce stated, “we make ourselves available to listen to firms and to work collaboratively as 
a team to attend to their needs.” 
The South Carolina Department of Commerce has mostly exerted such a role, recruiting 
MNCs and helping existing businesses to remain competitive. As one Berkeley County 
representative asserted, recruiting MNCs requires the South Carolina Department of Commerce 
to work closely with local states to develop attractive benefits packages and to offer corporations 
various potential sites (Interviewee 10). Therefore, successfully enticing corporations takes 
complex collective efforts involving various actors at different scales. This inter-scale collective 
work has unevenly developed across the state, a characteristic that Brenner (2003) has 
acknowledged in his theoretical work. Some regions have garnered more success than others in 
attracting firms. As Interviewee 6 detailed, Charleston has become a relevant player in recruiting 
firms only in the last 15 years, but “the Upstate, Greenville area, has been very aggressive in 
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economic development before.” This is because Charleston has built a strong form of 
governance, which has the capacity to compete for investments and to represent their interests 
and goals to state managers at the subnational scale. The Charleston Metro Chamber of 
Commerce (CMCC) and the Charleston Regional Development Alliance (CRDA) have remained 
primarily responsible for Charleston’s local governance agenda. Interviewee 10, a CMCC 
representative, professed: 
we go together and try to be one-on-one with many legislators from our area and educate 
them. Here is what is on our agenda. Here is why it is on our agenda. Here is why it is 
important. Here is how it impacts the business. That is what needs to be done to fix this 
issue. Will you help us? And because we have been doing that for a long-term, we got 
good relations. So, with building lobbying, it is all relationships, it is building that 
relationship with that particular elected official, so they know when you call […] 
 
Interviewee 15, a representative from the Berkeley Department of Economic 
Development explained the significance of existing channels of interaction between the local and 
subnational scale in the recruitment process for MNCs stating: 
The project came through the state. […] we got tied in with the state and soon we were 
competing with the others (counties). These big industries when they are out there 
looking, they hire site selection firms to do research of potential sites. They go through 
the states’ department of commerce and tell them what the requirements are and what are 
their needs and the state department of commerce has all the information on sites. So, if 
there is a potential site that will work in our county, they will send a request for 
information and we will have to submit all the information on that sight. If the site 
selection firm presents our site to x y z companies, and they like our site, then they will 
initiate a conversation with the state and the state will be negotiating.” (Interviewee 15, 
2016). 
 
Phelps (2008) contended efficiency in state institutional coordination is crucial to foster 
externalization processes and avoid corporate capture. But in the case of South Carolina, the high 
inter-scale capacity of state managers to coordinate actions has vitally facilitated the state to meet 
MNC interests and consequently to attract such firms to their regions. At 2016 South Carolina 
Manufacturing Conference, Philip Morgan, a senior project manager at the South Carolina 
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Department of Commerce publicly asserted that the state has successfully recruited 
manufacturing firms due to the state’s flexibility and capacity to work collectively: 
We are a team; you can reach out to any one of us. So, we partner with regional 
representatives, with county representatives, we partner with them all, with private 
partners and utilities. Any company that wants to talk to us, please come and talk and we 
will put the right people in front of you. “One of our skills is the ability to be flexible.” 
(Aerospace Conference 2016). 
 
Interviewee 9, a representative from Trident Apprenticeship Program, also attributed the 
success of South Carolina in attracting companies, such as Mercedes Benz, Volvo, and Boeing, 
to state managers’ capacity in working collectively to accommodate corporate needs.  According 
to Interviewee 9, “Charleston has grown to manufacture more than any place in the United 
States…” and this is because 
…[the state] gets people involved, when you get leadership, companies, high schools 
together, you get the college, technical schools, whatever, together, you see results and 
that is something else. 
 
Researchers have explored such a role in several studies. For example, scholars like 
Phelps and Wood (2006) have demonstrated how states’ and MNCs’ interests have grown more 
mutually coincidental, transcending, or blurring the separation between public and private 
sectors. Therefore, the power of states when bargaining with MNCs does not only reside in 
specific regional assets, as GPNs scholars would argue but also on the trustworthiness, 
flexibility, inter-scale fluidity, and the state manager’s willingness to meet present and future 
MNC interests. Accommodating the immediate and future MNC interests requires constant 
change, adaptation and experimentation of state institutional capacities and arrangements as well 
as locality intervention to create new assets. 
 
4.1.2 Greater Commitment to Keeping South Carolina’s Right-to-Work Status  
 
 
 116 
 
One second significant aspect of South Carolina’s accumulation strategy shift has 
concerned South Carolina’s greater commitment to maintaining the state right-to-work27 status. 
Although such a commitment is not new, South Carolina state managers have increased their 
efforts at the state and local level to discourage workers’ attempts to unionize in the state. This 
plays an important role in its accumulation strategy, given that such efforts, as Block (1987) has 
pointed out, enhance business confidence in the state, encouraging potential investors like MNCs 
to come to the state. To explain South Carolina’s success in attracting MNCs, Philip Morgan 
contended that: “We are a right-to-work state. We have the lowest unionization labor rate. The 
employees here don’t want to be unionized. It is a culture within the workforce” (SC Aerospace 
Conference 2016). State managers’ commitment has been relayed mostly through speeches, 
news statements, and online platforms, like Twitter. At an automobile conference in Greenville, 
Nikki Haley, a former South Carolina governor, spoke out about the state’s view regarding 
unions: 
We discourage any companies that have unions from wanting to come to South Carolina 
because we don’t want to taint the water. […] You’ve heard me say many times I wear 
heels. It’s not for a fashion statement. It’s because we’re kicking them every day, and 
we’ll continue to kick them.” (Bell 2014). 
 
More recently, the current governor of South Carolina, McMaster, has also opposed 
attempts of unionization in the state. Due to the International Association of Machinists (IAM)’s 
unionization victory28 in 2018 at the Charleston’s Boeing plant, the governor contended, “Their 
presence (IAM) in North Charleston is about as welcome as a Category 5 hurricane. […] we 
aren’t going to let out-of-state labor unions ruin the wonderful working environment in our 
 
27 The term right-to-work state refers to states that have passed a law which guarantees that no person can be compelled to join or 
not join or to pay dues to labor unions (Niznik 2018). 
28 In June 2018, flight line workers at the Boeing South Carolina plant voted in favor of organizing into a union with the 
International Association of Machinists (Moxley 2018). 
 
 
 
 117 
 
state.” (Twitter, May 21st, 2018). As an IAM union representative, Interviewee 2, claimed, this 
state manager anti-union commitment has remained a principal part of South Carolina’s 
developmental strategy: 
They (state managers in South Carolina) lend their face to the anti-campaign 
(unionization campaign). […] She (Nikki Haley, former governor of South Carolina) 
chooses to try to make South Carolina look more attractive to companies to move here so 
she will help to keep the workers oppressed. 
 
The anti-union commitment has extended to the local scale as this research will detail in 
another section. State accumulation strategies prioritize certain actors and their strategic needs 
and demands (see Jessop 2015). Regarding South Carolina’s accumulation strategy, 
manufacturing capital fractions’ strategic needs and demands have remained privileged while 
actors’ representational power such as the working class and their delegates have weakened. The 
lack of workers’ representation has resulted in direct foreign investment policy not having any 
significant involvement from the working class and their representatives. Issues like transparency 
regarding incentives such as customized training, plus solid wage gains guarantee, and workers’ 
benefits have been left to state managers working with MNCs to decide. 
 
4.1.3 Greater Alignment Between Education and Businesses 
A third aspect of South Carolina’s accumulation strategy, and most vital for this research, 
pertains to how South Carolina state managers have further aligned education with the interests 
of manufacturing MNCs in the state, transforming education into a crucial part of its 
accumulation strategy, or asset to foster structural coupling processes. State managers have 
pushed the commodification of education to a new level, framing education as an economic 
development matter, and the corporate capture of its educational system and educational 
initiatives as a developmental mechanism to foster structural coupling processes. Three primary 
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initiatives have revealed this further alignment: the development of career academies within 
schools; the development of Apprenticeship Carolina, and the reorganization of ReadySC. These 
three initiatives have been designed to foment structural coupling processes.  
Further alignment between corporate interests and education does not hold unique to 
South Carolina. In the last four decades, US neoliberalism has reoriented education’s purpose, 
structure, and priority, basing educational decisions more heavily on free-market policies and 
economic rationality (Saunders 2010).  Such a reorientation has related to the American shift 
from a Keynesian state form to a Schumpeterian one. The state started to advance policies 
promoting labor market flexibility and developing flexible and enterprising workers suited to the 
evolving knowledge-based economy (Jessop 2002).This new vision regarding the emergent 
knowledge-based economy has held knowledge production, valorization, and application as the 
principal driving of competitiveness, profitability, and development (Jessop 2017 p 854). 
However, this does not mean that a new education model has emerged. American higher 
education has continued to attend the capitalistic ruling class29. Nonetheless, neoliberalism has 
drastically accentuated this previous model, increasing profit-driven, corporate ends, and faculty, 
student, administrator, and policy maker adherence to market targets and priorities (Saunders 
2010). This reorientation has resulted in trustee members at educational institutions increasingly 
coming from the private sector, bringing their corporate logic to decision-making strategies 
(Saunders 2010). Moreover, the vocationalization of community colleges in the US has advanced 
to the point faculty in some departments have considerably lost their influence over curriculum 
decisions. In this context, in some cases curricula continue to meet capital interests catering to 
 
29 The corporatization of the United States’ higher education is not recent and started in the 19th century with the emergence of 
public education. Moreover, the vocationalization of the curriculum, the focus on meeting the demands of capital, and the 
corporatization of governing boards started more than a hundred years before the emergence of neoliberalism (Saunders 2010). 
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job training and career development (Saunders 2010). Although clearly represented in science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), it also has also affected the arts and 
humanities (Jessop 2017). 
In South Carolina, the development of career academies at schools across the state 
exemplify how education and the private sector have been further aligned. This reorientation 
started in 2005 and was influenced by firms’ representatives such as the South Carolina State 
Chamber of Commerce and the Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce (CMCC), and by state 
managers. The key aspect of this reorientation was Michael Porter’s 2005 plan entitled “South 
Carolina Competitiveness Initiatives: A Strategic Plan for South Carolina”, which served as a 
guideline and justification for MNCs to represent their interests to South Carolina state 
managers, and to advance their goals regarding such an alignment. One primary recommendation 
in Porter’s plan was to “align and link the educational system and local business so that 
education meets the workforce requirements of business, and business appropriately supports the 
educational system” (Porter 2005, 62). Porter’s plan was based on a cluster-approach, and placed 
innovation and human capital at its center. One of the participants from the Aerospace Council of 
Competitiveness claimed:  
“…it really started when Michael Porter from Harvard came down and did a 
study…They generated a report that had some co-foundational things that they 
need to do to help the industry grow and evolve here, and the reason the 
Department of Commerce did that was that the secretary (Bob Hyatt) had worked 
for BMW.” (Interviewee 18, 2016). 
In the same year, the South Carolina general assembly, influenced by corporate interests 
passed the 2005 Education and Economic Development Act (EEDA), a document establishing 
requirements for schools, colleges, and universities to work collectively with businesses in the 
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state. Interviewee 12, a representative from the Trident Youth Apprenticeship Program, 
observed: 
The 2005 Education and Economic Development Act was driven into existence by the 
State Chamber of Commerce, because the Chamber recognized a shortage of people with 
particular skills sets, the baby boom that has the skills sets are retiring, there are not 
enough students getting trained in these skills to fill these positions let alone to expand 
what is happening in the region and across the state. So, the State Chamber of Commerce 
pushed into existence this piece of legislation. 
 
The 2005 EEDA moved significantly to further the state educational system’s 
corporatization process by establishing that every South Carolina school must maintain a 
standards-based academic curriculum structured around a career cluster system, and must require 
students to take career-focused courses. The 2005 EEDA also determined the credits acquired in 
career courses at secondary schools would be transferable to four- and two-year courses at state 
colleges and universities. According to Interviewee 11, in the 2005 EEDA, career academies 
related curriculum mostly to STEM courses and vocational training. According to one participant 
from the South Carolina Department of Commerce, one major reason for passing this act held to 
develop channels with students, parents, teachers, and companies directing learners to pursue 
career paths that address existing skill gaps in the market.  
This alignment is part of a broader US movement, where researchers, corporations, and 
not-for-profit organizations have claimed for the existence of a skill gap in manufacturing 
positions in the country (Lerman 2012). Yet there is debate in the US over the extent to which 
firms confront actual skill shortages (Cappelli 2015), and whether these are the result of short 
falls in firms’ investments, or the inability of public institutions to meet firm demands as training 
becomes increasingly firm specific (Rutherford & Holmes 2011). This alignment epitomizes a 
cultural problem. This is considered a cultural problem because students and parents associate 
social and economic success with college degrees, creating disinterest in manufacturing-related 
 
 
 121 
 
careers (Lerman 2012); hence, the 2005 EEDA sought to tackle this issue.  A participant from 
the South Carolina Department of Commerce (Interviewee 14) remarked: 
[…] it was really to make sure that students, teachers, parents, understood what kind of 
industry we have and make that connectivity. So, the students could understand the kinds 
of jobs were in the community, and potentially do internships and things in that nature, 
not only manufacturing but outside manufacturing. […] With that law there was 
established regional workforce education centers across the state […] really to make that 
connectivity between K12 and post-secondary education and families with the types of 
business and industries. 
 
This further alignment seeks to support different fractions of capital in the state, attending 
to their skill formation needs, but has also been framed as an important component of South 
Carolina’s accumulation strategy. One state representative from Berkeley county, Interviewee 
15, voiced: 
I think a lot of times, what a business looks at a location to go to, they want to know how 
serious is the commitment of the county, how serious is the commitment from the state, 
but also how serious is the commitment from the education system to not only make sure 
that if I move my business here, my kids are getting good education, but making sure that 
we are going to have a workforce, not just for today, not just 5 years from now, but 20 
years from now, well trained and well educated to handle our needs. 
 
Worthy of notice, such a reorientation in education is not just about meeting the interests 
of MNCs regarding skill formation. South Carolina state managers believe this educational 
model to improve state educational quality in a state hosting one of the worst public-school 
education US standards30 (Bowers et al. 2018). As Poulantzas (1978) pointed out, state managers 
who sympathize with a specific force, interpret their interests in terms of a particular ideology, 
that of the ‘neutral state’ (Poulantzas 1978). As Interviewee 7 from the Charleston Chamber of 
Commerce explained: 
[…] they (career academies) help engage students, high schools’ students are bored, don’t 
 
30 According to a recent report, in the 2017-2018 school year, more than half of students in grades 3 through 8 were not able to 
meet South Carolina’s reading and math standards. S.C. state test also reveals that one out of three students graduates unprepared 
for the job market, number that is worse in rural and poor districts. In the test known as “the nation’s report card”, South Carolina 
failed, in 2017, in almost every category (Bowers et al. 2018). 
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see why they need that. So, they get into a point they drop out. They want to leave 
because they see no relevance. So, if you can bring the relevance and engage them in the 
learning process, they will stay. So, you increase the number of students that graduate 
successfully. […] We found about career academies by doing research in other 
communities Nashville, Tennessee. They have a very successful program. They went 
from 68 percent graduation in high school to 82 percent in 7 years, and all the things that 
changed were the implement career academy. […] It makes it relevant and then the other 
part, the teachers are more like a facilitator than a lecture. So, the kids are working in 
teams, which is what employers want. They work on projects. […] So, it makes them 
excited about school and then the business community comes in and they offer jobs. 
 
The reorientation of South Carolina’s educational agenda did not only create career 
academies, but also established the programs Apprenticeship Carolina and ReadySC. Both 
programs are housed at the Economic Development Division of the South Carolina Technical 
College System, a System that administers 16 technical colleges strategically placed across the 
state. According to Interviewee 13 from Apprenticeship Carolina, the program was founded in 
2008. As in the case of career academies, South Carolina State Chamber of Commerce 
influenced this program’s establishment and structure, as an interviewee from Apprenticeship 
Carolina revealed in the following statement: 
The history of that takes us back to 2003 when our state chamber of commerce made a 
report on workforce needs, and the benchmark was when recommendations came out, 
asking for a better apprenticeship system for South Carolina. So, it was staffed in 2008 at 
the Technical College System. […] The state chamber of commerce was instrumental in 
driving the initial conversations. The industry responded to their report, saying “that is 
something we would support”, and here we are today. 
 
As a participant from Trident Apprenticeship Program (Interviewee 9) noticed, 
Apprenticeship Carolina sought to develop market-demanded skills, and as in the Career 
Academies case, the program also engendered the goal to alter students’ perception regarding 
manufacturing careers, “We have a generation of millennials that have no sense of pride in 
becoming a welder or machinists. The problem is (…) the companies that are coming, this is 
what they are looking for.” In the US, the apprenticeship system has remained decentralized, 
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where states have the autonomy to develop programs and to choose whether to register their 
programs in the registered apprenticeship system of the US Labor Department office (Lerman 
2012). In the US, participation in apprentice programs has proven minimal when compared to 
other countries, such as Germany (Levesque et al. 2008). For this reason, the VoC literature has 
characterized the US vocational training system as focused on general skills training, lacking 
firms’ participation in apprenticeships due to absence of mechanisms to avoid firms poaching 
apprentices from one another (Hall and Soskice 2001). However, evidence suggests that South 
Carolina varies from the US national state concerning vocational training. In the state of South 
Carolina, apprenticeship has gained relevance in the last decade, where the number of 
apprentices and apprenticeship programs across the state have greatly increased. This increase is 
related to the recent shift in the educational agenda of South Carolina, which has demanded local 
states to implement and expand apprenticeship programs. One feature in these programs is to 
register apprentices in the U.S. Dept. of Labor. For example, the number of active apprentices in 
the state increased from 3,198 in 2011 to 20,763 apprentices in 2018. This represents a rise of 
649% in seven years. Moreover, South Carolina has the highest percentage of apprentices by 
population size in the US (see table 5 and 6). 
 
Table 5. Increase of Apprentices and Apprenticeship Programs from 2011 to 2017. 
South Carolina 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Increase 
% 
Active 
Apprentices 
3,198 4,791 6,412 4,485 5,367 5,297 17,609 20,763 649% 
Active 
Programs 
283 565 619 463 524 569 964 1,054 372% 
Source: US Dept. of Labor, 2011-2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124 
 
Table 6. Percentage of Apprentices by Population Size. 
State Population 
Size 
Active 
Apprentices 
Apprentices/Population 
California 39,557,045 89,949 0,23% 
Ohio 11,689,442 19,081 0,16% 
Michigan  9,995,915 20,576 0,20% 
South 
Carolina 
5,084,127 20,763 0,40% 
 
Source: US Dept. of Labor, 2011-2018; US Bureau Census, 2018. 
 
 
The reasons why the state of South Carolina had such a high increase in apprenticeship 
programs and participants were not provided. However, in the last years focus has been given to 
strengthen apprenticeship programs in the state. To encourage firms’ participation in the 
program, South Carolina state managers have designed certain mechanisms. To design such 
mechanisms, the corporate sector has played an active role as Interviewee 9 professed, “the State 
Chamber of Commerce idealized the State Technical College System and convinced state 
legislator to develop one division of apprenticeship.” As this participant explained, the program 
has garnered success because the state adopted the State Chamber of Commerce 
recommendations. Regarding the program functioning, Apprenticeship Carolina does not 
perform firm training, but supports businesses to develop their own apprenticeship programs and 
to register them with the federal government. Hence, Apprenticeship Carolina has consultants 
meeting with company staff to guide them systematically in creating apprenticeship programs 
(Interviewee 13). This means consultants will freely guide firms to first identify what education 
or training the offered positions require. Consultants, after identifying the education type, 
connect the business representative with a state technical college. Second, consultants help firms 
to structure on-the-job training. For every 2,000 hours apprenticeship program, corporations 
must complete 144 education hours (Interviewee 12 and Interviewee 9). Third, consultants assist 
firms in setting up a scalable wage plan, completing bureaucratic paperwork, filling in forms, 
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and completing federal registration paperwork. Consultants also present the resources available 
for companies registered in the apprenticeship program, such as obtaining state and federal tax 
credits. South Carolina offers firms U$ 1,000/month in tax credit per apprentice for up to four 
years (Interviewee 12 and Interviewee 9). Apprenticeship Carolina is structured as follows: 
 
Diagram 4. Apprenticeship Carolina. 
 
Source: Author. 
Another program showing how MNCs have reoriented the educational system of South 
Carolina is ReadySC, which clearly typifies a process of corporate capture. ReadySC started in 
1961 and was initially called Special Schools. One of the oldest training programs offering 
customized training for businesses, the program has trained more than 290,000 people and 
attended to more than 3,600 companies (ReadySC.org 2018). The program was initiated when 
South Carolina jobs were declining and young people were leaving the state, lacking training 
services. Fritz Hollings, a former South Carolina governor, understood to attract new 
corporations, the state would need to have an educational system providing the skills in demand 
(Ford & Stone 2007). In this way, the South Carolina College System was founded in the 1960s 
along with the program Special Schools, program which was created as a developmental 
instrument meant to entice firms to the state. The program Special Schools, reformulated in the 
Skills
•Identify firms' demanded skills.
•Design training curriculum for firms in a SC Technical 
College.
On-the-
Job
•Design with firms the structure of 
on-the-job training
Bureaucratic 
Paperwork
•Apply for state and federal 
Registration.
•Design scalable Wage Plan.
•Apply for Tax incentives.
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early 2000s, was named ReadySC, establishing a systemic, technical, and refined approach to 
recruiting MNCs.  
ReadySC program exemplifies a process of corporate capture because this program, 
without the need of any negotiation, provides highly customized training and recruiting services 
for firms interested in moving to South Carolina or planning to expand. Both services are not 
only cost-free for firms, but also bureaucracy-free. According to one ReadySC’s representative, 
firms can have access to ReadySC’s services independent of their size; however, the focus has 
remained on large multinational corporations. For firms to receive services, they need to generate 
at least 10 new permanent jobs, pay competitive wages for the region, offer benefit packages 
with health insurance, and invest an appropriate capital amount (Interviewee 29). 
Currently, ReadySC is a crucial mechanism to attract and retain corporations to South 
Carolina and is intrinsically related to South Carolina’s accumulation strategy.  As stated before, 
central to South Carolina’s accumulation strategy is to foster structural coupling processes. Many 
participants consider ReadySC the major “trump” in their assets when bargaining with MNCs.  
Interviewee 9, a representative from the Trident Apprenticeship Program declared: 
ReadySC is the carrot that gets them in the door, gets things going…We are very 
attractable to foreign companies. It started with the leadership of the state. Leadership 
realizing that apprenticeships, ReadySC, getting companies up and going is the most 
important issue. In these cases, skilled labor. We are going to be really popular…It is not 
just the sunshine in our port, is what we offer [referring to ReadySC free customized 
training] to companies when they come. There is nothing wrong with building buildings. 
We hear that a lot, “if we just had this building, this equipment” […]. I know places that 
built places and have the equipment and they are empty […]. 
 
Generally, when working with businesses, ReadySC is structured in a 3D process: 
discovery, design, and delivery. First, ReadySC discovers what the company training needs not 
only from a technical perspective, but also from a cultural perspective, such as discipline. 
Second, ReadySC designs the training program, developing the curriculum according to the firm 
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specificities.  Hence, ReadySC staff meet with the firm human resource representatives to 
discuss needs and interests. ReadySC does not outsource training but delivers the corporate 
training needed. Specific and customized training fits firms’ needs. The third program piece, 
training delivery, depicts the company establishing standards, and ReadySC training accordingly. 
Recruitment and screening are other two services ReadySC provides.  Companies reveals 
the skills’ characteristics for which they are looking, such as desired experience, diploma, 
college education, and ReadySC, through several partners, recruits the people to receive training. 
Project management represents a feature ReadySC offers. ReadySC assigns one project manager 
to the company being attended, manager who will be the primary contact point between the 
company and ReadySC. 
ReadySC also tracks corporate metrics, varying according to firm requirements and 
serving not only for ReadySC to improve its services, but also for companies to ensure they 
attain the most qualified workers. Training can take place at the state technical colleges or at the 
firms. The training location varies according to the entity interests, but usually, ReadySC 
establishes a training center at a state technical college housing the necessary equipment. 
ReadySC is structured in the following way: 
 
Table 7. ReadySC Program. 
 
Source: Author. 
 
 
•Discover what the companies' training needs are.Discover
•Design curriculum.Design
•Establish a training center, and train customized workers.Deliver
•Screen and recruit workers according to the skills' 
characteristics provided by firms.Recruit and Screen
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Therefore, this program typifies a process of corporate capture. However, ReadySC 
differs from the classical processes of corporate capture in which state institutional capacity 
capture results from bargaining events between state managers and MNCs. Rather, ReadySC was 
designed to be captured as a mechanism to recruit firms at the subnational scale. To further 
demonstrate how ReadySC represents a form of corporate capture, in the next section, this 
research will analyze the structural coupling process between the state of South Carolina and 
Boeing in 2009. 
To conclude, the evolution of the corporate capture in South Carolina in training 
programs such as ReadySC, Career Academies, and Apprenticeship Carolina demonstrates how 
the specialized literature cannot fully explain how such processes evolve. On one hand, scholars 
such as Phelps (2008) have argued that national liberal states are more prone to have processes of 
corporate capture because their state apparatuses are marked by low levels of coordination. 
However, as the variegated capitalisms literature revealed, national states have internal 
variations, where their subnational states do not always comply with its national form. This is the 
case of South Carolina, which although its national state has been analyzed by the VoC literature 
as a liberal state, resembles a developmental form of state, having an accumulation strategy that 
is marked by a high level of state coordination, heavy state intervention, and a clear industrial 
policy. Still, corporate capture is a common practice in the state, which contradicts Phelps’s 
(2008) argument. 
On the other hand, the GPN literature has explained corporate capture based on the lack 
of distinct regional assets in certain locations (see Mackinnon 2012; Yeung 2016). This means 
that, regions that do not have distinct assets to meet the strategic interests of MNCs are in an 
inferior position when bargaining with firms, and thus, more prone to corporate capture. 
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Although such a rationalization sheds some light on how processes of corporate capture evolve, 
it still provides an incomplete explanation, being based on purely descriptive accounts of such 
processes. 
As demonstrated, the accumulation strategy of South Carolina is based on mechanisms 
such as ReadySC that were designed or institutionalized to be intentionally captured. The 
corporate capture of ReadySC does not require negotiations and does not happen solely due to a 
lack of distinct assets in South Carolina. Although, as this research will show in the next section, 
in the case of Boeing and South Carolina, their bargaining event did matter in that it intensified 
the process of corporate capture of ReadySC. The diagram below summarizes South Carolina’s 
accumulation strategy: 
 
Diagram 5. South Carolina’s Accumulation Strategy. 
 
Source: Author. 
 
 
Therefore, this section sought to argue that processes of corporate capture regarding 
training in South Carolina evolve—and should be understood—according to South Carolina’s 
accumulation strategy. In the case of South Carolina, the major goal of its accumulation strategy 
is to foster structural coupling processes. Thus, state managers have aligned their interests with 
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manufacturing MNCs. Such an alignment has allowed MNCs to advance their interests, fostering 
processes that could be framed as corporate capture in the educational system and educational 
initiatives of the state. More specifically in South Carolina’s educational agenda and initiatives 
such as Career Academies, Apprenticeship Carolina, and ReadySC. Nonetheless, this alignment 
has also enabled state managers to develop complex mechanisms and assets that have been 
efficient in recruiting firms. 
 
4.2 Boeing and South Carolina’s Strategic Coupling: The Corporate Capture of ReadySC 
In 2009, the state of South Carolina announced the establishment of a new Boeing 
Company’s plant in North Charleston to produce 787-airplanes. The Boeing Company, an 
American multinational corporation, designs, manufactures and sells rockets, satellites, missiles, 
and airplanes for the commercial and defense sectors. Considered one of the largest US exporters 
in terms of dollar value and the largest aerospace company worldwide, the establishment of a 
Charleston plant was acclaimed for its potential to generate thousands of jobs (Boeing.com 
2019).  
Boeing, founded in 1916, has continued to grow since World War I when the company 
established close links with the US Army. During WWI and WWII, Boeing was a major airplane 
and missile supplier for the US Army. After the end of World War II, the company started to 
manufacture commercial airplanes. Today, the company manufactures several commercial 
airplanes accommodating from 85 to 660 passengers, such as the models 737, 747, 767, 777, and 
787. On January 1, 2018, the company employed 141,332 people across the world (Boeing.com). 
The state of South Carolina played a crucial role in the attraction of Boeing. The GPN 
literature categorizes its role as facilitator, and its coupling process as a structural coupling. As a 
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facilitator, the role of the state is to promote, retain and attract firms, and to support the 
participation of local firms in global chains (Horner 2017). Structural coupling processes are 
based on proactive policies and strategies in which states provide competitive cost structures, 
fiscal and financial incentives, stable policy environment, and abundant labor supply to attract 
lead firms in GPNs (MacKinnon 2012; Coe et al. 2004; Yeung 2015). 
 
Diagram 6. Structural Coupling Between Boeing and the State of South Carolina. 
 
Source: Author. 
 
The establishment of Boeing in the region of Charleston took place in a time in which 
unemployment was near a record high in the state due to the 2008-09 financial crisis and 
recession. The bargaining process was controversial, given the negotiations involving South 
Carolina state officials and Boeing were conducted secretly and were not publicly undisclosed 
(Brundrett 2012). Some reports have stated South Carolina provided almost $1 billion in public 
incentives and subsidies to Boeing, which ranged from cost-free training services, promises of 
infrastructure improvements and land donation, to tax credits and front money investments. The 
state also granted hundreds of millions of dollars in public loans at low-interest rates (Brundrett 
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2012; McDermott 2009; Slade 2010; Norman 2010).  
As Mackinnon (2012) has asserted, regional coupling processes are connected to 
decoupling processes elsewhere, and involve an uneven development. Another major reason for 
Boeing’s decision to expand its production in Charleston was related to the constant strikes the 
company had faced in Everett, Washington (Wojcik 2011; Slade 2010). A representative from 
the Defense Association (Interviewee 6) professed: 
Why is Boeing here? Because we don’t have unions. That is the biggest reason why 
Boeing is here…They knew they couldn’t grow there [Everett] and it is cheaper to grow 
here. A lot of their facilities were closed and opened here. 
 
Another significant reason of Boeing’s decision to come to Charleston, South Carolina 
was the formidable incentives and subsidies the state provided to the company, as well as the 
existence of low-wage labor, a well-structured infrastructure, and the existence of a customized 
training program, which could start from scratch the establishment of a skilled workforce for the 
aerospace sector. The state, through ReadySC, committed to Boeing to recruit and train, free-of-
cost, 3,800 workers, but the training has exceeded this number as one interviewee from ReadySC 
stated in 2014, “We trained for new hiring 2700, but we probably provided some training, one 
course or more, I be guessing close to 5000, all the touch labor…”. At the beginning of 2018, 
Boeing had 6,749 employees in the plant located in Charleston.  
In this context, since 2011 when the plant was launched, the region of Charleston has 
experienced the formation of an aerospace industrial cluster, which has not resulted from 
emergence of aerospace startups, but from Boeing’s pull effect for suppliers. In this regard, the 
Charleston Regional Development Alliance has sought to attract aerospace-related companies, 
including Boeing’s suppliers to Charleston region. However, as Interviewee 28 from the 
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Charleston Regional Alliance Development claimed, the results have proven unsatisfactory, for 
the aerospace firms in the cluster have not increased as expected: 
In terms of the aerospace supplier growth, the growth hasn't been as 'fast' as anticipated 
due to the new approach of Boeing's 787 program. The focus [of Boeing] has been 
correcting supply chain issues, cutting production costs, and improving overall 
production efficiency. As the production rate increases, we suspect more suppliers will 
have a stronger business case to locate closer to the facility.” 
 
Since the establishment of Boeing, South Carolina has received more than 400 aerospace-
related firms, hosting in 2018 more than 90 firms in the region of Charleston (SC Dept. of 
Commerce 2018). Specialists have indicated aerospace jobs will grow drastically in the 
following years (Avalanche Consulting 2014), although it is unknown whether such a growth is 
related to the presence of Boeing. 
 
4.2.1 The Evolution of ReadySC Corporate Capture 
As stated before, the coupling process between the region of Charleston and Boeing is 
conceptualized by the GPN literature as structural coupling. According to Mackinnon (2012), 
this coupling has held more prone to processes of corporate capture than organic or strategic 
coupling, especially when states lack the distinctive assets to meet the strategic interests of firm. 
This is because the lack of regional distinctive assets leaves the state in an inferior position when 
bargaining with MNCs, fostering asymmetric power relations. In the case of Boeing and South 
Carolina, Boeing’s mode of entry was as a greenfield investment. Therefore, when bargaining 
with Boeing, South Carolina had an unsubstantial aerospace industry, skilled aerospace 
workforce, and aerospace training programs. This means that the state of South Carolina and the 
region of Charleston did not possess distinctive or specific assets to meet the strategic needs of 
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Boeing. As a participant from ReadySC (Interviewee 8) noticed, when discussing the capacity of 
ReadySC to deliver training to Boeing: 
To be honest with you, I think within Boeing there was a good bit of doubt. There is no 
aerospace industry in here, no background here. It is always been in Washington state. I 
think there was a good “can I do it?”. So, [participant’s name] and I were both back in 
2010, 2011 trying to get this thing stood up. There was always a light degree of that, but, 
beginning about 2012 to now, that’s gone. They [Boeing’s staff] have total confidence in 
our work. 
 
This lack of distinctive assets regarding skilled workers and training initiatives, as the 
GPN theorists have explained, resulted in South Carolina assuming an inferior position when 
bargaining with Boeing, and thus more prone to process of corporate capture. Nonetheless, this 
partially explains how the institutional capacity of ReadySC was captured. In fact, ReadySC was 
designed to be intentionally captured as a mechanism part of South Carolina’s accumulation 
strategy; therefore, Boeing captured the institutional capacity of ReadySC without having to 
bargain with state officials. Corporate capture was fostered by the fact that the company meets 
ReadySC’s criteria in terms of size of investment, and number and quality of jobs. Interviewee 9, 
discussing the size of firms able to obtain incentives, stated: “It is an equal footing, we don’t care 
as long as the company meets the requirements, we will do the training for them.”. 
However, the bargaining between Boeing and South Carolina also played a significant 
role in how the corporate capture of ReadySC evolved, given that the company was able to 
further intensify capture, by receiving greater incentives than other businesses generally do. 
According to one participant, MNCs such as Boeing receive more incentives for two reasons. 
First, while small- and medium-size firms acquire training incentives through local state 
managers or ReadySC’s staff, large MNCs like Boeing have direct access to the South Carolina 
Department of Commerce and high-level state managers to manifest their interests and bargain 
incentive packages. Second, MNCs receive more incentives because of the greater economic 
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potential these firms bring to the state in relation to small- and medium-size firms.  One 
participant from ReadySC explained: 
For big companies like Boeing, Mercedes, Volvo, it is through the Department of 
Commerce, government affairs, those kinds of folks…Once they get a good idea of what 
the company is looking for…then they will start reaching out to at a little bit lower level, 
maybe to a county, county economic development, and or ReadySC…Companies are 
going to provide 15 jobs we train them, but they are not going to get what Boeing gets. 
Funding depends on the size and scope of the company. Boeing being who they are, it 
was at a very high level. Boeing folks interact with the commerce, with state folks. I 
don’t have visibility at that level of discussion…Incentives packages will be much more 
significant for companies like Boeing, which by the way, sometimes generates a little bit 
of challenge for folks at our level, because a company will come here and see what 
Boeing gets, and that is what they want. Even though it won’t work in that way. That 
sometimes creates a little bit of animosity. 
 
In this context, state officials committed to invest U$33 million in the recruiting and 
training of 3,800 workers at the entry-level according to the company’s needs. In exchange, the 
company committed to generating a minimum of 6,000 jobs in the state (Shain 2009).  
The 3D process of ReadySC was not applied in Boeing’s case. ReadySC did not have to 
discover the company’s training needs, nor design from scratch a curriculum according to 
Boeing’s interest. Boeing provided ReadySC with a very detailed curriculum with the courses, 
encompassing not only technical and cultural/ethical courses but also the hours that should be 
spent in each course, and the ways the ReadySC’s staff should evaluate student performance, as 
a representative from ReadySC (Interviewee 29) articulated: 
…the training pack we have with Boeing is very different than a lot of the other 
companies that we worked with…Boeing told us, we understand your 3D process, but we 
don’t really want you to design any training. We have been building airplanes for one 
hundred years. So, we have the curriculum. So, our instructors actually delivered for 
Boeing curriculum. A little bit unique. For the other companies, we had to design the 
curriculum to meet their needs. 
 
To deliver training for Boeing, ReadySC established a training center at the Trident 
Technical College with a simulated factory environment. The state bought and brought from 
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other technical colleges across the state aerospace equipment for training. To attend the needs of 
Boeing, ReadySC “has 9 people to run the training project…60 plus instructors that are full time, 
that teach over 100 courses…” (Interviewee 8, representative from ReadySC). The training 
process is structured to take between 10 and 14 weeks, 40 hours per week but can be shorter or 
longer according to the needs of Boeing.  
Training takes place after candidates pass a phone interview, an assessment test, and a 
face-to-face interview; all delivered by ReadySC and its partner institutions. The training process 
at ReadySC is divided into three phases. Phase I – Pre-Employment Training consists of 32 
hours of unpaid pre-hire training and completion of assessments. In this phase, the goal is to 
screen and recruit potential employees for the company. Boeing provides the skill characteristics 
of desired workers, such as their education level, experience, etc., and ReadySC recruits workers 
that fit the description. To do so, ReadySC works with several local institutions who advertise 
the open positions, conduct interviews, administer the assessment, and select the applicants 
matching the demanded requirements. ReadySC, after recruiting workers, obtains Boeing’s 
approval to start the training process. A representative from ReadySC (Interviewee 29) described 
the recruiting process: 
Recruitment is another piece of what we do. We are partnered with a couple of other 
organizations around the state. We partner with the South Carolina Department of 
Employment and Workforce to be able to recruit for the company. Again, we don’t come 
up with what the companies are looking for. We work with the company. We have them 
telling us what kind of workers they are looking for. What type of experience do they 
want? Diploma, college education, all those types of things, and then we can build an ad 
and recruit from there. Again, at no costs to the company. 
 
Phase II – New Hire Training is comprised of specific training in occupations required by 
the company, such as welding, machining, and assembly. This entails general curriculum and 
basic manufacturing industrial skills training. In this phase Boeing hires workers, receiving a 
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minimum of U$12 per hour during their training. After 10 to 14 weeks, the employees start 
working at Boeing’s plant. Phase III – Factory Skill Enhancement consists of courses offered at 
ReadySC for existing Boeing’s employees to enhance their existing skills, improve proficiency, 
and quality level of production, encompassing onboarding processes, and on-the-job training. 
Boeing staff often visits the training center to make sure training is delivered according to their 
standards. Such visits are also marked by periodic meetings in which adjustments and changes 
concerning training are required. Boeing’s staff, responsible for overseeing ReadySC training, 
are also in constant contact with managers working in the manufacturing plant to attain 
suggestions and feedback regarding skills and training. 
In 2016, ReadySC had trained 2,800 entry-level workers for Boeing of which 94 percent 
of which were from South Carolina. Training was free for students and for Boeing. In 2015, the 
state of South Carolina had invested an average of U$10 thousand dollars per trainee in Boeing’s 
program (Brundrett 2015). Although South Carolina was able to get many local residents to be 
hired for manufacturing positions, the state failed to require Boeing, for example, to hire workers 
from within the state in top job positions such as administrative or engineering positions. 
Initially, ReadySC committed to Boeing training of 3,800 workers, but as Boeing expanded its 
presence in the region of Charleston, new rounds of negotiation resulted in new training 
incentives. For example, in 2013, Boeing announced a further investment of U$1 billion and the 
additional creation of 2,000 jobs, resulting in more training services incentives. In 2016, Boeing 
established a new regional painting facility, requiring ReadySC to develop a new training project 
to deliver this specialized training. Incentives were not disclosed. A ReadySC staff (Interviewee 
29) affirmed: 
We are up to 2800 folks (trained people), newly hired folks that we trained for Boeing. It 
is the number we are at. We have recently taken on an additional scope of work with 
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them to train their painters. They are establishing a painting facility that is supposed to 
open later this year. We are now training their painters for them. 
 
Boeing’s influence has also caused Charleston regional training programs to expand. In 
2019, the state of South Carolina will conclude the construction of its new S.C. Aeronautical 
Training Center. The state, the Charleston region, and other not-for-profit institutions will invest 
U$79 million in this construction. The center will accommodate more than 5,000 students per 
year, where more than 100 faculty members and professors will teach aerospace-related courses.  
The Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce played a crucial role in such an expansion as one 
of its representatives, Interviewee 7, declared in 2014. 
…one of the other things we were lobbying in Columbia was money to build an 
aeronautical training campus at Trident College. That would be some really big building 
just for aeronautical training because now they (Trident College) have a wait list to get 
into it…Boeing has told us the long-term potential for Charleston is enormous. Our talent 
and our workforce, if we can’t supply them the workforce they need, they are not going 
to grow as they wanted to… 
 
As stated, to receive training services from ReadySC, companies have to meet criteria, 
such as generate more than 10 permanent job positions with benefits and competitive regional 
wages. However, ReadySC has failed to demonstrate whether firms receiving its free training 
services met the required guidelines. Bargaining processes involving ReadySC, such as the one 
with Boeing, often happen secretly, lack transparency, and do not have mechanisms to guarantee 
criteria is met. 
For example, in 2000, a legislative audit of the program was performed, indicating 
several irregularities regarding whether firms have met ReadySC’s criteria. The report analyzed 
the projects delivered by ReadySC to 43 companies between 1993 and 1998 (SC Legislative Act 
2000). The 43 firms failed to display whether wages for jobs added were competitive as required 
by the program, and only 56 percent of the firms provided a commitment letter to South 
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Carolina. Moreover, only six companies revealed whether the workers trained by the program 
were hired (SC Legislative Act 2000).  
More recently, the media has criticized the lack of transparency of South Carolina state 
officials, for they failed to fully disclose the deal with Boeing (Brundrett 2012). During 
interviews, ReadySC and South Carolina state representatives were asked to provide some 
metrics regarding the Boeing trained workers at ReadySC. Metrics entailed their average wage, 
the percentage of workers according to their gender, race and locale of origin, and the average 
number of workers with benefits and career plans. None of the participants provided such 
information. Interviewee 9 from ReadySC, after stating he would ask his leadership for 
permission to share the data, emailed the following response, “I wanted to follow up with you 
from our interview. After discussing your requests with leadership, unfortunately, I will not be 
able to provide you any additional detail.” 
This lack of transparency regarding incentives for MNCs typifies a common problem in 
the US.  According to Mattera et al. (2014), while nine out of ten states in the US have disclosed 
at least some data online about companies receiving job subsidies, the quality of the disclosed 
data has remained poor, especially pertaining to performance measures, such as job creation. 
This means the states offering job subsidies have failed to publish documents identifying the jobs 
created, workers trained, or wages earned. This deficient transparency poses a problem since it 
impedes the conduction of studies weighing costs versus benefits. South Carolina, in 2014 
ranked as one of the worst states disclosing subsidy programs (Mattera et al. 2014) because it has 
failed to provide pertinent information regarding people trained, recipient names, and rarely 
gives information pertaining the subsidized jobs created, such as wages, benefits, and number of 
permanent job positions created (Mattera et al. 2014). Therefore, South Carolina has not released 
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ReadySC data for Boeing regarding the wages, benefits, job status (temporary/permanent), and 
trained workers’ benefits. 
To conclude, this section examined how the process of corporate capture of ReadySC 
evolved. The capture of ReadySC’s institutional capacity by Boeing was intrinsically related to 
South Carolina’s accumulation strategy and thus, part of a structural coupling process. ReadySC 
provides cost-free customized training services to firms meeting its requirements, and thus 
automatically grants its capture. This means South Carolina state officials intentionally seek 
having their training capability captured subnationally as a way to attract MNCs. Such an 
“automatic” capture is advanced further once firms engage in negotiations with South Carolina 
state officials, asking for more incentives or program adaptations. Although ReadySC requires 
MNCs to meet criteria, they are problematic. As demonstrated, ReadySC has successfully trained 
local people; however, in many ways, the program lacks transparency regarding whether Boeing 
has met its required guidelines. 
 
4.3 Labor Market Governance, Charleston Aerospace Regional Training System and 
Concerns over Corporate Capture 
In this section, the following question will be addressed: Does Charleston’s local form of 
governance reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in its regional training systems? 
It will be postulated that Charleston’s local form of governance has reinforced corporate capture 
by embracing, implementing, and expanding its higher-scale state initiatives and educational 
agenda. Although, attempts have been made to minimize corporate capture. I explore how such 
attempts to minimize capture are related to how the region’s formal sector-level strategy named 
One-Region, reduces single-firms’ influence, such as Boeing over Charleston’s local regional 
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training systems. Moreover, I demonstrate how these attempts to minimize corporate capture 
have been problematic, mostly due a lack of power of local state managers and to local 
governance actors’ attempts to solve corporate capture based on market relations.  
Every summer thousands of tourists visit the region of Charleston (see map 1). The 
region, comprised of three counties, Berkeley, Charleston and Dorchester, has a good reputation: 
nice beaches, good culinary dining, pleasant weather, and historical sites all make the region a 
popular tourist site. However, since the 2000s, the economy of Charleston region has drastically 
changed from tourism. The region has been transformed into a significant manufacturing hub, 
attracting in the last 20 years many manufacturing MNCs such as Boeing, Volvo and Mercedes-
Benz. As one participant noticed “[…] we are not the same community. We got this enormous 
potential […]” (Interviewee 7, 2014), referring to the success that the region has had attracting 
manufacturing companies, and consequently in increasing manufacturing jobs. 
 
Map 1. Boeing South Carolina Plant Location: 
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Between 2015 and 2017, the region generated 19,200 new jobs, achieving remarkable 
growth rates and an unemployment rate as low as 4 percent (SCEAR 2018). This economic 
growth held impressive, especially for a region in a state known for its fragile historical process 
of industrialization as well as current economic and social situation (Rees 2016). 
GVC experts have demonstrated how the establishment of new plants as well as firms’ 
upgrading processes result in a demand for new skills requiring new workforce development 
initiatives (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2016). Due to several recent manufacturing firms moving 
to the region, the aerospace/manufacturing local labor market of Charleston can be considered 
still under construction. Therefore, the manufacturing local labor market, and more specifically 
the aerospace sector, has faced challenges regarding skill gaps and training mismatches. As 
Interviewee 1 from Berkeley Chamber of Commerce mentioned,  
We have people that do not have the skills [manufacturing skills]…Right now we are 
inundated with manufacturing jobs. That is the basic need. But Charleston (College of 
Charleston) is a liberal school. We are not going to have a lot of manufacturing people 
but liberal arts. Their needs are different. 
 
Since the establishment of the Boeing South Carolina plant in Charleston, the regional 
aerospace sector has rapidly expanded, not only due to Boeing’s presence, but also due to the 
existence of newly established regional suppliers, resulting in a lack of a skilled workforce. The 
primary skilled positions lacking in the market entail: general assemblers, aerospace assemblers, 
technicians and mechanics, general machinists, industrial maintenance, welders, and engineers 
with specialization areas such as industrial, aerospace, mechanical, and electrical (Avalanche 
Consulting 2016). Several managers of aerospace firms’ human resource department claimed 
they had to compete hard with other businesses to hire skilled manufacturing workers.  
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Interviewee 26, an aerospace firm representative, remarked, “We struggle to compete for welders 
based on the number of welder jobs and what they pay in the area.” 
One clear discourse in many participant interviews regards how the region manufacturing 
skill deficiency is not only related to the absence of technical and higher education programs, but 
also to cultural issues. The Dorchester County representative, Interviewee 23, affirmed: 
The biggest challenge has been mom and dad…I was trying to figure out why mom and 
dad were so opposed to a career in industry…Most of the dads and moms I am dealing 
with, when they were in high school, manufacturing was dirty, nasty, hot. They have no 
clue that you can walk into Robert Bosch and eat out of the floor. 
 
Therefore, according to participants, the lack of manufacturing skills has remained due to 
the negative connotation toward a certificate, or two-year associate manufacturing degree. As 
interviewees stated, students seeking to continue education after graduating from high school 
want to pursue bachelor’s degrees.  Interviewee 9 from Trident Technical College remarked, 
In America parents aren’t telling their kids they need to be mechanics. They tell them 
they need to be a doctor. You need to be a lawyer, an engineer. We have a generation of 
millennials that have no sense of pride in becoming a welder or machinists. The problem 
is that the companies that are coming to Charleston this is what they are looking for. 
 
In this context, one regional concern has remained to develop a skilled workforce and a 
regional training system capable of meeting manufacturing firms’ skill needs, including the 
aerospace and automobile sectors. As demonstrated in the third chapter of this dissertation, local 
governance plays a crucial role in these processes. The development of a regional training 
system, and thus of a skilled workforce, happens through complex and uneven interactions 
among actors from different scales, such as individual firms and fractions of capital, educational 
institutions, public and not-for-profit institutions, and state managers, among others. Such an 
interaction defines which firms or sectors will be benefited, which skills will be provided, in 
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some cases who will finance training, which programs should be established and expanded, the 
level of vocational/academic integration, and the degree of skill transferability, among others. 
In this regard, one question emerges. Does the local governance of Charleston minimize 
or reinforce the processes of corporate capture at its regional training system?  
 
4.3.1 Charleston’s Local Form of Governance and its Contradictory Dynamic of Corporate 
Capture 
 In the region of Charleston, the major educational institutions responsible for training 
people for the aerospace sector are Trident Technical College, Clemson University, College of 
Charleston, The Citadel, Lowcountry Graduate Center, and R.B Stall High School.  The most 
relevant training institution for the aerospace sector has remained Trident Technical College. 
The region of Charleston has a strong and very active form of governance that represents 
the counties of Charleston, Berkeley, and Dorchester. This situation did not come to fruition until 
1993 when the US closed a Charleston Naval Complex, resulting in 20,000 people leaving the 
state, and in a loss of 15,000 spin-off jobs. This event pushed local actors to rethink their 
developmental policies, and to work collectively as one participant stated, “…it forced us to 
diversify and form alliances, to sit together at the table.” (Interviewee 23, representative from 
Dorchester County Department of Economic Development). As an outcome, the Charleston 
Regional Development Alliance (CRDA) was created in 1995 under the Charleston’s Metro 
Chamber of Commerce (CMCC) leadership. The naval complex closure “… put Charleston into 
action” (Interviewee 28, representative from CRDA). 
Today, the CMCC and the CRDA have retained the responsibility for leading the primary 
initiatives of the local governance agenda of Charleston.  Both institutions have identified 
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regional economic development problems and have found and proposed possible solutions.  
While the CMCC has represented and advocated for local firms, the CRDA, a not-for-profit 
institution, has focused on recruiting firms and talent to the region. 
In the last 10 years, the Charleston aerospace and automotive sectors have expanded, 
where its local governance has sought to develop a regional training system that is capable of 
delivering the skills demanded by local firms. The development of this regional training system 
raises questions of whether the local governance of Charleston has reinforced or minimized 
corporate capture. As this research argues, the way Charleston’s local governance has developed 
its regional training system demonstrates a contradictory dynamic in which it has reinforced 
processes of corporate capture, although fostering problematic attempts to minimize them. This 
research will start examining how Charleston’s local form of governance attempts to minimize 
corporate capture. 
Fieldwork evidence reveals that the main reason for local actors to develop a regional 
training system that is capable of delivering the skills needed by local firms is to prevent labor 
being hired by large corporations like Boeing from outside the state. As Phelps (2008) pointed 
out, one aspect of corporate capture concerns how MNCs receive high levels of subsidies from 
regions but end up recruiting out-of-state workers. In this regard, state managers have worked 
with the CMCC and the CRDA to establish and develop a training system that can train as many 
locals as possible; thus, seeking to minimize Boeing’s corporate capture in this regard. In this 
way, manufacturing firms do not need to look for skilled workers outside the state. One 
representative from the CMCC (Interviewee 10), proclaimed the following: 
The Talent Study really had us to change the conversation about the needs to build a 
pipeline of workers and to really make sure we are doing everything possible to prepare 
high school students. So, the jobs can be created in the region. If we are training 
incorrectly, then they don’t have chances to get jobs. In the long term, it is not good for 
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the community...It means we will have more people moving into the community and we 
are left behind and that is what we don’t want. 
 
To do so, local governance leaders hired a research group in 2014 to analyze Charleston’s 
labor market and identify its primary skill gaps and lack of related-training initiatives at principal 
local educational institutions. This study gathered information from the business community 
according to five regional sectors: aerospace, automobile, advanced security and IT, biomedical, 
and wind energy. When asked if the focus was given to the aerospace sector, one representative 
of the CMCC (Interviewee 10) responded: 
We got shortages in all kinds of sectors. So, we cannot just focus on aerospace. We need 
to make sure we are offering programs for all levels. There is Trident College, higher 
education, other areas for companies. 
 
The key skill gaps found in these five sectors were included in Charleston’s four-year 
developmental strategy, where goals and delineating initiatives such as opening of new education 
programs and courses to tackle such gaps were established. Examining the list of participants 
interviewed for the establishment of One-Region strategy, hundreds of actors from the business 
community were involved in the process. Established in 2016, the One-Region strategy has been 
widely adopted as a guide by state managers, educational institutions, the CMCC, and the 
CRDA. The elaboration of studies and formal strategies such as the One-Region are important 
tools used for local governance actors to represent their interests and needs to state managers. 
Such tools are part of a dominant political culture in the United State, which scholars have 
termed managerialism. Formal studies and strategies demonstrate to be some of the main 
mechanisms of South Carolina state selectivity, through which state managers select which 
demands to attend. Through lobbying, the Talent Study and One-Region strategy are used as 
assets to convince state managers about the “real” needs of their region, and thus, to advance 
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local firms’ interests. As Interviewee 7, a CMCC representative, stated, the Talent Study and 
One-Region strategy are used to “educate” many legislators about the region’s needs and agenda. 
However, although the One-Region strategy seems to minimize single firm’s influence, 
such as Boeing, over the creation and expansion of courses, programs, and the local educational 
agenda, thus, reducing corporate capture, this strategy has major issues. First, the One-Region 
strategy only attempts to offer a long-term solution to skill gaps, overlooking more urgent needs. 
As we will discuss later, aerospace small firms are having issues with a certain lack of skills and 
with poaching, which require short-term solutions. Short-term solutions have been ignored by 
governance actors.  
Second, while ReadySC has committed to train South Carolinians in manufacturing 
positions for Boeing, in this way preventing the company to hire workers from outside the state, 
Boeing South Carolina has not been required by state managers to hire local residents for job 
positions at the higher edge of salaries, the so-called white-collar workers. In this regard, the 
state of South Carolina has neglected in its bargaining agreement with Boeing, the fact that a 
high percentage of white-collar workers will be hired from outside the state, in this aspect, 
reinforcing corporate capture. 
Third, initiatives and goals established at the One-Region strategy and fostered by the 
local governance to tackle skill issues are mostly based on training initiatives and programs 
designed by the state South Carolina such as Career Academies and Apprenticeship Carolina. 
Such initiatives and programs, as argued in the last section, represent a form of corporate capture 
in which the state manufacturing fraction of capital has greatly influenced the educational agenda 
and strategy of South Carolina, fostering their interests. Therefore, the local governance fosters a 
contradictory dynamic. It reinforces corporate capture by embracing, implementing, and 
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expanding higher state scale programs and initiatives, while trying to minimize some of its 
detrimental outcomes such as workers being hired from outside of the state. In the next 
subsection, this research will explore how Charleston’s local form of governance has reinforced 
corporate capture with more detail by analyzing the development and functioning of two main 
programs in the region of Charleston: the Charleston Career Academies Program and the 
Charleston Youth Apprenticeship Program. The major goal of both programs is to tackle the 
regional skills deficiencies by altering the adverse cultural paradigm for high schoolers to join 
vocational careers. 
 
4.3.2 The Charleston Career Academies Program 
In 2014, the CMCC established the Charleston Career Academies Program through a 
partnership with Berkeley, Charleston, and Dorchester counties and school districts in order to 
develop career academies across their local schools. As explored before, this program is part of a 
process of corporate capture in the state of South Carolina in which the state manufacturing 
fraction of capital have influenced South Carolina’s educational agenda and strategy in regard to 
expanding vocational training at schools. The program in the region of Charleston, although 
based on its state educational agenda and strategy, has its own characteristics. According to a 
participant from CMCC (Interviewee 10) the program was developed based on a Nashville, 
Florida program. 
We have taken a group to go and visit academies in Florida in Nashville. That came 
about after several years of studying how it works in how to implement it here, so that’s 
where the academies come from. Nashville now is sort of a national model and they 
actually do annual training sections twice a year in how to implement career academies. 
 
In 2018, the CMCC had fomented partnerships with 22 Charleston high schools, creating 
62 career academies focusing on science, technology, engineering, and math; business and IT; 
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culinary/hospitality; and health sciences; however, a representative from ReadySC (Interviewee 
29) professed the focus had remained on manufacturing careers: 
The other thing that has drawn a lot of attention, a lot of focus, and funding, since we 
talked last time, is the focus of school systems on STEM. A lot of the schools are making 
changes to the curriculum to support those types of courses to help with the development 
of the workforce. 
 
One important component in these career academies concerns how businesses are also 
major partners with schools, counties and the CMCC.  To design career academies in local 
schools, the CMCC interacts with teachers and counselors to structure the program to meet 
community job opportunities. The CMCC also organizes meetings where regional teachers 
interact with businesses to learn about the needed skills and training. According to one 
representative Interviewee 10 from the CMCC: 
We have engaged 160 businesses and partners in the [career] academies. STEM, business 
and computers, hospitality and culinary, health sciences. The businesses are coming and 
meeting with the teachers once a month and they talk about curriculum and 
understanding how the teaching will be actually used in a job. 
 
The Charleston Career Academies Program seeks to influence students regarding their 
career decisions, so they pursue locally demanded careers. When a participant from CMCC 
(Interviewee 7) was asked about the Charleston Career Academies Program goals, she 
responded: 
The jobs are being created in this country, you don’t necessarily need a four-year 
degree…So, how can you help prepare students that may stay in the work or maybe go 
into to tech, where they get a two-year degree? They can still be very successful…What 
our goal is, is to have more students leaving high schools and being career or college 
ready. That’s is a very difficult thing to get and we are struggling. We struggle to get 
students to study in specific careers that we have a lot here. Our goal is to make sure that 
local students are being prepared to be able to be hired in good jobs that are being 
created. So, we are trying to align education with employers’ needs. 
 
Explaining the obstacle to “get students to study in specific careers,” Interviewee 7 
described how students and their parents have held a negative view regarding manufacturing 
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careers. In this regard, governance leaders have developed initiatives such as talks and meetings 
with students and parents to de-construct this view and impression. Such an attempt to de-
construct their views on manufacturing careers is also present in the Charleston Youth 
Apprenticeship Program, which will soon be demonstrated. 
Although the Charleston Career Academies can be seen as an approach to minimize 
corporate capture by firms, for it seeks to stop corporations from hiring out-of-state workers, the 
program not only seeks to influence schoolers in following vocational careers of interest of 
manufacturing corporations but also opens possibilities for schools to be influenced or have their 
Career Academy Programs captured by individual firms like Boeing South Carolina. 
One example regards how Boeing has influenced some schools in Charleston to establish 
career programs related to the aerospace sector. Since 2014, Boeing has partnered with R.B. Stall 
High School in North Charleston, creating aerospace courses. In the process, Boeing provided 
grants for equipment, creating teaching partnerships, and designing the curriculum of aerospace 
courses. When explaining the program development, Interviewee 19, a school representative, 
claimed: 
We invested money from the state and from Boeing, a combination [to structure the 
courses]. More input from Boeing, advice regarding how we are going to set the room, 
what kind of material we need. Boeing provided some consultants to come over here and 
help our teachers, to set up the program, make sure we were on board, very 
supportive…They are trying to create a good workforce, and that one way of doing it. 
 
Currently, R.B Stall High School offers a wide range of aerospace courses, such as 
computer integrated manufacturing, aerospace engineering, aircraft manufacturing 1/2/3, aircraft 
digital electronics, computer system, and intro to engineering design. Boeing has also impacted 
other schools’ career academies in the region, such as North Charleston Elementary, 
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Morningside Middle, North Charleston High, Fort Dorchester High, West Ashley High, and 
Berkeley High. 
 
4.3.3 The Charleston Youth Apprenticeship Program 
In 2014, Trident Technical College created the Charleston Regional Youth 
Apprenticeships Program. This program, although functioning in conjunction with 
Apprenticeship Carolina, also has its own particularities. The program resulted from local 
governance initiatives in which representatives of the CMCC, several local businesses, the 
Trident Technical College, and some high schools embraced its state program, understanding 
that apprenticeship programs could be an efficient way to tackle skills gaps in their labor market. 
The Charleston Youth Apprenticeship Program was created after the CEO of a German 
corporation located in Charleston contacted the Trident College Adult Apprenticeship Program 
to recruit youth apprentices, a participant from Trident Apprenticeship Program (Interviewee 9) 
explained: 
In 2014 a company called IFA Rotarian reached out to me. They said they had a new 
CEO, German-born, when came to America, walked to the company and the first thing he 
asked was, “where all my apprentices?”. He was not talking about adults but talking 
about kids. In Germany, they start in 10th grade. In America, we don’t do that. So, he 
reached out to me and said, “they want to do this, can you help?” I said you know we 
have been trying this for years, but we never had an employer who was willing to hire 16 
years old kids…I will figure it out, make it happen…We did a meeting and invited other 
firms like Bosch. We threw this proposal, saying why don’t we work together as a 
consortium of employers? 
 
According to some participants, the Trident College department of adult apprenticeship 
was able to get firms interested in hiring 16-year-old kids at the same time that CMCC was 
developing and implementing the Charleston Career Academies Program. This resulted in 
CMCC’s interest in being part of the program. CMCC acknowledged that apprenticeships could 
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be an important piece of their own program. One participant from Trident Apprenticeship 
Program affirmed: 
When the Charleston Chamber of Commerce found we had these six companies, they 
called us and said we want to help. Companies would have to pay the tuitions and books 
and fees, and CMCC decided to give a scholarship. They got companies to donate for the 
program to help kids. So, companies have only to pay the wages (Interviewee 9). 
 
The next step was to hire an employee to promote partnerships with high schools in order 
to recruit students for the program. This employee role is to recruit and “connect the kid with the 
employers for interviews.” (Interviewee 9).  
Today, the Charleston Youth Apprenticeship Program works in the following way. 
Charleston Youth Apprenticeship staff is responsible for connecting firms that are part of the 
Apprenticeship Carolina Program with 16-year-old (and up) high school students who are 
interested in participating in the program. The program has recruited students according to the 
firm skill needs.  To recruit students, the program has partnered with 26 regional schools, where 
students can apply for the opportunities.  
High school students go to school in the morning, take classes at Trident Technical 
College two to three times a week in the afternoon, and work part-time for firms (full-time 
during summer), gaining on-the-job training. After graduating, students earn a certificate degree, 
transferable to an associate degree, a national credential, and two years of working experience. 
CMCC provides scholarships to students/participants, paying tuition, fees, and textbooks; 
therefore, companies only pay wages, which can fully or partially be covered by tax credits.  
After concluding the apprenticeship program, the Charleston Regional Youth 
Apprenticeship Program organizes a Signing Day event, where youth apprentices officially sign 
their employment contracts. Hundreds of business leaders and students, media channels, 
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educators, and politicians attend the Signing Day event. The event glamourizes students’ choices 
for vocational careers and intends to counteract the negative view toward manufacturing careers. 
The main goal of this program is to provide a long-term solution for firms in the local 
business community, struggling to recruit workers with specific skills. Although finding specific 
skills in the local market has been a general challenge for local aerospace firms, small- and 
medium-size firms have experienced greater difficulties due to their competition with MNCs like 
Boeing and Volvo. A participant from CMCC (Interviewee 10) articulated: 
In the apprenticeship program…The majority of the companies offering apprenticeship 
are actually small and medium-size companies. Many of the 160 partners we have with 
the career academies are small and medium-size companies. So, they want to be 
involved, and in many cases, they have a harder time selling a job. So, I think there are 
efforts in all levels to make sure we are not dysfunctional. 
 
One participant, talking about how large corporations receive access to the most skilled 
regional workers voiced, “They [Volvo] just started recruiting and they already have 24,000 
applicants. And they will start with 2000 jobs.” (Interviewee 9).  Although MNCs, such as 
Boeing have also participated in the program. A representative from Trident Apprenticeship 
Program (Interviewee 9) continued: 
we can change the mentality of their [students] work ethic sooner than when they become 
adults and already have the perceptions of how they should work. And I can tell you that 
is not the only reason why companies are involved, but everyone wants to help a kid. 
Companies always have recruiters, but you are throwing a fishing line, when there are 
other options, like grow your own. 
 
To conclude this sub-section, Charleston’s local form of governance fosters a 
contradictory dynamic. On one hand, it reinforces corporate capture by embracing, 
implementing, and expanding higher state scale programs and initiatives such as Apprenticeship 
Carolina and Career Academies. Such programs are part of a process of corporate at the 
subnational scales, which has been fostered by manufacturing corporations interested in 
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influencing schools to expand vocational training. Therefore, by embracing and implementing 
such initiatives, this research understands that Charleston governance reinforces capture. 
However, on the other hand, some attempts to minimize corporate capture have been made. 
More specifically in regard to how local governance actors have sought to address long-term 
skill gaps in order to prevent labor being hired by large corporations like Boeing from outside the 
state.  Such attempts to minimize capture can also be seen in how apprentices are getting 
transferable skills, recognized outside of firms they train in. The initiatives of Charleston’s local 
governance, and thus, its tendency to reinforce or minimize corporate capture, are related to 
South Carolina accumulation strategy and to the mechanisms through which its state selectivity 
functions.  
 
4.3.4 Charleston’s Local Governance, Boeing, and ReadySC Corporate Capture 
In the second section of this chapter, this research explored the process of corporate 
capture between Boeing and ReadySC. As demonstrated, corporate capture resulted from 
interactions at the subnational scale. In this section, this study will pay attention to the local scale 
in order to analyze whether the local governance of Charleston has minimized or reinforced the 
process of corporate capture related to ReadySC specifically. 
In the second section of this chapter it was revealed that ReadySC requires companies 
that receive its services to meet some criteria such as paying competitive wages. However, the 
lack of any parameter to determine what is meant by a “competitive wage” poses a problem. 
South Carolina is considered one of the ten poorest states in the United States. Moreover, the 
state has one of the lowest real median wages in the country (U.S. Census Bureau 2018). 
Therefore, corporations do not have to pay much to claim to be paying competitive wages. 
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In the case of Boeing, evidence suggests the company has failed to pay competitive 
wages compared to what aerospace workers make in other regions, such as Everett, Washington. 
According to the local union, the pay rate at Boeing’s South Carolina plant has remained 35 
percent less than the U$31.04 per hour workers earn in Everett.  
Moreover, in contrast to Boeing Everett, Boeing South Carolina lacks a pay scale. Hence, 
while material touch workers in Everett make U$36 an hour after six years of work, in 
Charleston, workers at the same job position will earn U$20. Different from Everett, in 
Charleston, raises in salary and career advancements are subjective and based on manager 
appraisement.  Interviewee 2, a representative from the IAM union remarked: 
…a worker here working for six years, and a worker working in Everett six years…In 
Everett, it would be a $36 an hour. Here [North Charleston] they do not have a pay scale 
or anything. All based on forms of appraisement for managers, very subject you know. 
All I can tell is that here somebody here, a MT [material touch], after 6 years would make 
$20 an hour. Boeing brags about it because in this area wages are kind of low in general. 
 
Furthermore, according to the IAM representative, Boeing South Carolina released 
numbers that depicted the company to pay an average of U$23 per hour; however, most of the 
workers, working in material touch positions, hardly earn U$20 an hour, he asserted. According 
to the union representative, Boeing pays higher salaries to contractors than to their own workers. 
An interviewee from the IAM union contended: 
They [Boeing] say the workers here are at the 95 percent of the area wages and their 
average wage there is $23 an hour. It is really not for that MT [material touch] group. 
They are enrolled in with contractors. Boeing puts the numbers up. So, you are going to 
hear $23 per hour from Boeing and from the newspapers, but I can tell you from meeting 
with the workers and getting an understanding of how the plant is laid out. MTs are the 
largest group, it is hard to find anybody near $20 per hour. They pay more the contractors 
than they pay the workers (Interviewee 2). 
 
Another criterion firms must meet to receive ReadySC’s services concerns offering a 
benefits package. Besides not having a pay scale and a career advancement plan like workers do 
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in Everett, Boeing in Charleston has provided a health insurance plan that costs more than twice 
the price of the plan in Everett. This health insurance plan also has significantly fewer benefits.  
Moreover, workers have also faced overtime issues, working 12 hours six days per week with 
every other Sunday off. Overtime work has recently raised some issues regarding the quality of 
production at the Boeing South Carolina plant with its own workers putting in check the safety of 
Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner airplanes (Kitroeff & Gelles 2019). 
In this regard, Charleston’s local governance has not attempted to foster changes in 
programs such as ReadySC at the subnational scale, which would minimize the detrimental 
outcomes of processes of corporate capture such as this one with Boeing. First, this is because 
local actors not only lack the power to advance structural changes at the subnational scale, where 
ReadySC is designed. This lack of power of local states is part of a tendency in the US, where 
subnational states are shrinking their local capacity and authority to govern (Kim & Warner 
2018). As Kim and Warner (2018) disclosed, there is a trend in the US, where subnational states 
are increasingly transferring their expenditure responsibilities to local government as well as 
fostering constrictive revenue tools and preemption of policy authority. Therefore, the local 
forms of governance of Charleston finds itself in a position that, even if desired, changes are hard 
to be implemented due to a lack of power. 
Second, the local governance of Charleston has not attempted to foster changes in 
programs such as ReadySC at the subnational scale because local actors problematically believe 
that market relations, or more specifically, firm competition for labor and workers investing in 
the right skills will fix problems related to wages. Governance actors share the belief that 
through the market, South Carolina and Charleston, by attracting more and more MNCs to the 
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region, will be able to increase wages due to firms competing for skilled workers. Additionally, 
participants believe wages will increase as the skills of local workers improve through training. 
Therefore, while local governance actors, such as state managers, have increasingly 
embraced various responsibilities such as customized training to support business development; 
state managers have transferred the responsibilities concerning wages and benefits to the market 
and to individuals who are accountable for acquiring skills in order to have better wages. A 
representative from CMCC (Interviewee 10) mentioned the following when asked about the role 
of ReadySC in increasing wages as what has been done in this matter: 
We believe that we will start seeing wage pressure and that will be a big thing. It is going 
to find qualified workers, so companies will start to pay a higher wage. We want the 
wages to go up. That is one of the challenges of our region is that our living costs are 
really high, and our wages are lower than the national average. Part of our strategies is to 
have wages to increase. So that is why the Chamber is with high schools and existing 
workforce, to make sure that they can give the skills they need to be able to compete for 
these jobs. 
 
The potential and role of unions to increase workers’ wages in the region is heavily 
criticized as well as attacked at the local scale. Boeing has received a full commitment from state 
politicians to thwart unionization attempts. The IAM union has attempted in the last years to 
unionize workers at the Boeing’s Charleston plant, resulting in Boeing and its supporters to 
foster several initiatives to impede unionization.  
According to an IAM representative, state politicians, and the local media have joined the 
fight against unionization at Boeing’ South Carolina plant. For example, North Charleston 
mayor, Keith Summey, has sharply criticized IAM unionization attempts. When Boeing’s 
employees voted on April 2015, Mayor Summey discouraged unionization, stating: 
[…] Charlestonians that work at the Boeing facility need to remember what that union 
thinks of them. […] So, they're not concerned about our employees. They're concerned 
about their employees on the West Coast and how they can keep the Boeing business 
there (Rolo 2015). 
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Moreover, the local media has played a crucial role supporting the anti-union discourse, 
joining state manager efforts. Several media outlets have attacked the Charleston IAM union, 
demonizing its intents. Interviewee 2, a representative from the IAM union claimed: 
…when I first got down here, we participated in a Martin Luther King parade downtown. 
We had the biggest bus and 25 people walking with the bus carrying the American flag. 
We were singing songs for the race and labor movement and we never made in the tv. 
The float in front and behind us was on the tv. We were not. When I first got here the 
aerospace writer for the Post Courier, every chance he got bashed us…all these other 
entities are powerful including the mayor of North Charleston, he summed today a press 
release. He called one of those media things, where they all come out and lie. He said the 
only reason we are here is to take workers back to Everett. But we don’t have that ability 
even if we are organized here. 
 
Another issue is that although any firm-size can have access to ReadySC, the program is 
largely dominated by large corporations, reinforcing the view that ReadySC was designed to 
foment structural coupling processes. In this way, most of the investments have been directed to 
large corporations, such as BMW, Boeing, Continental, Volvo, Mercedes-Benz, Samsung, and 
Michelin while small- and medium-size firms, creating most of the state jobs have failed to 
receive similar attention. 
In Charleston, human resource representatives of small- and medium-sized aerospace 
firms professed they were facing shortages in several job positions. An aerospace human 
resource representative, Interviewee 27, claimed many job positions confronted a lack of skilled 
workers because “Boeing hires them, and training at Trident Technical College is for Boeing’s 
needs.” The participant continued discussing about Boeing’s influential power over training and 
state managers, “Boeing has got everybody in their pocket. Boeing says they [state managers and 
Trident Technical College] do whatever they ask. We are at the mercy of Boeing.” 
While local governance actors have attempted to address these skill issues through career 
academies and apprenticeship programs, such initiatives engender a long-term solution. At the 
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subnational scale, large corporations have captured what could be the short-term skill gap 
solution, ReadySC, limiting for small- and medium-size firms its local access. 
Among all 90 existing aerospace companies in the Charleston aerospace industrial 
cluster, only Boeing, Senior Aerospace AMT (12 trainees), and TigHitco have benefited from 
ReadySC—less than 4 percent of the aerospace firms. When a ReadySC representative 
(Interviewee 29) was asked about why ReadySC has failed to provide substantial services for 
small- and medium-size firms, he responded: 
I will not be able to answer why…It is free, effective. It is proven. I would venture to say 
that there is a fair number that doesn’t know about ReadySC, what we do and what we 
are capable of doing. 
 
Therefore, ReadySC has given centrality to Boeing South Carolina, overlooking the 
short-term needs of the aerospace business community, which has struggled to recruit skilled 
workers, like welders, mechanics, and assemblers, due to low unemployment levels and Boeing 
poaching skilled workers from these firms. As another aerospace firm human resource manager 
remarked: “The people we are looking for are already employed so we often have to use 
recruiters to try to pull them out of other places, particularly for our salary positions.” 
(Interviewee 26). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at analyzing three main issues. First, this research sought to 
demonstrate how the state of South Carolina has gone through some significant processes of 
corporate capture related to vocational training. It was revealed how the state manufacturing 
fraction of capital has influenced the design of South Carolina’s educational strategy and agenda, 
and consequently, the creation of state programs such Career Academies, Apprenticeship 
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Carolina and ReadySC. I argued that this process of corporate capture has evolved as an intrinsic 
element of South Carolina accumulation strategy, which has placed its manufacturing fraction of 
capital at the center of accumulation. In this regard, manufacturing corporations are structurally 
privileged by South Carolina selective institutional context, having advantages to strategically 
foster their interests. 
Second, this research attempted to analyze how the structural coupling process between 
Boeing and South Carolina resulted in the corporate capture of ReadySC. As revealed, ReadySC 
“automatically” grants its capture to MNCs that meet its criteria. It was intentionally designed to 
be capture. Nonetheless, as bargaining events emerge, as in the case of Boeing, the intensity of 
corporate capture can be greatly advanced. In the case of Boeing, the company was able to 
receive much more incentives than regular firms would get. 
Third, this chapter analyzed whether Charleston’s local form of governance reinforce or 
minimize processes of corporate capture related to the state manufacturing fraction of capital and 
to Boeing. I argued that Charleston’s local governance has fostered a contradictory dynamic, 
where local actors have attempted to minimize processes of corporate capture; however, these 
attempts have been problematic and have actually reinforced such processes. 
First, it was demonstrated that attempts to minimize processes of corporate capture at the 
local scale are related to Charleston Talent Study and One-Region strategy. As revealed, such 
study and strategy, based on sector-level demands, decrease single-firm influence, such as 
Boeing, over the local educational agenda of Charleston. Moreover, one major goal of the One-
region strategy is to prevent firms from recruiting and hiring of out-of-the state workers. 
However, as claimed, such an approach gives provides a long-term solution, overlooking urgent 
skills gaps, given that ReadySC capacity has been capture by large corporations. 
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Second, it was demonstrated that Charleston governance embraces and expands processes 
of corporate capture fostered at its subnational scale, thus reinforcing it, by implementing 
programs such as the Charleston Career Academies Program and the Charleston Youth 
Apprenticeship Program at the local scale. As demonstrated, these two programs are 
contradictory. This is because while they reinforce processes of corporate capture that were 
established at the subnational scale, at the local scale, they can be seen as attempts to minimize 
corporate capture. As revealed, one major goal here is to prevent workers being hired from 
outside of the state. 
Concerning Boeing’s process of corporate capture in regard to ReadySC, the local form 
of governance of Charleston has failed to minimize its detrimental outcomes because local actors 
not only lack the power to advance structural changes at the subnational scale, where ReadySC is 
designed, but also because local actors problematically believe that firms’ competition for labor 
and individual workers investing in the right skills will fix problems related to wages. As stated, 
this lack of power is part of a tendency in the US, where subnational states are shrinking their 
local capacity and authority to govern (Kim & Warner 2018). Boeing’s corporate capture of 
ReadySC presents problems related to a lack of transparency, low wages, poor benefits package, 
and overtime work. Moreover, while ReadySC has been responsible for training and getting 
locals hired by Boeing in manufacturing vocational job positions, whether Boeing is hiring white 
collar workers from outside the state of South Carolina and Charleston is a subject that is 
ignored. Corporate capture in Charleston can be summarized as follows (see next page): 
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Diagram 7. Corporate Capture in South Carolina and Charleston. 
 
Source: Author. 
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Chapter 5: Variegated Forms of Corporate Capture: The Case of São José dos Campos 
and Embraer in Perspective 
São José dos Campos (SJC) is a medium-size city located 55 miles from the city of São 
Paulo. SJC is known in Brazil as “the capital of airplanes” due to the presence of Embraer, a 
manufacturing aerospace company specialized in the production of military, commercial, 
executive and agricultural aircrafts. Embraer is one of the major employers in the region, being 
responsible for the generation of more than 15 thousand jobs. This has granted the company 
significant economic, social and political power. Therefore, Embraer as a major local player has 
fostered processes of corporate capture in SJC’s regional training system, influencing many local 
public educational institutions. In this regard, this chapter will be structured in two main 
sections. 
In the first section, this researcher will analyze how processes of corporate capture in 
training initiatives in SJC, São Paulo, Brazil have evolved intrinsically related to the Brazilian 
import-substitution accumulation strategy. Such a strategy privileged domestic industrial 
capitalists, having organic and structural coupling processes as its principal goals. This research 
argues that in SJC, the evolution of Embraer processes of corporate capture in training initiatives 
is associated with the organic coupling process fostered by the Brazilian national state in the 
1950s, which resulted in the establishment of Embraer and the Brazilian aerospace sector in the 
city. Therefore, the capture of training initiatives does not happen through bargaining events, like 
in South Carolina, but organically through synergistic informal one-on-one interactions. To 
illustrate this argument, in this section, this research will explore the evolution of Embraer’s 
corporate capture in two training initiatives, one at the Aeronautics Institute of Technology (ITA) 
and one at the São Paulo State Technological College (FATEC). 
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Second, this researcher will examine whether the local governance of SJC minimizes or 
reinforces Embraer’s process of corporate capture. I will argue that the SJC’s local governance 
reinforces processes of corporate capture due to the nature of the interactions among state 
managers and other governance actors. State managers and governance actors identify the 
aerospace local training needs, and advance training initiatives based on informal relations and 
personal/professional ties, which function as the main mechanism of state selectivity. This 
combined with the economic and social power of corporations magnify single firm influence, 
such as Embraer, over educational institutions and their training initiatives, reinforcing processes 
of corporate capture. 
 
5.1 The Brazilian Import-Substitution Accumulation Strategy and the Uneven and 
Combined Development of São José dos Campos, São Paulo, Brazil 
This section entails two subsections. In the first subsection, I will analyze the 
particularities of the Brazilian import-substitution accumulation. First, the emergence of the 
Brazilian import-substitution accumulation strategy will be analyzed, revealing how 
accumulation was made possible and how domestic and international fractions of industrial 
capital were central in such a strategy. In the second subsection, I will demonstrate how the 
Brazilian developmental state promoted development based on top-down decisions, fostering an 
uneven development that benefited the industrialization of the city of São Paulo, and later, of 
SJC through a combination of structural and organic coupling processes. This is important 
because the creation of Embraer in SJC is related to these processes. 
After the Second World War, the import-substitution model of development gained 
prominence in many countries in the Global South. In Latin America, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, 
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Uruguay, and Venezuela, among others, adopted this model with the goal to develop their 
internal market by substituting product imports with domestic production. In Brazil, the import-
substitution accumulation strategy, remaining in place from the 1930s to the 1980s, was adopted 
during the Great Depression when the Brazilian raw material exports severely declined. This 
waning in raw material exports encouraged the Brazilian state to diversify its economy, 
bolstering domestic industrial production to reduce foreign dependency (Oliveira 2004). 
In this model, Dependency theorists played a crucial role not only by revealing how 
accumulation was fomented but also by influencing the design of such a policy (Souza 2016). 
The Dependency theory emerged in 1949 when Prebisch and Singer established the Singer-
Prebisch thesis. Subsequently, other theorists, such as Furtado, Frank and Cardoso, also entered 
the scholarly discussion. According to Dependency theory, underdevelopment in Latin America 
remained predicated on the development of the Global North because the relationship between 
the core and periphery was based on an unequal exchange. In other words, less developed Latin 
American countries with economies based on “backward sectors” would sell raw materials below 
their real value, whereas core countries would sell their industrial manufacturing products at 
prices above their real value (Larrain 1989; Peet & Hartwick 2009). Such a dependence created a 
small elite as well as a vast population of poor peasants in less developed countries, where the 
profits gained through exports were used for luxury consumption rather than domestic 
investment (Prebisch 1950; Peet & Hartwick 2009). Dependency theorists understood that the 
import-substitution accumulation strategy encouraged development because internal domestic 
production would break the unequal exchange paradigm. In this regard, the backward sectors of 
Latin American countries, such as subsistence agriculture, posed an obstacle, necessitating 
industrialization replacement (Furtado 1964; Oliveira 1972). 
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However, Dependency theory, emphasizing core-periphery relations to explain the 
development (or underdevelopment) of Latin American countries, overlooked the role and 
significance of internal class relations in the import-substitution development model (Oliveira 
1972). As Oliveira (1972, 36) stated, “the expansion of capitalism in Brazil happened by 
introducing new relations in backward sectors, relations that are not only unequal but also 
combined.” International regulation, seeking to break with the unequal exchange relations 
between core countries and Brazil, was not the only feature accounting for Brazilian 
accumulation during this period. According to Oliveira (1972), under this model, development in 
Brazil happened due to the combination of four main factors. 
First, the internal industrial capital accumulation in Brazil did not result from the 
modernization, or industrialization of backward sectors—through a break from the core-
periphery unequal exchanges—as the dependency theorists would claim. Accumulation was 
made possible due to how the backward subsistence agriculture sector and its surplus production 
was articulated with the interests of the newly emerging industrial fraction of capital. The new 
modern relations of capitalist production took advantage of this backward sector, providing food 
for urban workers at low-costs and enabling working class reproduction at low costs (Oliveira 
2004).  
Second, the existence of an urban reserve army of labor, working in informal sectors and 
living in slums, also reduced the labor reproduction costs. Third, different from the US Fordist 
accumulation regime, the Brazilian state did not assume a commitment to foster full employment 
and to establish fundamental social rights as a way to sustain adequate demand. Labor rights 
were established but with a low minimum wage. Moreover, gains in productivity were not tied 
with increases in wages, like those in the US, which were based on an institutional compromise 
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between unions and industrial capitalists (Souza 2016). In this accumulation strategy, but mostly 
under its dictatorship period from 1964-1985, the Brazilian state coerced labor unions, 
suppressing labor mobilization (Oliveira 2004).  
Fourth, under this model of development, accumulation was made possible due to the 
Brazilian developmental state. The Brazilian developmental state forged an institutional 
compromise, where its national developmental project was mostly constructed along with the 
interests of the emerging Brazilian industrial fraction of capital. However, foreign direct 
investments also played an essential role in this project (Fine 1999; Oliveira 2004; Souza 2016). 
Industrial domestic and international manufacturing capitalists gained a privileged and 
hegemonic position in the Brazilian state. 
This means that the Brazilian import-substitution accumulation strategy developed 
several mechanisms and initiatives to foment two types of strategic coupling: Organic coupling 
based on the establishment of domestic firms mostly related to heavy industry and infrastructure, 
and structural coupling based on the attraction of foreign direct investments related to 
manufacturing firms of consumer and durable goods (Henrique & Muniz 2015; Santos 2015). 
To enhance organic coupling processes, the Brazilian developmental state directed 
investments to create, strengthen, and develop national firms, and to advance specific sectors 
(Henrique & Muniz 2015; Santos 2015). The Brazilian developmental state also implemented 
several measures privileging domestic capitalists, such as currency exchange devaluation and 
increased import tariffs (Bruno 2005). In this period, the Brazilian state created several national 
companies, such as Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (today Vale S.A), Companhia Siderúrgica 
Nacional, Petrobrás, Telebrás, and Embraer (Santos 2015). As this research will reveal in the 
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next section, it is in this context that SJC was selected by the federal government to host the 
creation of Embraer. 
While some Latin American developmental states limited or restricted FDIs in their 
countries to promote national firms, the Brazilian state rarely imposed restrictions on FDIs. 
Restrictions of FDIs were only imposed in some strategic sectors, such as the defense sector. In 
other atypical cases, restrictions were associated with certain conditionalities, such as 
requirements of association between FDI and Brazilian companies, or technology transference 
(Motta Veiga 2004). The Brazilian state was also successful in promoting structural coupling 
processes, and thus, in attracting FDIs—not only due to its lack of investment restrictions but 
also due to the existence of a large domestic market in Brazil combined with its imposed high 
import tariffs (Motta Veiga 2004). In the 1950s, the Brazilian state impressively attracted about a 
third of FDIs in developing countries (Oliveira 2001a). A summary of this accumulation strategy 
can be visualized in the figure below. 
 
Diagram 8. Brazilian Import-Substitution Accumulation Strategy 
 
Source: Author. 
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Under the import-substitution accumulation strategy, the Brazilian state was highly 
centralized, where the political decision-making reflected a top-down process. Mechanisms such 
as planning, coordination, fiscal centrality, and public investments proved crucial for the state to 
encourage development (Souza 2016). The autonomy of subnational states and municipalities in 
countries based on a federal governmental system such as in Brazil and the United States, as 
Ward et al. (2010) argued, behaves as a pendulum. In the Brazilian case, during the import-
substitution model of development, the federal government, which was already centralized—
given that under its dictatorship period, governors and many municipality mayors were political 
appointees from the federal government—gained more power, reducing the autonomy of 
subnational states and municipalities through the 1966 Tax Reform31. In this reform, the federal 
government increased its capacity to collect taxes. Such a centralization started to decrease after 
1974 and continued until the end of the 1980s when Brazil went through a process of 
decentralization due to the 1988 Federal Constitution (Sallum Jr 1996; Souza 2016). The 1988 
Federal Constitution reconfigured direct tax collection to subnational states and municipalities 
and established the right for citizens to elect their politicians (Souza 2016). 
The Brazilian developmental state, as Souza (2016) stated, was responsible for 
elaborating and coordinating policies while subnational states and municipalities were tied to 
these top-down decisions. As scholars such as Jessop (1990) and Jonas (1995) pointed out, the 
state tends to privilege not only actors but also places through its accumulation strategy and 
hegemonic project. In Brazil, the import-substitution accumulation strategy not only privileged 
 
31 In the 1966 Tax Reform, the Brazilian federal government further centralized its fiscal system and thus power of decision by 
directly receiving some taxes, such as the State and Municipal Participation Funds (FPM and FPE) and the Taxation on the 
Circulation of Goods (ICM) that before would be collected by subnational states. Before the 1966 Tax Reform, subnational states 
would collect the FPM and FPE taxes and transfer 30 percent to the federal government and 20 percent to their municipalities. 
After this change, the federal government started to collect the ICM and transfer to states and municipalities 12 percent of total 
collected (Piancastelli & Perobelli 1996; Souza 2016). After the process of decentralization in Brazil in 1988, the federal 
government started to transfer 20 percent of the FPM and FPE taxes to states and municipalities of the total collected. 
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industrial capitalists, but also fomented an uneven spatial development, which benefitted the 
Southeastern subnational states32, but mostly São Paulo (Souza 2016). For example, in 1956, the 
former president Juscelino Kubitschek launched the “Plan with Targets”, aimed at developing 
five primary areas and industries in Brazil: food, transports, energy, base industries, and 
education. This plan directed investment predominantly to São Paulo (Souza 2016). Such 
investments resulted in the state of São Paulo receiving the greatest amounts of public and 
private investments, and consequently, going through its most severe process of industrialization 
in Brazilian history (Loureiro 2006; Pereira 2018). For example, organic and structural coupling 
processes transformed São Paulo in the 1950s and 1960s into the largest Latin American 
aerospace and automobile production centers. The state attracted firms such as Ford, General 
Motors and Volkswagen (Takami 2018). 
Subnational states and municipalities lacked autonomy to design significant regional and 
local development policies to attract FDIs (Conceição et al. 2015). Therefore, FDIs’ locational 
decision and the federal governmental assessments regarding where to establish state-owned 
companies were dependent on aspects such as political ties with state and municipal politicians, 
infrastructure, presence of a skilled labor force, and to a lesser degree, subnational states and 
municipalities subsidies and incentives. Although, subnational states and municipalities subsidies 
and incentives were made more critical after the 1988 Federal Constitution, which awarded states 
and municipalities greater autonomy (Conceição et al. 2015). 
Besides receiving large public investments, the São Paulo metropolitan region also 
attracted and concentrated firms due to its significant presence of consumers and concentration 
 
32 However, the Brazilian state also sought, although unsuccessfully, to decrease such an uneven development by creating regional 
developmental programs to support some states and cities lagging behind economically. For example, the creation of SUDENE in 
1959 aimed at supporting the development of the Northeast region of Brazil (Conceição et al. 2015). 
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of skilled workers, state and municipal incentives, and a well-developed infrastructure previously 
established for coffee production and exports (Loureiro 2006; Pereira 2018). However, while the 
São Paulo metropolitan region enjoyed the highest agglomeration of firms in the country, the 
state’s countryside, as well as other states, lagged behind regarding its industrial development 
(Lencioni 1991). 
In the 1970s, São Paulo sought to decentralize its industry to benefit its countryside. The 
state invested in infrastructure, such as in the construction of modern roads connecting the 
countryside with the São Paulo metropolitan region. The state also created the Financial 
Coordination Committee of São Paulo Industrial Policy. The primary goal of this committee was 
to develop jobs in countryside cities by stimulating industrial relocation and decentralization 
from the São Paulo metropolitan region. The state also established more significant incentives 
for firms located outside the São Paulo metropolitan region (Lencioni 1991). Two other factors 
also promoted this industrial decentralization. 
First, infrastructure problems related to fast, unplanned urban growth, pollution, 
increased wages, strong union presence, and high land costs in the São Paulo metropolitan region 
encouraged industrial decentralization (Santos 2015). Second, the federal government 
established research and technology institutes in São Paulo countryside cities to promote the 
development of specific sectors (Negri 1992). These institutions remained crucial for the 
Brazilian developmental state to grow a highly skilled workforce as well as to develop the 
required technology to foster organic coupling processes through the establishment of state-
owned companies and specific sectors (Negri 1992). For example, one can mention the 
development of the IT industrial cluster in Campinas, of Embraer and its aerospace industrial 
cluster in SJC, and of the alcohol-related sector in Paulínia. This strategy, therefore, resulted in 
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several organic and structural coupling processes taking place in the São Paulo countryside as 
well as in other states.  
The leading destinations for domestic and foreign firm in the countryside of São Paulo 
were cities such as Campinas, São José dos Campos, Taubaté, Jundiaí, São Carlos, Piracicaba, 
and Sorocaba (Henrique & Muniz 2015). This industrial decentralization began before the 
promulgation of the Brazilian 1988 Federal Constitution; therefore, subnational and municipal 
development remained mostly dependent on top-down decisions (Piancastelli & Perobelli 1996). 
SJC became one of the major sites for firms leaving the metropolitan region of São Paulo due to 
a combination of factors, which privileged its process of capital accumulation (Henrique & Ricci 
2011; Henrique 2012). Besides providing incentives to firms, SJC also possessed a cheaper labor 
force compared to São Paulo city and was located alongside the Dutra Highway, a major road 
connecting two of the biggest consumption centers in the country: São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro 
(Henrique & Ricci 2011). 
To conclude, under the import-substitution accumulation strategy, the Brazilian 
developmental state positioned domestic and foreign fractions of industrial capital at the center 
of its accumulation strategy, fostering several actions and initiatives that favored such actors. 
The Brazilian developmental state developed mechanisms and initiatives to promote organic 
coupling processes as well as structural coupling processes. Under this strategy, development 
reflected a top-down decision, where subnational states and municipalities like SJC lacked 
autonomy to design policies and provide considerable incentives. In this context, the Brazilian 
state advanced an uneven development privileging some states and municipalities over others by 
directing greater private and public investments. This is the case of SJC, which had several 
structural coupling processes, receiving companies such as Ericsson, General Motors, Parker, 
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Kodak, Panasonic, Johnson & Johnson and Petrobrás. SJC also went through an organic coupling 
process, where Embraer was established, as outlined in the next section. This organic coupling 
process is crucial to understand how processes of corporate capture between Embraer and 
educational institutions evolved in SJC. 
 
5.2 Embraer and São José dos Campos’s Organic Coupling: The Corporate Capture of 
Training Programs at the Aeronautics Institute of Technology (ITA) and at the São Paulo 
State Technological College (FATEC) 
This section will be structured in three parts. First, I will provide a brief contextualization 
of the city SJC regarding its economic and social situation as well as its labor market. Second, I 
will analyze the aerospace organic coupling process in SJC. Third, I will demonstrate how the 
evolution of processes of corporate capture between Embraer and public educational institutions 
in SJC is intrinsically related to this aerospace organic coupling process. This section argues that 
due to the Brazilian form of state and its accumulation strategy, and consequent aerospace 
organic coupling process in SJC, the corporate capture processes of programs at the ITA and the 
FATEC evolved organically through synergistic and informal interactions. 
The history of SJC (see map 2) dates back to 1611, when Catholic Jesuit Priests 
established the São José village to assist outcast indigenous tribes from other São Paulo regions. 
Through the years, the village increased its non-indigenous population, becoming, in 1767, the 
city of SJC (Borba & Silva 2011). Presently, with a population of 713,943, SJC is a medium-
sized city located 94 kilometers from the São Paulo city and is nearby other cities like Jacareí, 
Taubaté, Caçapava, Campos do Jordão, and Monteiro Lobato (IBGE 2018). Dubbed the aviation 
capital, SJC is the birthplace of Embraer, one of the biggest national firms in Brazil today, and 
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the third largest aerospace company worldwide. The city has remained admired for having one of 
the best qualities of life and education in the country and being highly industrialized (Henrique 
& Ricci 2011). 
 
Map 2. The Location of São José dos Campos, São Paulo, Brazil. 
 
 
Throughout its history, the city has had two distinct periods of development. In the first 
period, from the 1870s to 1940s, the city was economically based on the production of coffee, 
and in the provision of sanatorium33 services. In 1924, the state of São Paulo established a public 
sanatorium named Vicentina Aranha in SJC, transforming the city into a national center for 
tuberculosis treatment. In 1935, the former president Getúlio Vargas turned SJC into an Estância 
 
33 SJC had several resorts and sanitariums to treat people with tuberculosis. This happened because SJC is located in the 
countryside and in a mountainous region. In the past, the city received federal investments to develop this sector (Santos 2014). 
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Climática. Under this title, the city acquired the right to receive higher federal funding to invest 
in infrastructure related to tuberculosis treatment (Borba & Silva 2011). However, after the 1929 
Great Depression when the Brazilian state adopted its import-substitution accumulation strategy, 
the city entered its second period in the end of the 1940s, shifting its economic base to industrial 
production (Borba & Silva 2011). Under the import-substitution accumulation strategy, SJC was 
able to emerge as one of the most developed and industrialized cities in Brazil. This is related to 
how the Brazilian developmental state fostered an organic coupling process in SJC, which is 
directly tied to the creation of the Aeronautic Technological Center (CTA). One participant from 
the SJC Technology Park, describing the significance of the CTA to SJC, said the following: 
SJC is a city that somehow was enormously benefitted by the federal government in the 
40s with the creation of the Aeronautic Technological Center; today named Department 
of Aerospace Science and Technology. In 1956, SJC had 1/3 of the population of 
Taubaté. Today SJC has three times more than the population of Taubaté. Taubaté was 
the “capital” of the “Vale Region”; nowadays it is SJC. The city of Jacareí had the same 
level of development than SJC. Today Jacareí is undeveloped in comparison to SJC. 
Amongst all the cities in Brazil with a population average of 700 thousand, SJC is 
probably the city with the best socioeconomic rates […]. The creation of the Aeronautic 
Technological Center generated DNA in the region of innovation and technology. The 
Aeronautic Technological Center attracted firms…originated many firms…It has 
important ingredients such as high skilled workforce, and the presence of the government 
with its strategic orientation and potential opportunities to develop programs of foment. 
(Interviewee 50) 
 
The CTA dates to the 1940s when Lieutenant Colonel Casemiro Montenegro Filho, after 
visiting the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the US, decided to establish a 
Brazilian aeronautic research and education center (Coimbra & Hopfer 2017). Under the 
selective institutional context of the Brazilian import-substitution accumulation strategy, 
Casemiro’s project gained support from the federal government, which had an interest in 
developing its aerospace technological autonomy and aerospace defense sector (Henrique & 
Ricci 2011). 
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The federal government’s initial plan was to create the CTA in the city of Guaratinguetá. 
Nonetheless, SJC was selected and privileged by the federal government as a site to receive the 
CTA for three main reasons. First, from 1935 to 1958 and 1967 to 1978, the São Paulo governor 
appointed SJC mayors (Coimbra & Hopfer 2017), which established a political tie between 
federal, state, and SJC state managers. In the case of the CTA, a former mayor of SJC, Jorge 
Zarur, worked with a local influential group to obtain a 500-acre donation from the state of São 
Paulo, which was transferred to the Brazilian Aeronautic Force as an incentive to establish the 
CTA (Coimbra & Hopfer 2017; Henrique and Ricci 2011). Jones (1995) argues that for a 
national accumulation strategy to be successful and achieve hegemony, its state apparatus has to 
mobilize forces of representation—strategically significant sectors and institutional agents—to 
support its strategy, structure, goals, and mode of operation. In this setting, the national 
accumulation strategy favors the places where forces of representation remain located. The state, 
therefore, privileges its social basis, which SJC typified. Second, the Dutra Highway 
construction in 1951 provided SJC a strategic locational position, attractive to firms, given that 
SJC is positioned between the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Henrique & Ricci 2011; 
Santos 2014). Third, as a sanitarium center, SJC established a well-developed infrastructure 
using state and federal investments, serving as an essential asset to firms. 
In 1946, the Brazilian Air Force founded the CTA in SJC, which established in 1950, the 
Aeronautics Institute of Technology (ITA), a federal public university specializing in aeronautic-
related engineering courses, and in 1953, the Institute of Research and Development (IPD). The 
CTA played an essential role in establishing Embraer34. As Mackinnon (2012) asserted, organic 
 
34 The CTA was responsible for transforming SJC in a technological hub. After the establishment of the CTA, SJC started to 
receive many FDIs. For example, in 1959, the former president Juscelino Kubitschek inaugurated the establishment of a General 
Motors plant in city. Other examples are Johnson & Johnson in 1954, Ericsson in 1955, Kanebo, Eaton and Bendix in 1957, and 
Engesa in 1958. Therefore, the CTA was a major aspect propelling the industrialization of SJC (Coimbra and Hopfer 2017). 
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coupling processes happen through a co-evolution of regional assets and global firms in the same 
region. In the case of SJC, the IPD and the ITA provided the necessary assets, including the 
technological capacity and skills for the creation of Embraer. In this scenario, the IPD, funded by 
the Brazilian developmental state—which had the goal of developing its domestic aeronautic 
sector—hired 300 workers to develop a small-size airplane prototype in 1965. Workers included 
graduates from the ITA. Therefore, in 1968, the IPD developed its prototype known as Embraer 
EMB-110, Bandeirantes. One year later, in 1969, the federal government, along with some 
private investors, founded Embraer and started to produce the Bandeirantes (21 passengers) for 
its internal market but mostly for the government (Henrique 2012). One participant from the 
Institute of Development and Technology described the role of the CTA in the creation of 
Embraer as follows: 
…when you already have experience [in producing airplanes], you are basically getting 
your experience and transferring to another location. That is easier than when you want to 
start from scratch. What did happen so that Embraer could be created? First, the federal 
government created the CTA, and then the ITA in 1950. Nineteen years later, in 1969, 
Embraer was created. So, we had an aeronautic labor market in SJC, who knew how to 
work in the aeronautic sector. The first group of engineers in SJC graduated in 1955. So, 
we had to wait for 19 years to form a sufficient labor market. It is a short time, but 
enough to have the skills to start. (Interviewee 51) 
 
The creation of the IPD and the ITA not only resulted in the creation of Embraer but also 
in the emergence of an aerospace domestic production network. SJC hosts the highest 
concentration of aerospace firms in the country with 94 firms, mostly Embraer’s suppliers, 
forming an industrial cluster. The emergence of this domestic production network and industrial 
cluster is related to significant technological spillovers that the CTA and Embraer enhanced35. In 
 
35 Moreover, the creation of Embraer under the import-substitution accumulation strategy resulted in several international 
aerospace firms establishing production in SJC to supply parts to Embraer in a period marked by high import tariffs (Henrique, 
2012). In general, the creation of the CTA by the federal government allowed SJC to become a technological hub with several 
research institutes such as the National Institute for Space Research, a research institute capable to produce and launch satellites 
created in 1971. 
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the years following the creation of Embraer, many of Embraer’s former employees, researchers 
from the IPD, and alumni from the ITA started their own business as Embraer’s suppliers but 
also, and to a smaller degree, as startups based on innovations developed by the IPD. As one 
participant explained, “Everybody who has an aerospace company here was from the IPD, the 
ITA, from Embraer, or the National Institute for Space Research (INPE). The majority comes 
from these institutions and Embraer” (Interviewee 57). Another interviewee from the ITA 
claimed: 
…the ITA came first. The government could have created Embraer first, and then the 
IPD, the ITA, and the INPE, but the government did not. The skilled workforce from 
Embraer induced everything. Through the history of the CTA, it has been created more 
than 150 aerospace companies in SJC, some small, but others very large like Embraer. 
The ITA received investments; it was created in a time and in a country that had nothing 
in the aerospace sector, let alone in other sectors. People here always say “in the 1940s 
we were not producing even bicycles”. Brazil did not have a mechanic or aeronautic 
industry, so training had to come first. (Interviewee 35). 
 
Another participant also from the ITA further voiced: 
The Technology Park has around 100 firms, and many of them are related to the ITA 
because they were founded by ITA’s alumni. Many aerospace companies in SJC were 
founded by ITA’s former students such as Avibrás and Mectron. There are many 
companies created by ITA’s former students. (Interviewee 39) 
 
This aerospace organic coupling process in SJC can be summarized as follows: 
 
Diagram 9. Aerospace Organic Coupling in São José dos Campos. 
 
Source: Author. 
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This organic coupling process in SJC, happening through the co-evolution of the IPD, the 
ITA, Embraer, and then the SJC aerospace industrial cluster, established and fostered symmetric 
and synergistic power relations among local actors—prevailing today and remaining critical for 
this research to explain how and why processes of corporate capture in training related to 
Embraer evolve in SJC. One representative from the ITA asserted: 
Institutions in São José dos Campos have a high synergy among them. Look at the 
director of CECOMPI, Marcelo; he is the dean of the ITA and a former student in our 
master’s degree program. Look at the Secretary of Development of SJC, Cavalli; he was 
the dean of the ITA and a former student. Look at the director of the SJC Technology 
Park, Horácio Forjaz; he is an ITA’s former student and a former director at Embraer. 
Look at Tozi, the dean of FATEC; he coordinates the expansion team at the ITA. 
Embraer and Avibrás founded by ITA’s former students. Because of that, synergy is high. 
 
This synergy among local actors is also related to how the Brazilian import-substitution 
accumulation strategy was based not only on material and political practices but also on a 
nationalistic developmental ideology. Under this strategy, there was a shared view of the 
Brazilian state to be defending the nation’s interests (jobs through the support of national firms) 
against dependency and subordination to developed nations and their influence (Bresser-Pereira 
2018). Such a “nationalistic developmental ideology” propagated the view that development 
required cooperation around common national interests, where the state was the major 
instrument of collective action (Bresser-Pereira 2018). In the case of SJC’s organic coupling 
process, local actors embraced Embraer’s establishment as part of this collective national—and 
local—project in which cooperation towards a common good was required. One participant from 
CECOMPI, talking about how collectiveness is essentially related to local actors’ connection to 
the aerospace in SJC, professed: 
We have strong interactions here because of the CTA. Inside the CTA today we have six 
Institutes of Research and the ITA. There is also the INPE, which is a spinoff of the CTA 
 
 
 180 
 
founded in 1971. The ITA is a spinoff of the CTA. As spinoffs, we have Embraer, 
Avibrás, Mectron, and others. The government believed 70 years ago, and that’s the 
government success. Someone said “Let’s build an Aeronautic Center here? From where 
do we start? From education, education of excellence. (Interviewee 49) 
 
Interviewee 52, a representative from the Sao Paulo State Secretary of Development, 
talking about the interactions among the actors in the SJC aerospace industrial cluster, and more 
specifically, how aerospace local actors work collectively, mentioned: “Companies, educational 
institutions, the municipal government, they interact, they are all involved (in collective 
initiatives). They all interact. We don’t have problems with conflicting initiatives.” Another state 
representative, but from the federal government, claimed that many actors related to the SJC 
aerospace sector possess a great degree of articulation because they emerged organically in 
connection to one another. The participant contended the following: 
The São José dos Campos aerospace industrial cluster has a closer connection to the 
government because everything started from a public initiative. You had the creation of 
the ITA but also Embraer, which later was leading everything. Who pushed 
development? The government is creating institutions and Embraer but also the 
government buying airplanes. Because this cluster has always had a close relation to 
public policies, they need to interact, to have articulation in order to work together to 
reach the government goals.” (Interviewee 56). 
 
In conclusion, as GPN scholars revealed, the state can have a vital role in the initial 
development of GPNs and the configuration and restructuring of existing ones (Yeung 2016). 
The GPN experts have sought to analyze how the state, as a mediator, meets the strategic needs 
of firms in GPNs to foster strategic coupling, and consequently capture value (Horner 2017; Lee 
et al. 2014; Yeung 2009). Less attention has been given to other state roles, such as states as 
producers (Horner 2017). In this regard, this sub-section sought to reveal how the Brazilian 
developmental state, as a producer and a buyer, played a crucial role in establishing Embraer and 
its aerospace domestic production network through what researchers have conceptualized as an 
organic coupling process. In SJC, organic coupling process happened through the co-evolution of 
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several regional assets seen in the creation of the IPD, the ITA, Embraer, and in the subsequent 
spillovers resulting in the emergence of several other local aerospace firms and related 
institutions. Such an organic coupling process, related to the Brazilian import-substitution 
accumulation strategy, was based on symmetrical and synergistic actions and relations under a 
national—and local—collective project, i.e., the development of Embraer and of the Brazilian 
aerospace sector in SJC. This researcher will argue in the next sub-section that this dynamic has 
left significant imprints regarding how processes of corporate capture evolve in the post-
privatization era. 
 
5.2.1 The Evolution of the ITA and the FATEC Corporate Capture 
In this sub-section, I will analyze how Embraer processes of corporate capture in training 
initiatives evolved in SJC. According to the GPN literature, corporate capture happens as a result 
of states lacking specific or distinctive regional assets that meet the strategic interest of firms. 
This feature, scholars argue, puts such states in an inferior position when bargaining with FDIs, 
making them vulnerable to having their institutional capacity captured (Coe & Hess 2011; 
Mackinnon 2012; Yeung 2016). However, in the case of SJC, the process of coupling occurred 
organically. Therefore, process of corporate capture in SJC cannot be solely explained based on 
the lack of distinctive regional assets or due to asymmetric power relations through bargaining 
processes between the state and FDI resulting in the coupling. I will assert Embraer’s processes 
of corporate capture in training initiatives at the ITA and the FATEC evolved organically due to 
its past organic coupling process. Capture evolves based on professional ties through synergistic 
local and informal one-on-one interactions rather than through bargaining events like in 
Charleston. In this sub-section, I will first provide a contextualization of Embraer’s privatization 
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process and how its approach to skill formation has changed. Second, I will analyze the 
processes of corporate capture mentioned above. 
In the last two decades, Embraer underwent severe transformation from a state-owned 
company with domestic production to a private global corporation. This transformation has 
affected Embraer’s internal training, SJC aerospace labor market, and the company’s relation to 
local educational institutions. Embraer represents one of the largest Brazilian companies, 
generating more than 16 thousand national jobs, of which more than 10 thousand are employed 
in SJC (Embraer Report 2018). While the company started manufacturing military cargo 
airplanes, today Embraer also manufactures commercial small- and medium-sized airplanes (30 
to 130 passengers), having subsidiaries in five locations: Brazil (the largest), the United States, 
China, and Portugal.  
Embraer was privatized in 1994, but its context dates back to the 1980s. The 1980s were 
marked by important changes in Brazil. First, José Sarney, having assumed the Brazilian 
presidency in 1985, restored democracy in the country, and three years later established the 1988 
Federal Constitution. Second, neoliberalism gained significance in this period, driving the major 
changes in this new Brazilian phase of post-democracy, as in many Latin American countries. As 
scholars have revealed, since the 1970s, the ecological dominance of neoliberalism has advanced 
across the globe through dramatic ruptures and through incremental forms, rebuilding state-
economy relations in tendential, uneven, discontinuous, conflictual, and contradictory ways 
(Jessop 2014; Harvey 2007, Peck and Tickell 2002; Brenner et al. 2010). This has resulted in 
variegated capitalisms under the shadow of neoliberalism (Jessop 2014). Brazil has not been 
immune to such influence. 
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The neoliberal agenda began to influence Brazil after 1989, initially when Fernando 
Collor and Itamar Franco assumed the presidency (Fine 1999). As Braga (2017) pointed out, 
starting under the presidential administration of Fernando Collor and influenced by the 
Washington Consensus, the Brazilian state adopted a new model of development, which the 
author termed a “post-Fordist, peripheral and financialized” model of development. In 1990, 
Fernando Collor launched an economic liberalization and privatization program; this was later 
led by Itamar Franco, due to Collor’s resignation in 1992, and then in 1994 by Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso. Under Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Brazilian state 
sought to dismantle regulatory rigidity, to privatize state-owned companies and to decrease 
protectionism bias. Industrial policy was abandoned, a mark from the older development model. 
Under this new accumulation strategy, the Brazilian state also integrated its economy with the 
global economy (Arbix & Martin 2010). This model of development received continuation with 
the Workers Party under the presidential administration of Luis Inácio da Silva and Dilma 
Rousseff. However, significant changes were implemented in regard to social policies such as 
Bolsa Família, and in regard to a return of strong industrial policies (Braga 2017). 
The emergence of this new accumulation strategy in Brazil directly affected Embraer. 
Embraer had arrived in the 1990s on the edge of bankruptcy and became a target of the Brazilian 
privatization program. Embraer’s economic problem was due to the world Fordist crisis, which 
affected accumulation in Brazil and resulted in the “lost decade”. The principal buyer of 
Embraer’s airplanes was the Brazilian federal government and due to the Fordist crisis, 
purchases significantly decreased, affecting the company. Itamar Franco decided to privatize 
Embraer during his presidential term, and Fernando Cardoso concluded the company’s 
privatization in 1994. Although the company was on the brink of bankruptcy before its 
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privatization, it only took two years after its sale for the company to turn impressive profits 
(Henrique 2012; Souza 2008). However, to reach this position, changes were made. 
After privatization, Embraer laid off 11 percent of its employees, invested in its 
production process thus increasing productivity and quality, expanded exports, changed its career 
plan and internal training practices, and outsourced services related to cleaning, security, 
computing, and cooking (it had four internal restaurants). The company also reduced its average 
salary and changed its private governance with suppliers (Bernardes 2000). The production of 
the airplane ERJ 145, launched in 1989, was successful and resulted in numerous sales across the 
world. The National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) enabled the 
insertion of Embraer into the global economy as a global competitor when it provided public 
funding investments and incentives for Embraer to manufacture airplanes for international 
buyers (Bernardes 2000; Catermol 2010). The internationalization of Embraer and its coupling 
with the aerospace global production network were also made possible due to the federal 
government’s creation of a special tariff regime: drawback and Recof, allowing firms to import 
products tax-free. Firms remained exempt from significant tariffs if they imported products used 
to manufacture products for export. Embraer’s privatization and insertion in the aerospace GPN 
resulted in the company reconfiguring its private governance with suppliers, having 95 percent of 
its 500 suppliers located outside of Brazil. In 1996, two years after Embraer’s privatization, the 
company rose to status as a major international player in the aerospace sector. 
Until 1995 Embraer maintained an effective educational policy with significant internal 
training practices (Bernardes 2000). However, since its privatization, the company has 
increasingly relied on external training. After its privatization, the number of Embraer’s 
employees in the training department for technical courses decreased from 107 workers in 1990 
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to only three in 1996. Before its privatization, Embraer even offered courses for workers to 
acquire junior high and high school diplomas through partnerships with local educational 
institutions (Bernardes 2000). Even though Embraer has a training center offering nearly 900 
different courses, third-party organizations administer training. Currently, Embraer requires a 
minimum of a certificate degree for touch labor (hands-on production); recently hired workers 
must go through a 3-month training process, called Famiero, as one participant from the Union 
of Metallurgists in SJC expounded: 
In the 1990s, Embraer established some criterium. First, to work for Embraer workers are 
required to have a certificate degree. Those courses that last six months, or a year. Touch 
labor at Embraer they normally have electrician or mechanics certification from SENAI. 
After they are hired, workers go through 3 months of internal training in which they are 
under probation. Training focuses on getting workers familiar with aeronautics. When 
Embraer has a volume hiring, workers instead of going to work in production, they go to 
their study center in the morning and spends the day training. Sometimes training lasts 
less than three months. It depends on their need. But normally training lasts three months, 
and we learn about aeronautic manufacturing, concepts of avionic, structure, and many 
other things. When Embraer has little hiring like 20 workers, then training is only in the 
mornings, half of a period, and in the afternoon they work. (Interviewee 47) 
 
Although internal training has remained a common practice due to the highly specific 
nature of aeronautic skills, after the company’s privatization, Embraer has focused more on 
external training than before (Bernardes 2000). Moreover, the cyclical aerospace sector is 
characterized by peaks in which companies hire and lay off workers according to market 
dynamics. Embraer represents a large corporation, employing “5,900 technicians, engineers and 
technologists, the company has a 3 percent turnover, having to replace between 150 to 200 
engineers and technicians that retire every year” (Interviewee 44). This requires the company to 
intensify interactions with local educational institutions to present its skills needs and to shape 
training according to the company’s needs. It is in this context of privatization and increasing 
reliance on external training that processes of corporate capture in SJC have occurred. 
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Currently Embraer and Boeing are negotiating a joint venture. As the Brazilian federal 
government holds a ‘golden share’ in Embraer, it has the majority power over Embraer strategic 
decisions. Therefore, for Embraer and Boeing joint venture to happen, it requires governmental 
approval. While it is uncertain to know whether the Workers Party with Lula and Dilma would 
have approved or denied this joint venture, the liberal government of Jair Bolsonaro has 
announced in January 2019, it will approve the fusion of Boeing and Embraer. It is estimated that 
the joint venture will be concluded by the end of 2019 (Venture 2019). Boeing will invest $3.8 
billion to acquire 80% of Embraer (Jiménez 2018). 
 
5.2.2: Embraer and its Training Partnership with the Aeronautics Institute of Technology 
(ITA) 
The business community has applauded the training partnership between the ITA and 
Embraer. However, this research will not highlight it as a case of success, but as a case of 
permanent corporate capture. In this sub-section, this research will analyze how the creation of 
the Embraer Program of Specialization in Engineering at the ITA evolved organically as a 
process of corporate capture. As this research will reveal, this program offers highly customized 
training designed to deliver specific skills for Embraer alone. The program lacks transparency 
and privileges Embraer, rather than the general business community and also presents class 
issues. 
The Embraer Program of Specialization in Engineering (PEE) was launched in 2002 
through a partnership between Embraer and the ITA, a federal higher education and research 
institute that focuses on aerospace science and technology. Ranked as one of the most prestigious 
engineering schools in Brazil (“the Brazilian MIT”), the ITA offers 5-year bachelor’s degrees in 
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engineering courses36 as well as master’s and doctoral degrees (ita.br). The PEE foundation is 
related to the significant restructuring process Embraer underwent after its privatization in the 
1990s, when the company laid off hundreds of engineers from 1994 to 1996. However, even 
though Embraer was not performing well economically before its privatization, two years later, 
the company started generating profits. In 1996 the airplane ERJ-145 reached international sales 
success. An increase in sales required Embraer to hire workers, including aeronautic engineers. 
However, the company encountered difficulties recruiting aerospace engineers in the market. 
One participant from Embraer, describing the changes Embraer underwent in the 1990s, voiced: 
In the 1990s, we (Embraer) fired many employees, decreasing to 4,000 employees, but 
before (privatization) we had almost 20,000 employees. So, after privatization, Embraer 
started to sell airplanes and obtained great success in a short-term. So, the company could 
not find enough skilled people to hire. Moreover, Embraer has a turnover... (Interviewee 
44) 
 
According to some participants, from 1996 to 2000, the lack of aeronautic engineers in 
the market forced Embraer to hire engineers from several different fields, such as electrical and 
mechanical engineering, requiring months of on-the-job training to teach them aerospace-related 
skills and the “Embraer way to work”. In 2000, a former CEO of Embraer decided to contact the 
ITA to develop a short-term course to provide non-aeronautic engineers not only the basic skills 
of aeronautic production, but also highly customized and specific skills according to the internal 
interests and skill needs of Embraer. The program could drastically reduce on-the-job training. 
One participant from the ITA explained: 
“At the time, a former CEO of Embraer said “Besides not being able to recruit aeronautic 
engineers in the market, I lose too much time training on-the-job…getting workers 
familiar with aeronautics. So, the goal was to have workers trained before hiring them. I 
hire an electronic engineer, from anywhere, and a mechanic (engineer), the guy does not 
 
36 The ITA offers 5 undergraduate courses: Aeronautical Engineering, Aerospace Engineering, Civil-Aeronautical Engineering, 
Computer Engineering, Electronic Engineering, and Mechanical Engineering. The ITA is so competitive and prestigious that its 
admission rate in 2016 was 1.12% (ita.br), while Harvard University 2015-2016 admission rate was 5.6% (see 
https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/admissions-statistics). 
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even not the aeronautic jargon. He gets here lost. So, he (former CEO of Embraer) said 
“we need a program that helps all engineers to have a minimum common base (in 
aeronautics), and to get to know the systems of Embraer, to learn the ways of Embraer. 
Then once at the company, the worker can perform, work eight hours (Interviewee 34). 
 
Therefore, the program initially entailed a three-month, short-term training initiative 
offering a certificate degree, and the first graduates were hired as Embraer engineers during the 
training process. However, in 2001 the federal government created a norm allowing public 
universities to establish vocational master’s programs, enabling students in any Brazilian 
postgraduate vocational training program to apply for public federal scholarships. Hence, the 
ITA proposed to Embraer to shift the short-term program to a long-term vocational program with 
a master’s degree. However, this training would require significantly more time, resulting in 
higher salary costs for Embraer. The ITA suggested to stop hiring students as engineers during 
training, and instead pay them as apprentices. The ITA committed to providing Embraer’s 
students a monthly scholarship. This combination of salary and scholarship would reduce 
Embraer’s costs related to salaries and labor contract taxes and benefits, making long-term 
training viable. One representative of the ITA articulated: 
“The first group of students, Embraer hired as engineers, but someone from Embraer 
suggested to have students (in the next group) as trainees. Then I said “you are behaving 
as a fool. If these students are engineers why don’t you (Embraer’s employees) typify 
them as students, and so, you pay them as students and not as engineers. You (Embraer) 
pay what the government pays as a scholarship to master’s degree students. In this way, 
you won’t have to spend with payroll taxes and labor contract benefits.”…Then I added 
“we can turn this training initiative into a vocational master’s degree program. These 
engineers will then be typified as students from the ITA…studying full time…but also as 
an apprentice of Embraer. In this way, you (Embraer) can have very low-cost training.” 
(Interviewee 34). 
 
Under this model, the PEE was launched in 2002, typifying a process of corporate 
capture due to its structure and goal to provide highly customized training and specific skills for 
Embraer. To meet this objective, the program was structured according to the interests of 
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Embraer but with insights from the ITA. At present, the PEE has a long-term, 16-month duration 
and provides a master’s degree. Student enrollment is flexible, varying from 30 to 120 according 
to the needs of Embraer. Students are hired as apprentices, receiving a much lower salary than an 
engineer and a scholarship from the ITA. The ITA and employees from Embraer teach the 
coursework cooperatively. The ITA is responsible for teaching slightly more than 50 percent of 
the curriculum while employees from Embraer deliver the remaining in the curriculum. A 
participant from the ITA professed: 
…the ITA was charged with teaching a little bit more than 50 percent of the total 
curriculum grade. The curriculum includes lectures from Embraer’s employees, who help 
students to understand how Embraer functions and also to understand some aeronautic 
projects that could not be approached formally through academic classes. (Interviewee 
34) 
 
The program is divided into three phases, five months each. In the first phase, students 
learn aeronautics production basics. In the second phase, students choose and further specialize 
in specific careers. These two phases take place at ITA and Embraer establishes numerous 
mandatory classes. In the third phase, students are grouped into teams and charged with 
developing conceptual projects according to Embraer directives. This phase occurs at Embraer, 
where students work as full-time apprentices. The outcome culminates in a master’s thesis 
developed cooperatively under the supervision of a professor from the ITA and an engineer from 
Embraer (Interviewee 44). One participant from the ITA contended: 
This is a collective program, so, there is a part of the ITA and a part of Embraer. The part 
of the ITA is to release professors to teach at the master program, to release professor to 
advise students in their thesis, to provide classrooms and laboratories, given that research 
is done in our labs. Embraer provides some employees to help advising students, to teach 
some classes at Embraer. Embraer also helps the ITA in the recruitment process, and 
offers employment for participants, aspect that gives credibility to the program and raises 
students’ interest because they know that in the end they will be hired. (Interviewee 35) 
 
Under this program, Embraer pays the ITA instructors by hours taught, creating problems 
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and issues of transparency for two reasons. First, the ITA hires professors under a 40 hours per 
week contract regime where professors prepare and teach classes, advise graduate students, and 
perform ITA administrative tasks. Nonetheless, professors are dedicating some of these 40 hours 
to teaching the Embraer Program of Specialization in Engineering. Although this is considered 
legal since, theoretically, the PEE is an ITA’s program, in reality, the program is designed to 
serve Embraer’s interests. Therefore, Embraer provides a partial salary to professors working in 
this program. Second, it is illegal for public universities in Brazil to deliver customized teaching 
for private corporations and to develop research for specific companies. Such a practice is 
considered lobbying, which is not regularized in Brazil37. Thus, the ITA and Embraer had to 
circumvent the law to obfuscate this issue. The ITA created a not-for-profit institution called 
Casemiro Foundation, responsible for receiving funding from Embraer and paying professors 
from ITA. Hence, the ITA is not directly receiving payments from Embraer, but through the 
Casemiro Foundation, depriving it status as a lobby. One participant from the ITA stated the 
following: 
We have an algorithm for professors’ remuneration, from Embraer via the Casemiro 
Foundation. We have a scheme that Embraer pays part of the hours taught by 
professors…The Institute of Aeronautical Technology allows its professors to use some 
of its 40 hours to teach, and professors will even receive for it. A professor is allowed to 
use part of the 40 hours because if you do the math; professors do not use all these hours. 
So, the Institute of Aeronautical Technology has zero-cost by allowing them to work 
because professors will continue doing the same. But there is always that issue; nobody is 
safe from having the Public Prosecutor’s Office to come and pressure us. If someone 
reports then “oh, what is going on here? (Interviewee 34) 
 
To recruit students Embraer uses ITA’s institutional support to attract applicants 
countrywide. In this regard, while the ITA elaborates and administers the admission exam to 
select students (a calculus test), Embraer interviews and recruits the students with the highest 
 
37 Under the law at. 321, CP of the Brazilian constitution, it is considered illegal for any state manager to use the government 
apparatus in order to sponsor private interests, benefiting one entity over others (Brazilian Criminal Code 1998). 
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scores. Given that the ITA is portrayed as one of the best engineering schools in Brazil, Embraer 
boosts its capacity to attract applicants in order to recruit the most qualified workers in the 
country. Generally, less than three percent of applicants are selected to participate in the 
program. One participant from Embraer asserted: 
So, first, the ITA elaborates an admission exam and selects the best applicants. We 
decrease 1,200 applicants to 200, and then after interviews, we recruit 30. At present, I 
have 3,680 applicants for 40 vacancies. The magic of the Program of Specialization in 
Engineering is that we have a great power of attraction for young people who like 
engineering. (Interviewee 44) 
 
Therefore, this program is remarkably beneficial for Embraer, for it not only selects and 
recruits the best national market candidates but also receives customized training from the best 
Brazilian engineering school at a meager cost. As one representative from the ITA claimed, 
“Embraer invests in the Program of Specialization in Engineering, but many times, what 
Embraer is investing does not pay even 5% of what the company should pay” (Interviewee 35). 
Even though the ITA provides scholarships for Embraer’s students and allows Embraer to use its 
facilities for the program without any charge, the program does not establish after-course 
conclusion requirements, such as the payment of competitive and scalable wages or insertion in 
career plans. 
Moreover, another feature typifying this program as a process of corporate capture 
resides in the fact the program reveals significant implications for class relations, given that the 
program was initially a form of precariatization of work, used to lower wages and benefits by 
replacing long-term employees. Long-term engineers were hired while Embraer was a state-
owned company. Therefore, such employees were hired under a differential scalable wage plan, 
where earning wage had greater increases over the years. This means many senior engineers 
receive higher salaries than newly hired engineers. In this way, the program has replaced senior 
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engineers with junior but highly skilled engineers at lower salaries. One participant mentioned: 
“The program brought some problems because long-term employees felt threatened. They were 
like, “there is all these new young employees, well-prepared, receiving lower wages than us. So 
many related problems emerged” (Interviewee 34). 
The program has become so entrenched that most of engineers at Embraer graduated 
from the PPE. One representative of the ITA stated, “We trained through this program 1,500 
students for Embraer. Soon we (the ITA) believe that at least 80 percent of all engineers at 
Embraer will be from the ITA” (Interviewee 35). The same participant from the ITA explained 
how the program displaced long-term engineers, saying: 
But this is a matter of costs as well. The workforce is the main asset of Embraer…The 
company brings young skilled workers and creates an internal pressure, and many 
workers are replaced. The company has old engineers at the top of its career plan, and 
Embraer is not able to maintain that. So, Embraer hires a skilled young engineer and 
replaces older engineers. I think this is a tendency that companies have to increase their 
profits. (Interviewee 35) 
 
According to several participants, the process of corporate capture of Embraer of the PEE 
at the ITA evolved organically, through symmetrical and synergistic relations locally, and is 
related to the aerospace organic coupling process, which took place in SJC in the 1950s. For 
example, when asked about how the ITA interacts with Embraer, one representative of the ITA 
claimed: 
With Embraer it easier to cooperate because many Embraer’s employees are alumni from 
the ITA. When these employees have needs, they know who they have to look for at the 
ITA. There is no need to bring Embraer and the ITA together. This is natural. When we 
are done with one project, there is another start. Students get their master’s degree in our 
program, go to work at Embraer and come back with ideas and proposals. They have 
come with many projects such as a project in the metallic structure, one in composite 
materials, another in aero-electronic systems… (Interviewee 39) 
 
Therefore, given that Embraer was developed by people who graduated at the ITA, and 
that most of Embraer’s engineers graduated at the ITA, the employees from Embraer and ITA 
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maintained a high degree of interaction and predisposition to establish joint projects. The 
development of this partnership did not face obstacles. One representative of Embraer explained 
the establishment of the PPE, citing: 
These things (partnerships) happen naturally because one (Embraer) is the son of the 
other (the ITA). You have professors from the ITA as academic advisors and co-advisors 
from Embraer coming with the company’s problems, and this comes from our DNA. So, 
our (Embraer’s) interaction with the ITA is very easy because we have the same way to 
teach classes, we were a state-owned firm, we were part of the Brazilian Airforce.  The 
guy from the ITA, who helps me to coordinate the program, was my professor at the ITA. 
I know him for 40 years. It is a student-professor relationship. (Interviewee 44) 
 
In this regard, although Embraer has shifted its nature and goal from a state-owned 
company with a national developmental purpose to an international private corporation with 
profit-driven targets, the ITA still supports the company as if Embraer were still a part of the 
former national developmental and collective project. As one representative from the ITA stated, 
“In reality, Embraer is just collaborating with the ITA in an activity that the ITA is doing 
because it is of the interest of the state, Embraer is cooperating, but who financially sustains the 
program is the government” (Interviewee 35). When representatives from the ITA were asked 
about the existence of training partnerships with other corporations in the business community, 
they claimed the ITA to have a purpose of benefiting the aeronautic sector, and thus, Embraer. 
For example, one participant from the ITA professed:  
Companies come to us to establish training partnerships, but the ITA is not interested. 
With Embraer we do because our mission is to work in this sector; after all, we are the 
Institute of Aeronautic Technology. Although we have other specialization, they are all 
focused on aeronautics.” (Interviewee 34). 
 
To conclude, this program typified a process of corporate capture due to three primary 
elements. First, process of corporate capture was demonstrated in how such a program delivers 
customized and highly specific skills for Embraer at a meager cost. Second, the program lacks 
transparency and circumvents its illegality using third-party institutions to deprive issues related 
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to lobbying. Third, the program is marked by issues in which workers are typified as students 
and later as apprentices, receiving much lower salaries. Moreover, the program was used to 
replace senior employees with junior highly skilled employees, who receive much lower salaries 
and were hired under a different career plan. Importantly, the evolution of corporate capture in 
regard to this training initiatives happened based on professional ties related to participants 
relationship to the ITA—as alumina, or co-creator of Embraer—through synergistic and informal 
one-on-one interactions. 
 
5.2.3 Embraer and its Training Partnership with the São Paulo State Technological College 
(FATEC) 
In this subsection, I will analyze how the process of corporate capture of the Embraer 
Designer Program (PEE) evolved. As this research will reveal, process of corporate capture, as in 
the case of the ITA, evolved organically. To do so, first this study will explore the establishment 
of the FATEC in SJC, and second, this research will analyze how the PEE evolved, typifying a 
process of corporate capture. 
FATEC, founded in 1969, is the dominant higher educational institution administering 
vocational associate degrees in the state of São Paulo. Under the administration of the São Paulo 
State Secretariat of Economic Development, Science, and Technology, the São Paulo State 
Technical College System consists of 71 college campuses located in 65 cities across the state, 
offering a wide range of courses and skills (https://www.cps.sp.gov.br/#). As a state public 
higher educational institution, FATEC delivers free education to students. 
One of these 71 FATECs is located in SJC and seeks to attend to firms’ local skill 
demands, having therefore many programs, courses, and initiatives related to the aerospace 
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sector. FATEC at SJC also attends other sectors, such as IT. In SJC, the FATEC offers 3-year 
courses, forming technologists38 with associate degrees in the following courses: system analysis 
and development, database administration, industrial production management, logistics, 
advanced manufacturing, aircraft maintenance, and projects in aeronautic structure. FATEC 
pioneered in the Brazil the formation of technologist, a relatively unknown degree, where many 
firms still have the view that technologists epitomize a better version of technicians. 
The establishment of the SJC FATEC campus happened in 2006 and is connected to the 
Technology Park in the city. In 2006, the state of São Paulo created a policy of industrial 
development in which the establishment of Technology Parks played an important role. In such a 
policy, Technology Parks were required to have three major components: research centers, 
institutions of higher education, and firms. In this context, the Technology Park in SJC induced 
local state managers to request that São Paulo establish a FATEC campus. Such a request took 
place through a proposal elaborated by SJC state managers, ITA professors, and Embraer 
employees. Including aeronautic courses, the proposal was sent to the São Paulo State Secretariat 
of Economic Development, Science, and Technology, who established the FATEC SJC campus 
in 2006. One participant from the FATEC detailed the foundation of the FATEC in SJC as 
follows: 
SJC and the state of São Paulo established an agreement. SJC committed to build a 
building and invested 10 million reais to do so. The establishment of the FATEC here is 
also related to the Technology Park. The state of São Paulo has a regulation saying that 
Technology Parks need to have institutions of higher education. So, the Technology Park 
was used to attract the FATEC. Regarding the creation of the courses, there was other 
entities involved like Embraer. Embraer asked, or better, Embraer suggested and 
supported the creation of some aeronautic courses. (Interviewee 40) 
 
 
38 In the United States, technologists are known as practical engineers. Technologists in Brazil are able to continue their 
education in master’s and doctoral programs. 
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Since the creation of the FATEC in SJC, the principal purpose of this institution has 
remained to attend to the needs of the aerospace sector, mostly represented by the needs of 
Embraer. The first director of the FATEC SJC stated: 
When the state of São Paulo decided to have a FATEC in São José dos Campos, the state 
had the intention to attend the skill needs of the aerospace, industrial cluster. So, working 
together, the ITA, Embraer, which gave some suggestions, and SJC state managers, they 
elaborated a proposal, which had the clear goal of providing skills to the aerospace 
sector…We talked to Embraer to see which course the company had more urgency. 
Embraer is basically the aerospace, industrial cluster, right. Embraer recommended to us 
a course in light structures to work with composite materials. (Interviewee 38) 
 
The influence of Embraer over the existing aerospace courses offered at the FATEC was 
expanded when the company proposed the development of a customized training partnership 
with the college in the same model of the Program of Specialization in Engineering with the 
ITA. This partnership between Embraer and the FATEC originated when Embraer was 
experiencing difficulties finding a specific skill: aeronautical designers. Embraer had to hire and 
internally train workers from scratch. One participant from the FATEC asserted: 
Embraer started to notice that there was a skill gap in the area of design. Designers are 
retiring and not being replaced. Educational institutions are not training people in this 
occupation. So, Embraer looked for us and proposed the creation of a program similar to 
the one they have at the ITA, but at the ITA Embraer has a master’s program, here we 
have a specialization, an undergraduate course. So, we recruit a person who has a 
technical degree, and then we provide a specialization. We do not give a diploma, but a 
certificate. (Interviewee 40) 
 
When one representative of Embraer was inquired about how the training partnership 
with the FATEC was established, he noted: 
When the FATEC came to São José dos Campos, they wanted us (Embraer) to give 
suggestion about the courses. So, since then, every year, we (Embraer) have 
conversations with professors from the FATEC to talk about the courses, to say what 
needs to be improved in their courses. So, because the FATEC had this relationship with 
us, we naturally saw the possibility to use the FATEC to train aeronautic designer. 
(Interviewee 44) 
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This significant ease for Embraer to interact and establish a partnership with the FATEC 
is also related to how the ITA, Embraer, and then later the aerospace industrial cluster 
organically emerged in connection to one another under the collective developmental view of the 
Brazilian developmental state. In this regard, evidence suggests actors that are related to these 
institutions have greater propensity to establish collective actions, such as a training partnership. 
For example, one of the co-founders of the FATEC in SJC stressed one of the reasons for him to 
be hired as the director was his relation to the aerospace sector and to the ITA. He indicated: 
They (SJC state managers) invited me to be the director. They did not invite me; they 
impelled me. They said, “You are going to be the director of the FATEC. You are a 
FATEC professor at the city of Guará. You worked in the aeronautic sector, and you 
graduated from the ITA. So, you have all the skill requirements. (Interviewee 38) 
 
Another participant from the FATEC also pointed out that this training partnership was 
made possible due to the close ties between the director of the FATEC and Embraer; he 
expressed: “…the director here, his father was a long-term employee of Embraer, part of the 
board of directors. So, there is an interaction that goes beyond…” (Interviewee 32). Moreover, 
this partnership was made easier because this former director of the FATEC—responsible for 
working with Embraer to establish this training partnership—received his master’s and doctorate 
degrees from the ITA and was a coordinator at the ITA’s Department of Expansion (Interviewee 
39). A director from FATEC added, “Many professors are part of the aerospace industry…The 
synergy is really high. There are professors who own aerospace firms; some professors work for 
Embraer or worked for Embraer, or work for another aerospace firm” (Interviewee 37). 
In this context, the Program Designer Embraer at the FATEC was founded in 2011. The 
12-month program offers a FATEC certificate degree in aeronautical design, training highly 
skilled aeronautic designers for Embraer. Therefore, as the goal is to attend to the interests of 
Embraer, the course and its curriculum were designed by the company. Talking about program 
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customization, one participant from the ITA remarked, “We had meetings with Embraer, and 
Embraer had the curriculum designed” (Interviewee 38, former FATEC director). Another 
participant from the FATEC further detailed: 
It was a collective work, but Embraer said, “I need aeronautic designers, and this is what 
aeronautic designers have to know…This is the number of hours: X hours. People from 
our (Embraer’s) engineering department said they have to know this…”. We said, okay 
we can do that, but some areas are too specific, so Embraer will have to teach these areas. 
So, the structure of the program was collectively established, but Embraer basically said, 
“Look, I need an employee like this. (Interviewee 32) 
 
In this regard, the Program Designer Embraer, as typical of processes of corporate 
capture, was customized to meet Embraer interests. Similar to the ITA program, the Program 
Designer Embraer was structured in four phases. In the first phase, students learn the basic 
aeronautic production. In the second phase, students choose between two career paths: systems 
or mechanics. In the third phase, students develop joint projects in CAD, where they have to 
design airplane parts. The fourth phase sets up students as apprentices who perform on-the-job. 
Only after these four phases, which take three months each, will Embraer hire successful 
students. The program is based on a full-time schedule. The program is taught at Embraer’s 
office building, where professors from the FATEC and employees from Embraer work 
cooperatively to teach several theoretical and practical courses. Such a customized and long-term 
program allows Embraer not only to provide highly specific skills for its workers, but also to 
evaluate the performance of these workers before hiring them as employees. As one 
representative from Embraer noticed, “this program is a way to interact with workers for one 
year before we hire them. So, we can be sure that these workers are fit to work for Embraer” 
(Interviewee 44). 
The recruitment for the Program Designer Embraer is also like the program at the ITA. 
Embraer uses the institutional image of the FATEC to attract applicants and to select students. 
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The FATEC administers the registration of applicants, and the admission exam. The minimum 
education required to enroll in this program is a technical or technologist degree related to the 
aerospace sector, and to have an intermediate English level. The number of vacancies is flexible 
and determined according to the needs of Embraer, varying from 30 to 60. After taking the exam, 
students with the best grades go through group interviews with Embraer, which recruits the best 
candidates for the program. In 2016, the program received more than five hundred applications. 
Since the FATEC remains a public educational institution, students do not have to pay fees or 
tuition (Interviewee 32, participant from the FATEC). 
Corporate capture processes in training are characterized by corporations receiving cost-
free training. In this case, although entailing some cost, the program has dramatically benefited 
Embraer, for the company has received institutional, recruiting, and training services from the 
FATEC at scanty costs. The only economic responsibility of Embraer is to pay FATEC’s 
professors for hours taught in the program. As in the case of the ITA, professors from the 
FATEC receive payment for their teaching via the Casemiro Foundation to avoid legal 
allegations of the benefiting of single private firms through customized training services. 
Regarding the costs of the program for Embraer, one participant from the FATEC affirmed: 
One reason for this partnership is the cost of training. Training is expensive, and although 
Embraer pays for our teaching hours, the logistic is ours (FATEC), the coordinator is a 
professor from the FATEC. So, there is the side of costs. (Interviewee 38) 
 
Moreover, this low cost is associated with how Embraer, through the FATEC, is able to 
typify its workers as students. During the program, Embraer hires students as apprentices, paying 
a scholarship of one thousand reais (U$300) per month. Although receiving public support to 
train customized workers, Embraer is not required to hire the students at the end of the program, 
to pay competitive wages, or to offer a career plan for students after graduation. Noteworthy, the 
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FATEC has faced issues with Embraer, which has hired the FATEC’s students as technicians 
(certificate degrees) and not as technologists with associate degrees. Therefore, the FATEC’s 
alumni have received lower salaries as if they did not have higher education degrees. One 
participant from the FATEC declared, “one difficulty is to make Embraer see the students from 
the FATEC as having a higher education degree. This is a struggle” (Interviewee 32). Another 
FATEC participant added: 
The first students graduated at the FATEC were only able to be hired as technicians by 
Embraer, but they are not technicians…The initial vision of Embraer was that the 
company was an engineering company, which had no space for technologists. But they 
are the same, however, technologists’ skills are narrower than engineers’. Embraer has 
evolved in understanding this, and today, our students from Logistics are able to be hired 
as analysts... (Interviewee 40) 
 
Although this program characterizes a process of corporate capture, the FATEC also 
benefits from this partnership. One participant from the FATEC affirmed that the PEE program 
has proportionated some reformulations at FATEC’s aerospace-related courses, and thus, in 
more suitable curriculums to attend to the general interests of the aerospace sector. This resulted 
in FATEC’s programs being more successful in terms of attaining students hired after 
concluding their studies, consequently enjoying higher enrollment levels (Interviewee 32). 
“…the FATEC learned a lot because professors started to teach inside Embraer and were 
able to capture its essence, its needs, and this made us reformulate some courses due to 
this partnership. This helped us a lot to see the needs of firms.” (Interviewee 40, FATEC 
participant). 
 
To conclude, the Program Designer Embraer was established organically and 
demonstrates a case of permanent process of corporate capture for several reasons. First, this 
provides an excellent example of how firms influence training at educational institutions, 
receiving specific training—a unique training initiative not offered to the general business 
community. Like in the ITA program, Embraer is able to design the program, the curriculum, the 
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hours, to use FATEC’s institutional image and institutional staff to recruit and train students. 
This program model maintains its potential future workers as students and apprentices for 12 
months, discharging labor contract and salaries, and expanding the time for Embraer to decide 
whether students fit Embraer’s profile. Second, this program does not guarantee students will be 
hired, receive competitive wages and scalable salaries and career plans, or provide benefits 
packages. Importantly, the evolution of this program, and thus, process of corporate capture, 
happened organically based on synergistic and informal one-on-one relations between employees 
from Embraer and professors and administrators from the FATEC. Such synergistic interactions, 
and ease for Embraer to advance its interests are related to how the aerospace organic coupling in 
SJC resulted in many actors at local educational institutions like the SJC FATEC and Embraer 
coming from the ITA or being former Embraer’s employees. This fact established close 
professional ties among local actors and facilitates collective efforts. 
 In summary the Embraer’s processes of corporate capture in SJC can be summary in the 
following way: 
 
Diagram 10. Embraer’s Corporate Capture in São José dos Campos Regional Training System. 
 
Source: Author. 
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5.3 Labor Market Governance and the Aerospace Regional Training System of São José 
dos Campos 
In this section, this research will investigate whether the SJC’s local governance 
reinforces or minimizes process of corporate capture in SJC’s regional training system. I will 
argue that the SJC’s local governance reinforces processes of corporate capture due to the nature 
of interactions among state managers and other governance actors. State managers and 
governance actors identify the local training needs and advance training initiatives based on 
informal relations instead of formal strategies, like in Charleston. In this regard, among state 
managers and local governance actors, professional and personal ties—created through the 
aerospace organic coupling process in SJC—function as a mechanism of state selectivity 
concerning which training initiatives will be advanced. This form of state selectivity combined 
with the financial and social power of Embraer magnify its influence over educational 
institutions’ initiatives. To develop this argument, first, this research will provide a context of the 
aerospace local labor market of SJC, examining how actors part of SJC’s local governance 
identify and address local training needs and how this is related to the Brazilian state form. 
Second, this study will reveal how and why such a characteristic magnifies the power of 
influence of MNCs, such as Embraer, therefore reinforcing processes of corporate capture in 
SJC’s regional training system. 
The co-evolution of the Institute of Research and Development, the Aeronautics Institute 
of Technology, and then later, the creation of the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) 
and the FATEC has greatly benefited SJC. SJC today is a technological hub with one of the 
highest innovation rates and concentration of workers with graduate and postgraduate degrees in 
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the country (www.inovacao.unicamp.br; Souza 2008). For example, in 2015 SJC ranked sixth in 
registered patents in Brazil. In 2006, the aerospace sector in SJC boasted an impressive 34 
percent of employed workers with graduate and postgraduate degrees (Souza 2008), presented in 
the following table. 
 
Table 8. Level of Workers’ Education Attainment at the Aerospace Sector in SJC in 2006.  
Education Level Number of Workers Percentage 
Without Higher Ed. Degree 12,720 66% 
Graduate and Postgraduate Degrees 6,475 34% 
Total 19,195 100% 
Source: Souza 2008, 154. 
 
SJC has a well-developed and established public aerospace regional training system and 
labor market. The aerospace regional training system in SJC remains composed of public 
educational institutions, meeting the present and future sector needs. The primary public 
educational institutions depict federal, state and municipal vocational high schools, SENAI (a 
not-for-profit institution with certificate degrees), the FATEC, the ITA, and the INPE. These 
institutions collaboratively offer certificate, associate’s, bachelor’s, and post-graduate degrees. 
Different from the state of South Carolina, the state of São Paulo and SJC do not provide training 
initiatives and programs as assets to attract and retain firms, or incentives related to training, as 
one representative of the Investe SP39 declared: 
Investe SP does not provide incentives, or subsidies to attract firms. So, we do not offer 
training services as a way to attract firms to the state. Investe SP functions more as a 
mediator between firms and municipalities across our state. If you are interested in 
establishing a firm in the state of São Paulo, we can do a research for you and provide a 
 
39 Investe SP is a public institution of the state of São Paulo that seeks to attract firms to the state. To do so, Investe SP does not 
offer incentives, but provides information regarding the municipalities’ skills, infrastructure, logistic, existence of supplier, 
market, and environmental regulations, helping firms to choose the best location in the state to establish their businesses. Investe 
SP also intermediates municipalities and firms’ initial interaction (www.investe.sp.gov.br). 
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list of municipalities that match all your requirements. We also give support in terms of 
environmental regulations and taxation… (Interviewee 58) 
 
Nonetheless, the presence of a well-developed aerospace regional training system and 
local aerospace labor market in SJC does not mean the local aerospace firms are without skill 
gaps and issues. Fieldwork evidence revealed that the aerospace business community, although 
not in the same proportion of Charleston, faced some skill gaps. As one interviewee from the 
FATEC explained, skill gaps in SJC are related to highly specialized areas, such as specific 
software use and advanced manufacturing and design, while general aerospace skills such as 
touch labor are abundant in the labor market (Interviewee 33). An aerospace firm representative 
added: 
We have difficulties hiring people to work with aeronautic processes. The applicants did 
not have 50 percent of the skills we needed. Talking to other aerospace firms’ employees, 
they said to have the same problem in relation to this job position…We also have issues 
hiring mechanic and manufacturing engineers with skills in Mastercam, AutoCAD, or the 
new software Top Solid. Another skill lacking is knowledge in CNC (computer 
numerical control), and aeronautic sealing. (Interviewee 42) 
 
Due to the economic crisis Brazil is currently facing, competition for skilled workers has 
not been as severe as in the past. Nonetheless, poaching has remained one issue in the local 
aerospace labor market, and more specifically, regarding how Embraer, or corporations from the 
city of São Paulo pilfer skilled and experienced workers from small-size aerospace firms, as one 
firm representative affirmed: 
It is hard to compete with large companies for some skills in the region. The higher the 
skills, the higher is the workers’ wage and benefits pretension, and small-size firms 
cannot compete in this regard. But at the present crisis context, we have not “lost” 
skilled workers for other firms. (Interviewee 42) 
 
Another participant from the FATEC expressed how the labor market has some issues related to 
poaching:  
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It is normal a worker to start in a small aerospace firm, and then after he acquires skills, 
Embraer poaches them. Workers prefer a higher wage…Small firm owners get mad. 
Third-tier firms hire a young worker, train them, workers who were doing everything 
wrong, then when they are good, Embraer poaches them…At small firms, workers don’t 
have the same wage and benefits they get at Embraer. Here in SJC, working for Embraer 
is also about status, even more than about wage… (Interviewee 40) 
 
In this context where the aerospace business community in SJC faces training problems, 
such as skill gaps and poaching, Embraer tackles its skill problems by capturing the institutional 
capacity of local educational institutions, like the ITA and the FATEC, through the development 
of highly specific and customized training partnerships. In this regard, one question emerges: 
Does the SJC’s local form of governance reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in 
its regional training system? As I will argue, the SJC’s local governance reinforces processes of 
corporate capture. This is because the way skill problems are identified and addressed magnifies 
the power of influence of single large firms, such as Embraer, over educational institutions. 
However, to develop this argument, first the main characteristics of the SJC’s local governance 
must be unveiled. 
As demonstrated before, the rescaling of national state power to international and 
regional scales represents a neoliberal trend that has taken place in different countries (Ward et 
al. 2010). In Brazil, the devolution of state power to subnational and local states was materialized 
mainly by the 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution. This legislation provided greater 
administrative and financial power to subnational and especially to local states and thus, greater 
autonomy in the designing of local developmental strategies (Souza 2016). This decentralization 
was influenced by two theoretical streams, fostering a mix of institutional experiments at local 
states (Frey 2007; Martins et al. 2010). The first one, termed neoliberal social democracy, has 
advanced attempts to make subnational and local governments more efficient by reducing their 
size and adopting managing practices used in the private sector. The second one, termed 
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participative democracy, has sought to promote mechanisms of collective decision in which the 
population receives greater access to public administration and decision-making. One well-
known example of this approach epitomizes the case of Porto Alegre city. However, generally, 
local states have adopted a mix of both approaches (Frey 2007). 
In the case of SJC, local government has remained more closely related to the neoliberal 
social democracy governance. Since the 1990s, SJC has embraced a type of public management 
where the logics of capital, privatization, and regional competitiveness have assumed a central 
position (Korin & Moura 2004). This also means the city has transferred its responsibilities to 
not-for-profit institutions. In terms of economic development, the Center for Competitiveness 
and Innovation (CECOMPI) was the main institution responsible for local governance. 
Nonetheless, the CECOMPI was recently absorbed by the SJC Technology Park. SJC created the 
CECOMPI in 2003 as a not-for-profit institution in a context where local large corporations were 
relocating to other regions. In this regard, SJC state managers, after consulting with professors 
from the ITA, decided to create the CECOMPI to foster a new and more diversified 
developmental path in the city. As part of this new public management, the CECOMPI sought to 
overcome the city’s strong dependency on large corporations by promoting industrial clusters 
and fostering innovation. For example, after its creation, the CECOMPI created the Aerospace 
Brazilian Industrial Cluster Program, an initiative to support local aerospace firms. The existing 
synergistic relation among local actors due to the past organic co-evolution of institutions and 
aerospace firms made the establishment of the CECOMPI a smooth process. One former SJC 
state manager described the creation of the CECOMPI as follows: 
The CECOMPI was an idea born with the staff of the ITA. We (SJC state managers) 
talked to the former director of the ITA, Michael Gartenkraut, and the president of the 
Casemiro Foundation. I was working for the SJC municipality, and the mayor at the time, 
Manoel, he was from the ITA…We were seeing large companies leaving the 
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city…Kodak, Panasonic, Phillips... The companies that were coming were small…So 
SJC needed to have a program that would make the next leap to make a more sustainable 
economy to develop the city...At the academy, I was just discussing these issues related 
to the development of clusters. Then we made an articulation with this group from the 
ITA, and with some companies…How do we resolve this? How do we create a new cycle 
of development?" And there was the idea of forming a group that would discuss these 
issues together. This work group made up of five or six people…decided to create the 
CECOMPI…So we came to this consensus, with the academy, represented by the ITA, 
local state managers, and companies. We reached a consensus regarding the need to gain 
competitiveness through innovation…The group (behind the creation of CECOMPI) was 
very concerned with technological issues. They were former workers from the INPE, the 
ITA, Embraer, so they were in the government but also connected to the market… 
(Interviewee 30) 
 
Following the creation of the CECOMPI, in 2006 SJC sought to advance this new 
strategy of development by founding a technology park. The SJC Technology Park is based on 
an approach called Triple Helix, which seeks to generate innovation and development by 
bringing “together the state, industries, and universities...” (Interviewee 49). Therefore, the 
Technology Park of SJC hosts several startups and well-established firms, three public 
universities and several research centers and laboratories, providing a thriving environment for 
firms to become more competitive (Interviewee 50). In 2016, SJC Technology Park absorbed the 
CECOMPI and has become the primary institution steering economic development policies in 
SJC. The Technology Park manages SJC’s industrial cluster programs: The Brazilian Aerospace 
Cluster and the Information Technology and Communication Cluster. The Brazilian Aerospace 
Cluster program consisted of 105 aerospace firms meeting monthly at the Technology Park to 
discuss their common problems and possible solutions. As one participant from the CECOMPI 
asserted, “the main asset of our program is our networking…rarely you will see it in other 
industrial clusters. The level of trust among aerospace firms in our program is really high.”  
(Interviewee 49). In this program, Embraer is depicted as a crucial participant, and as the lead 
 
 
 208 
 
firm, the company influences initiatives and uses the program to promote needed supplier 
changes. 
Although the creation of the CECOMPI and the SJC Technology Park appeared to 
engender a process in which the local government transferred some of its power of decision-
making to other non-public actors, this transfer, in reality, stood only as symbolic. SJC 
financially maintains both institutions and the mayor of SJC appoints their CEOs. The local state 
remained behind these institutions’ developmental decisions. Although local states in Brazil held 
greater administrative and financial autonomy (able to establish taxes) and power after the 1988 
Federal Constitution, they were not federally enabled to become the major protagonists in local 
development. Primarily concerned with addressing problematic infrastructure and public 
services, local states have based their local development policies mainly on the provision of 
incentives, such as tax breaks and subsidies (Martins et al. 2010). Therefore, the Brazilian 
national state as well as subnational states, such as the state of São Paulo, are still significant 
players in promoting local development through spatial selective and uneven top-down policies 
favoring some regions over others (Martins et al. 2010). 
This has been the case of SJC. The establishment of the program Aerospace Brazilian 
Industrial Cluster, although locally implemented by CECOMPI, is a national and subnational 
initiative to which municipalities with industrial clusters can adhere and, afterwards, receive 
public investments. For example, to promote a positive international trade balance, the federal 
government has directed investments to industrial clusters such as the SJC Brazilian Aerospace 
Cluster program to promote firm exports. Moreover, the establishment of the Technology Park, 
although requiring significant infrastructure investments from SJC, was designed by the state of 
São Paulo, as one representative of the Technology Park professed: 
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The state of São Paulo started a program called “São Paulo System of Technology 
Parks”. This initiative benefited SJC because the state of São Paulo selected five cities, 
and due to their characteristics, these cities were indicated to host the first Technology 
Parks. (Interviewee 50) 
 
Although SJC Technology Park, a not-for-profit institution, is responsible for the local 
government regarding economic development policies, the state has remained a principal actor in 
steering such policies. SJC’s local governance resembles an associational governance (Almond 
et al. 2017), given that local actors engage with local MNCs such as Embraer to improve 
location-specific advantages. The Brazilian state, as one of Embraer’s main buyers and provider 
of incentives and loans, pressures the company to support local suppliers and to foment 
cooperative practices. 
A critical feature of the SJC’s local governance regards how issues such as skill problems 
are identified and addressed, and this partially explains why the SJC’s local governance 
reinforces processes of corporate capture in training initiatives. Different from the region of 
Charleston, local governance initiatives in SJC are not based on sectoral level studies, data, and 
formal strategies, like the One-Region, but mostly on informal interactions. Marked by practices 
of clientelism, the existence of local professional ties, acquired from its aerospace organic 
coupling process, reinforces this interaction in SJC and serves as the main mechanism of state 
selectivity regarding the establishment of state initiatives, such as training initiatives at the 
aerospace. This form of state selectivity combined with Embraer’s financial and social power 
magnify the company’s power of influence over educational institutions such as the ITA and the 
FATEC. 
Clientelism (see glossary for definition) was a form of political relation under the mode 
of public management named patrimonialism, prevailing in the Brazilian state until 1930 when 
the developmental state emerged and introduced a more professional public management form 
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(De Oliveira 2017). Although the Brazilian state and its prevailing modes of public management 
have drastically changed over the years40, practices of clientelism are still present in the Brazilian 
state, but not as hegemonic as before (Seibel & De Oliveira 2006). Currently, the residues of 
clientelism in Brazil are still seen in practices such as: restricted access to the state and unequal 
control over material and symbolic resources; lack of formal/legal institutional channels to 
access resources; state-market-society relations based on personalism, reciprocity of benefits, 
and personal loyalty; political appointees occupying significant positions in the state; and 
fragmented demands and discontinuous initiatives (Bahia 2003; Seibel & De Oliveira 2006; De 
Oliveira Estevam 2010). Clientelism as a form of political relation intermediating the interests 
among state managers, private actors, public and not-for-profit institutions, and society still plays 
a crucial role as a mechanism of state selectivity regarding which actors and initiatives will be 
privileged by the state (Seibel & De Oliveira 2006). 
In the case of SJC, such a form of interaction reinforced by personal and professional ties 
of actors related to the aerospace sector—former Embraer employees, alumni from the ITA and 
the INPE, among others—explains how local issues, such as skill problems, are identified and 
addressed through informal one-on-one interactions. This form of interaction also elucidates why 
the SJC’s local governance reinforces processes of corporate capture in training initiatives. 
According to participants, the SJC’s local governance is marked by three significant elements, 
revealing how local actors identify and address issues or demands related to training: 
individualism, discontinuity, and access to the state based on informal one-on-one interactions. 
Individualism is concerned with how the SJC’s local governance lacks articulation among state 
 
40 As De Oliveira (2017) pointed out, the Brazilian institutional structure and political-administrative culture represent a mix of 
modes of public management: patrimonalistic, bureaucratic, and managerialism. 
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managers and fosters initiatives based on individual interests instead of collective. One state 
manager from the state of São Paulo voiced: 
Inside São Paulo State Secretariat of Economic Development, Science, and Technology 
there is no interaction among the departments, we do not have this culture of sitting and 
planning things collectively. The way we work is too individualistic. Everyone does their 
individual work, and we don’t work together…So I think there is a huge lack of 
articulation. For example, our department of science and technology never interacts with 
our department of regional development, and industrial clusters are related to innovation. 
Not even that. So, the lack of articulation is huge…The federal government also does not 
interact with us, the state. For you to have an idea, the Ministry of Development, Industry 
and Foreign Trade does not talk to the states. The Ministry is formalizing the existence of 
industrial clusters in São Paulo without talking to us…Clusters that do not even have a 
considerable number of firms to be considered a cluster (Interviewee 52) 
 
Discussing how the SJC’s local governance works, another participant added, “Initiatives 
are disconnected. We do not have a formal local strategy that I can present to firms to show what 
we plan for the future. Skills, workforce, training, logistics, safety, these are not sold as an asset 
to attract firms...” (Interviewee 46). This lack of articulation among state managers at different 
state scales and local governance actors is problematic and reinforces individualism, as well as 
initiatives fostered based on informal mechanisms related to political, professional, and personal 
ties. One state manager from SJC contended: 
There is a lack of articulation among the different entities of the state and other actors. 
So, the university does not talk to firms, and firms do not talk to local state managers. 
This results in several different and disconnected demands for initiatives, which we have 
a hard time to tie together… Interviewee 53) 
 
Another state manager from the state of São Paulo further described how initiatives and 
demands are based on political and personal interests instead of on the collective needs of the 
local business community. One state manager from the state of São Paulo, talking about how 
local governance actors demand investments and initiatives, declared: 
I think that one of the biggest problems is that many of the demands are political. 
Meaning that the demand comes through the local state but from a group of firm owners 
and does not represent the sector needs. For example, the representative of a chamber of 
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commerce from a city demands investments from us to do something for the industrial 
cluster of their city, but in reality, one can see that the initiatives are not for the cluster in 
general but to benefit a firm or small group of firms. (Interviewee 52) 
 
This lack of collective initiatives and strategies is not only due to the absence of 
articulation among state managers and other actors but also due to political interests outplaying 
such actions. One state manager from SJC claimed collective actions involving different state 
scales are not so common because they often require political ties among the political leaders 
governing these spheres. One state manager from SJC affirmed: 
The governor of the state of São Paulo is Geraldo Alckmin. He looks at the state and has 
goals established for the macro-regions…He has policies of development for regions, but 
this is still too distant from the municipalities. Why? Because of political issues. If the 
mayor of the city of São Paulo is from the Workers Party, and the governor of the state of 
São Paulo is from PSDB, then it will hinder any collective action, common development 
for the general good. State managers they tend to defend more their interests and projects 
than the interests of the country. (Interviewee 53) 
 
Another issue reinforcing informal one-on-one relations in directing state initiatives 
relates to the presence of political appointees and a consequent discontinuity of public initiatives. 
Political appointees strengthen decisions being made based on political and personal interests 
and advance a less technical approach to state problems as well as a discontinuity in public 
initiatives. As one state manager from the state of São Paulo pointed out: 
We do not have a long-term strategy. Every four years we have someone new, a new 
mayor and governor. For you to have an idea, I have been here for seven years, and I 
have had seven political appointees running the Secretariat. What can they do in one 
year? You can have a 20-year strategy, but the next politician will revoke. This is 
cultural… (Interviewee 52) 
 
Other participants corroborated this view. A former director of the FATEC claimed: 
We do not have a state policy of continuity. When you change the political party of São 
José dos Campos, you change everything, change in the mode of thinking, new 
personnel. In the first year of a new government, state managers will have to learn 
everything, in the last year they have to run for the election, so they have basically to 
years of work. (Interviewee 30) 
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This lack of articulation and continuity impedes the SJC’s local governance from 
identifying and addressing training issues based on formal broad collective strategies. Strategies 
play an essential role in bringing players together, establishing regional needs and demands as 
well as the collective goals and targets to be pursued. This collaboration constructs discursive 
narratives of what was needed to initiate development—characteristics present in Charleston, but 
not in SJC. As one participant from SJC local state described: 
We do not have strategies because we in general change political parties every four years. 
This change has not allowed the elaboration of long-term strategies. We have four years 
with one administration. After that then we have new elections, and everything changes. 
We have permanent workers that do not leave their job positions after a new political 
party assumes power, but these workers do not have the power to influence policies. So, 
we have projects that are often interrupted in the middle. So, we need more structuring, 
continuous, and permanent projects, independent of the political party in power. This is 
also aggravated by the lack of interaction among different spheres of the state. 
(Interviewee 57) 
 
When one representative of the FATEC in SJC was asked if they established and updated 
their programs and courses based on technical studies and SJC formal sectoral strategies, he 
answered, “There is no formal strategy…moreover, we do not trust in municipal studies. The 
municipality is normally too influenced by political factors” (Interviewee 33). Therefore, since 
formal collective strategies are not employed in the SJC’s local governance, the identification of 
skills has been based on informal one-on-one interactions. One participant from the FATEC 
articulated: 
How technical is this plan, how political is this plan? There are plans that are much more 
political than technical. There are few technical plans. We have a hard time having 
technical plans. Today, SJC and the FATEC do not have a gold map, a guide to steer us. 
In São José dos Campos, we find things through individuality, we go and talk to people. 
(Interviewee 33) 
 
Another representative from SENAI (a local not-for-profit educational institution) further 
described this mechanism, explaining: 
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…I participate in industry meetings, such as CIESP, where firm owners meet, and there I 
make myself available to listen to their skill needs…For example here in São José dos 
Campos, we have the Association of United Chácaras, which is an association of 
firms…I attend this meeting, they serve breakfast, and then I present my programs and 
ask about their needs to that I can update my course and curriculums. (Interview 31) 
 
Although interaction involves small- and medium-sized aerospace firms, this form of 
interaction tends to reinforce the power of single firms over training initiatives, such as 
customized programs. In SJC, informal one-on-one interactions magnify the power of influence 
of the aerospace sector in the city, and more specifically of large firms, such as Embraer, who are 
privileged by local actors due to their economic and social power as employers and as anchor 
firms for the aerospace industrial cluster. Due to its size, Embraer is able to have permanent 
customized training partnerships with educational institutions and to hire the trainees after 
conclusion. One participant from the ITA explained, “Embraer has this program with us for 17 
years…even during economic downturns, Embraer keeps the program with a small number of 
students just to not stop it…” (Interviewee 34). Another representative from the FATEC added: 
…to have a partnership, there is a need to have benefits from both sides. There is a need 
for resources to pay professors (worked hours)…and the only companies that can pay for 
this process are large companies. You cannot have professors teaching for free…You 
need numbers; you need resources…companies have their staff to teach some 
hours…Small firms cannot put their staff in a training program to teach for ten months. 
They cannot take it. (Interviewee 40) 
 
As stated before, the power of influence of Embraer over training is magnified not only 
by its financial and social relevance but also by the fact that the organic coupling process in 
SJC—and thus the co-evolution of educational institutions, research centers, aerospace firms—
has resulted in many important job positions in the local state, in educational institutions, in 
private firms and not-for-profit organizations being occupied by the ITA graduates and people 
who worked for a local aerospace company, such as Embraer, or for an aerospace-related 
institution.  This professional bond functions as a mechanism of state selectivity, which 
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facilitates the interactions among local actors, granting actors more direct access to public 
institutions and initiatives. The professional-personal ties and socioeconomic power of Embraer 
explain why the SJC’s local governance reinforces processes of corporate capture. Regarding the 
economic power of Embraer, one participant from the ITA responded with the following when 
asked why the ITA has only partnered with Embraer: 
There is a difficulty (for other firms to have training partnerships with the ITA) because 
the ITA is a military base, and there is not a department, where firms can go and speak 
about a training partnership. The ITA does not have an office of projects…Firms don’t 
know where to go, or who to speak with, which professor? The ITA does not have 
someone to explain how the aerospace business community can try to establish a training 
partnership. Firms owners can go there (to the ITA), and they will be jilted. So, they 
don’t come back. If you look at the ITA’s projects with firms, you will see that small 
aerospace businesses do not have any…The CECOMPI knows how hard it is to have the 
ITA opening for other firm-education relations (Interviewee 35). 
 
In conclusion, as demonstrated in the two previous subsections, processes of corporate 
capture in training initiatives in SJC happened through direct firm-university interactions, 
facilitated by employees from Embraer, the FATEC, and the ITA having close professional and 
personal ties, inherence of its past aerospace organic coupling. In this regard, the SJC’s local 
governance identifies and addresses skill gaps and training issues in the aerospace sector through 
informal one-on-one relations. This occurs due to the local governance interactions being marked 
by a lack of articulation—beyond the aerospace sector—, thus failing to build collective formal 
strategies. Such a form to advance training initiatives privileges aerospace initiatives in SJC due 
to how the aerospace organic coupling process in the city established strong personal and 
professional ties among governance actors, who are somehow related to the ITA, Embraer, 
INPE, IPD, or other aerospace firms. These bonds function as a mechanism of state selectivity 
where Embraer’s training interests are privileged over the general aerospace business community 
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due to its economic and social power. This explains why the SJC’s local governance reinforces 
processes of corporate capture in training. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to analyze the evolution of Embraer processes of corporate capture in 
SJC. More specifically, this chapter aimed at analyzing two main issues. First, this research 
demonstrated how processes of corporate capture at the ITA and the FATEC in SJC, São Paulo, 
Brazil evolved intrinsically related to the Brazilian import-substitution accumulation strategy. 
Such a strategy, I revealed, privileged domestic industrial capitalists, having organic and 
structural coupling processes as its principal goals. This research claimed that in SJC, the 
evolution of Embraer processes of corporate capture in training initiatives was associated with 
the organic coupling process fostered by the Brazilian national state in the 1950s, which resulted 
in the establishment of Embraer and the Brazilian aerospace sector in the city. Therefore, the 
capture of training initiatives does not happen through bargaining events, like in South Carolina, 
but organically through synergistic informal one-on-one interactions. 
Second, in this chapter, this research examined whether the SJC’s local governance 
reinforces of minimizes Embraer’s processes of corporate capture in the regional training system 
of SJC. In this regard, it was argued that the SJC’s local governance reinforces processes of 
corporate capture due to the nature of the interactions among state managers and other 
governance actors. More specifically, I claimed that SJC state managers and governance actors 
identify the aerospace local training needs and advance training initiatives based on clientelistic 
informal relations and personal/professional ties, which function as the main mechanism of state 
selectivity. This combined with the economic and social power of corporations magnify single 
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firm influence, such as Embraer, over educational institutions and their training initiatives, 
reinforcing processes of corporate capture. 
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Chapter 6: Variegated Forms of Corporate Capture in Regional Training Systems: São 
José dos Campos and Charleston in Comparison 
In this chapter, I will present the major findings of this research. To do so, I compare the 
major similarities and differences between the processes of corporate capture in SJC and 
Charleston. First, I will compare both states and their relation to corporate capture. Second, I will 
juxtapose their forms of governance and whether they reinforce or minimize capture. Finally, I 
will compare their processes of corporate capture. 
 
6.1 The Evolution of Corporate Capture Processes in Charleston and São José dos Campos 
in Comparison 
In the second and third chapter of this research, I sought to demonstrate not only how 
mainstream literature has defined corporate capture but also how researchers explain its 
evolution and relationship to the state and to different forms of governance. Although 
mainstream literature brings important contributions to the topic, when their theoretical 
explanations are contrasted with the empirical findings of SJC and Charleston, their associated 
rationalizations are problematic. 
As revealed before, two main bodies of literature have attempted to explain the 
relationship between the state and corporate capture: FDI studies and the GPN literature. 
Regarding FDI studies, scholars have claimed that liberal forms of the state are more prone to 
have their institutional capacities captured than developmental states (see Phelps 2008; Almond 
et al. 2013, 2014). Such explanations are based on different aspects (e.g., MNC opportunism), 
but mostly in regard to the level of efficiency of state institutions to coordinate inter-scale actions 
(Phelps 2008; Almond et al. 2013, 2014). The primary argument is that liberal states have low 
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levels of coordination among their state apparatuses, which create power asymmetries and allow 
MNCs to foster their interests over the interests of governments (see Phelps 2000, 2008; 
Pavlinek 2016; Dawley 2007; Phelps and Fuller 2010). In the case of the GPN literature, scholars 
have not attributed power asymmetries to the level of state coordination. Independent of the state 
form of regions, GPN scholars assert that processes of corporate capture are related to the lack of 
distinct and specific regional assets that meet the interests of MNCs, which puts states in an 
inferior position when bargaining with firms (Mackinnon 2012; Coe and Hess 2011; Yeung 
2016). However, as argued in previous chapters, such generalizations are problematic. 
When contrasting the cases of SJC and Charleston, four major features stand out. The 
first is that there is no correlation between particular forms of the state and specific levels of 
coordination—for example, liberal states having low coordination and developmental states 
having high levels of coordination. This particularity concurs with the variegated capitalism 
literature and Marxist scholars such as Poulantzas (1978), who have argued that the economy is 
not outside of the state but mutually constitutive. The second is that power asymmetry is not due 
to low degrees of coordination among states institutions, or a lack of specific assets but is mostly 
due to structural advantages that MNCs have over the state. Thirdly, corporate capture is 
associated to the accumulation strategies of each state. Finally, an approach sensitive to state 
scale is central to understanding the evolution of corporate capture. 
Regarding the levels of state coordination in SJC and Charleston, the empirical findings 
of this research point out to an opposite direction of what mainstream literature has claimed. As 
explained before, the VOC literature has analyzed the US and the UK as liberal market 
economies, which would lead this research to explain corporate capture in Charleston, South 
Carolina as based on their potential low-level of state institutional coordination. Nonetheless, as 
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argued in previous chapters, the US should not be pictured as a liberal market economy, or as 
marked by low levels of coordination. The examination of Charleston, South Carolina points to 
the direction of Block’s (2008) research, which depicts the US as a hidden developmental state. 
Charleston, South Carolina resembles the developmental state of Brazil. For example, South 
Carolina is characterized by a strong interventionist state with clear industrial policies of 
development, strong alliances with local fractions of capital, and direct forms of investment in 
specific sectors, such as manufacturing. 
Moreover, Charleston, South Carolina—as described in chapter three—has extremely 
high levels of coordination when compared for example with SJC, São Paulo, and yet corporate 
capture is still a common process. SJC, São Paulo—in a developmental state with supposed high 
levels of state coordination—has many issues regarding state-institutional coordination. For 
example, state managers in Charleston, South Carolina base their initiatives on formal sector-
based strategies and studies, and have developed a flexible, efficient, and inter-scale fluid 
institutional apparatus to attend the needs of MNCs. On the other hand, initiatives in SJC, São 
Paulo are based on informal, often disconnected, one-on-one interactions which could be 
characterized by low levels of coordination when seen side-by-side with Charleston. Moreover, 
even though SJC presents a low level of state coordination in relation to Charleston, during the 
interviews some participants stated that SJC has higher degrees of coordination than most cities 
in the country. Therefore, it becomes problematic to frame national states according to different 
levels of coordination, given that internal variations and deviations from the national state are 
common. Such findings prove it to be misleading to associate liberal or developmental forms of 
state with different degrees of institutional coordination, and thus, to propensities of states 
having processes of corporate capture.  
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These findings also oppose the supposition that power asymmetries between the state and 
MNCs—and thus consequent processes of corporate capture—result mainly from deficient levels 
of coordination among states’ institutions in contrast to the efficiency and opportunistic behavior 
of MNCs, or from a lack of specific assets. When comparing the similarities of the evolution of 
corporate capture in SJC and Charleston, it becomes evident that power asymmetries are not only 
due to dysfunctionality in all levels of coordination (like in the case of SJC), or a lack of distinct 
assets like in the case of Charleston but due to how MNCs have structural advantages over the 
state. Such structural advantages are not only due to how MNCs are able to push their interests 
over the interests of states given their ability to shift operations between locations (Featherstone 
and Mackinnon 2017) in the context of the ecological dominance of neoliberalism, but also due 
to how such advantages are institutionally inscribed in the state apparatus. One major similarity 
in the cases of Charleston and SJC demonstrates that the evolution of corporate capture in 
training is also related to how these states created models of development based on a strategic 
and selective institutional apparatus that privileges manufacturing corporations (see Jessop 
2014). Understanding that the state apparatus of both regions is selective and privileges 
manufacturing MNCs alludes to how power asymmetries between MNCs and the state are 
structurally inscribed in the capitalist state and are not just the result of a lack of specific assets 
or coordination. 
One important difference between SJC and Charleston resides in the fact that while the 
accumulation strategy of South Carolina is based on the attraction of FDIs by fostering structural 
coupling processes, SJC—although still giving centrality to Embraer—has a subnational strategy 
that is much more concerned with developing SMEs through, for example, the SJC Technology 
Park. As the empirical evidence revealed, however it does not mean that by placing SMEs at its 
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center of accumulation strategy, SJC has been able to avoid the influence of Embraer and 
consequent processes of corporate capture in educational institutions. This indicates that 
corporate capture results from a combination of how states are based on a selective institutional 
apparatus and of how MNCs behave as strategic actors pursuing their interests (see Hay 2002; 
Jessop 2007). For example, in the case of Charleston, as discussed before, the ReadySC Program 
grants to firms training incentives automatically—as part of its selective institutional apparatus. 
However, in the case of Boeing, the company strategically advanced its interests in order to 
increase ReadySC’s incentives. Nonetheless, acknowledging that MNCs are able to influence the 
state in advancing their interests and agenda to a point known as corporate capture, does not 
mean that the interests of state managers and state institutions are fully suppressed. 
Corporate capture in Charleston and SJC reveals that it is more a process of 
accommodation than imposition, e.g., corporate capture is not a process in which Boeing and 
Embraer simply imposed or forced their interests over the interests of SJC and Charleston. State 
managers—from the government and other subsidiary public institutions like educational 
institutions—have their own interests in such articulations, and for corporate capture to happen 
there is a need for MNCs’ and state managers’ interests to be accommodated, and somehow 
beneficial for both parties. Block’s theorization of state managers as a distinct class, and 
Rikowski’s (2000) theorization of education as a capitalist social form, are useful to understand 
this process of accommodation. State managers, as Block (1987) noticed, are influenced by 
MNCs due to their self-interest in power, prestige, and a healthy economy. While in SJC state 
managers’ success is not so attached to their ability to attract MNCs, in the case of South 
Carolina, they were almost synonymous. This is because the accumulation strategy of South 
Carolina is primarily based on fostering structural coupling processes, (e.g., attracting FDIs), 
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meaning that state managers’ success in having a healthy economy is dependent on their 
capability to attract and retain manufacturing MNCs. In the case of SJC, state managers since the 
1990s have pursued a wider accumulation strategy that is not solely based on the attraction and 
retention of large MNCs but mostly on the creation of aerospace and IT sector start-ups. In South 
Carolina, such a characteristic has resulted in processes of corporate capture, such as the one 
between the ReadySC Program and Boeing to be more frequent and significant than processes of 
corporate capture in SJC. This commitment of South Carolina state managers to success through 
the attraction of manufacturing MNCs can be seen in how the state has embraced the agenda of 
MNCs, such as Boeing, for example by battling against unions and by transforming its 
educational agenda by placing emphasis on vocational training, and by establishing training 
incentives. Therefore, corporate capture is a characteristic of capitalist states, as Phelps and 
Wood (2006) and many Marxists have argued, the interests of capitalists and the state have 
become intersected or blurred. 
Another important difference is related to the scale in which Embraer and Boeing 
influence the state of their respective regions, and to the mechanisms through which their 
structural advantages are exerted and interests advanced. This demonstrates the importance of 
the variegated capitalisms literature, which is not only sensitive to matters of scale, but also to 
the existence of national sub-models of development and internal variations (Peck and Theodore 
2007; Zhang and Peck 2014; Schröder and Voelzkow 2016).  
In the case of SJC, the evolution of ITA’s and FATEC’s processes of corporate capture 
by Embraer is intrinsically related to the import-substitution accumulation strategy of the 
Brazilian national state, which was adopted from the 1930s to the 1980s (Oliveira 2004). As 
previously highlighted, the Brazilian developmental state and its accumulation strategy had, at its 
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core, development based on a mix of organic and structural coupling processes. Based on top-
down decisions, the Brazilian national state, under the ideology of a nationalist developmental 
collective project, created the ITA, the IPD, and Embraer in SJC. The co-evolution of these 
institutions and Embraer established a synergistic and symmetric power relation among the 
aforementioned actors, which has been maintained even after the privatization of Embraer in 
1994. In this context, such an organic coupling has created the conditions for corporate capture 
to evolve at the local scale in an organic way through one-on-one and informal interactions. The 
evolution of corporate capture happened through Embraer’s direct access to public educational 
institutions and did not involve state managers from SJC municipality, nor from the state of São 
Paulo.  
In contrast to SJC, the process of corporate capture of the ReadySC Program by Boeing 
evolved at a different state-scale and involved different types of interaction. As analyzed 
previously, the evolution of corporate capture in Charleston happened based on a bargaining 
process between Boeing and state managers at the subnational scale and was part of its structural 
coupling process. Initially, there was no direct communication between Boeing and the ReadySC 
staff until capture was established. Training incentives and levels of customization were decided 
at the state-level as part of the bargaining process to attract Boeing to the region. The same 
applies to how the state manufacturing fraction of capital have influenced the education agenda 
and strategy of South Carolina. 
Such differences in scale are related to the differential state power of both states. 
Although Brazil and the United States have a similar institutional architecture, i.e., a federalist 
system in which state power is distributed at three different levels of government, state power 
across such scales is distributed differentially in both countries. In the United States, in terms of 
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intervention, subnational states have much more power, or autonomy when compared to Brazil, 
where the federal government is still the major player. Such a greater autonomy and power 
enable subnational states in the United States to have a more active role than in Brazil, and to 
design singular types of developmental policies that can greatly differ from their federal 
government approach. Although, in Brazil, the promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution 
fostered a devolution of power from the national state to states and municipalities, and thus 
granted to these state levels greater autonomy. Nonetheless, the Brazilian federal government has 
not transferred enough power for subnational states to become the major players in designing 
developmental policies and steering development at the local level. Such features demonstrate 
why processes of corporate capture are concentrated in some scales rather than others. 
To conclude, the evolution of corporate capture in both regions suggests that such a 
process is not a phenomenon of specific forms of state, nor an outcome relative to the existence 
or lack thereof effective state coordination and specific regional assets. Corporate capture is a 
common, general feature in capitalist states. Instead of associating corporate capture with 
different forms of state or types of assets, both case studies reveal that the influence of MNCs 
over the state is primarily due to the structural advantages that such corporations have over the 
state, which is related not only to the state accumulation strategy and different scales, but also to 
certain mechanisms through which firms are able to exert their influence. Moreover, scale poses 
a relevant feature in the explanation of how firms influence the state and how capture evolve. 
The diagram below summarizes the findings in this regard. 
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Diagram 11. The Evolution of Processes of Corporate Capture in SJC and Charleston in Relation 
to their States’ Accumulation Strategies 
 
Source: Author. 
 
6.2 Charleston and SJC Regional Training Systems, Local Forms of Governance and 
Corporate Capture in Comparison 
As established in the introduction, one of the main research questions of this study was, 
do the local forms of governance of each region reinforce or minimize processes of corporate 
capture in the regional training systems of SJC and Charleston? The response to this question has 
proven to be complex. In the last two chapters, this research analyzed how the local forms of 
governance in Charleston and SJC reinforce processes of corporate capture in training at the 
local scale. Although, as discussed on chapter three, in the case of Charleston, attempts have 
been made—without much success—to minimize some of its detrimental outcomes. In this 
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subsection, by comparing the tendencies of the local forms of governance of SJC and Charleston 
to reinforce corporate processes, I will reveal two major things.  
First, the tendency of SJC and Charleston governance to reinforce processes of capture is 
intrinsically related to their state form, accumulation strategy, and type of state selectivity. 
Second, their tendency to reinforce or minimize corporate capture is related to their governance 
mechanisms through which skill problems are identified and addressed, and through which 
MNCs foster their private interests. This subsection will be structured as follows. First, I will 
compare both forms of governance, demonstrating their relationship to their state forms, 
accumulation strategies, and type of state selectivity.  Second, I will contrast their governance 
mechanisms, and explore whether such mechanisms tend to reinforce or minimize corporate 
capture. 
The cases of SJC and Charleston present important features regarding the nature, 
characteristics and functioning of local forms of governance. While some scholars have argued 
that systems of governance are marked by shared power and interests, a collective mode of 
coordination and a strong autonomy from the state (Rhode 2007), the cases of SJC and 
Charleston reveal a different narrative. Their forms of governance, as Davies (2011, 2014, 2015) 
theorized, are marked by a strong relation to the state, hierarchical power relations, and can 
function as an instrument for single capitalist such as Embraer and Boeing, or fractions of capital 
to advance their interests (see Lovering 2011). As both local forms of governance tend to 
reinforce processes of corporate capture in training, theoretical rationalizations become crucial to 
provide explanations of the reasons behind these processes. 
Scholars such as Almond et. al. (2013, 2014, 2017) have argued that systems of 
governance tend to reinforce processes of corporate capture in regional training systems due to 
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their forms of state. According to the authors, subnational states within liberal market economies 
often have less active systems of governance in regard to fostering processes of externalization, 
and thus, are more prone to processes of corporate capture. Coordinated market economies, the 
authors argue, in general have systems of governance with wider developmental concerns. 
Despite this, the authors also acknowledge that national states can present, at the subnational 
scale, deviations from such a correlation, given that their state forms (e.g., federalism), can 
present some autonomy for variation (Almond et al. 2017; Tregaskis and Almond 2017; Almond 
et al. 2014). Understanding local forms of governance and their relation to processes of corporate 
capture according to their extent or commitment to wider development goals is valid, but to 
correlate such forms of governance with specific types of state becomes problematic. 
In this regard, the governances of Charleston and SJC (both within national states with a 
federalist system) have wider developmental goals, but processes of corporate capture are still 
present and reinforced. For example, one of the major goals of Charleston governance is to train 
and hire local residents by newly established MNCs, while the SJC’s local governance has 
greater concerns with developing Embraer’s domestic value chain. Therefore, their wider 
developmental goals do not nullify their tendency to reinforce corporate capture in training. 
Consequently, it implies that the tendency of their local forms of governance to reinforce or 
minimize capture is beyond the extension of their developmental goals. 
When comparing the cases of Charleston and SJC, one major evidence, which indicates 
how to understand the tendency of their local forms of governance to reinforce processes of 
corporate capture, is how such forms are related to their state accumulation strategy. As revealed 
previously, the accumulation strategies of SJC and Charleston are based on a selective 
institutional apparatus that privileges certain actors, fractions of capital and their sectors, and 
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some initiatives (see Jessop 2015; Rutherford et. al. 2018). This particularity affects local forms 
of governance in two main ways. First, some actors will be more successful than others in 
shaping the governance agenda of their regions and in advancing their interests, given their 
privileged position in their state apparatus and accumulation strategy. Second, local forms of 
governance tend to pursue development based on methods and initiatives that are congruent with 
their state accumulation strategies. Different state strategies tend to result in different methods to 
attract, embed, retain, and/or develop firms. 
In this context, the local forms of governance of SJC and Charleston tend to reinforce 
processes of corporate capture in training due to their state accumulation strategies and, more 
specifically, due to the centrality and power of representation given to MNCs in the balance of 
forces among existing actors. As discussed, South Carolina state managers have given centrality 
to the state manufacturing fraction of capital, having a strategic accumulation strategy based on 
fostering structural coupling processes. In this context, local economies across the state must 
compete with one another for such investments. Such competition has forced regions like 
Charleston to develop local forms of governance adapted and congruent to the logics of this 
accumulation strategy. In this regard, manufacturing corporations have a privileged position in 
the governance agenda of Charleston, where governance actors have pursued development based 
on compatible practices related to its state accumulation strategy.  
To be more specific, Charleston’s local form of governance reinforces processes of 
corporate capture in its regional training system by embracing South Carolina accumulation 
strategy as part of its own developmental strategy. By doing so, the local governance of 
Charleston seeks to locally implement higher-state scale training initiatives, which are 
understood as corporate capture. In this respect, this research demonstrated how processes of 
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corporate capture in South Carolina are related to its accumulation strategy, and thus, to broader 
structural occurrences that involve not only single-firms influence over educational institutions 
and their training programs (as exemplified in the case of Boeing and ReadySC) but also the 
influence of an industrial/manufacturing fraction of capital over broad state educational agenda 
and policies. To foster structural coupling processes, the state of South Carolina has developed 
an institutional apparatus that is flexible, inter-scale fluid and efficient, has committed to keep 
the state’s right-to-work status, and has further aligned its educational agenda and initiatives with 
manufacturing corporations’ interests, which this research explored as a form of corporate 
capture. In this respect, the local governance of Charleston reinforces processes of corporate 
capture fostered at the state level by embracing and implementing such practices at the local 
level. 
For example, Charleston’s local form of governance reinforces corporate capture at the 
local scale by implementing state programs at high schools, such as Career Academies and 
Apprenticeship Carolina that are of great benefit for manufacturing MNCs, and part of the recent 
further alignment between South Carolina’s educational agenda and the interests of private 
manufacturing corporations in the state. Local governance also reinforces corporate capture in 
Charleston’s regional training system by supporting the state’s right-to-work status. Local 
governance also has a crucial role in shaping the imaginaries of students concerning vocational 
education and the local community regarding the relevance of unions. One example in this 
regard is related to how governance leaders, such as the Charleston Chamber of Commerce and 
the Charleston Regional Development Alliance, enforce the idea that increasing local wages is a 
matter of individuals learning the right skills or improving their skills and not of unions fighting 
for workers’ rights. It is worth mentioning that in Charleston, processes of corporate capture also 
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result from single-firm influence over educational institutions and their training programs, which 
this research will reiterate later in this chapter. 
As in the case of Charleston, the local form of governance in SJC also reinforces 
processes of corporate capture, and this tendency is related to the Brazilian import-substitution 
accumulation strategy, which was adopted from the 1930s to the 1980s. As demonstrated before, 
this strategy sought to foster accumulation by privileging domestic corporations. The Brazilian 
developmental state sought to foster a mix of organic and structural coupling processes. As a 
result, the Brazilian state fostered an organic coupling in SJC in the 1950s, which culminated in 
two major features. First, this organic coupling resulted in the co-evolution of the Aeronautics 
Institute of Technology, the IPD, Embraer, and later, of the local aerospace industrial cluster.  
Second, it resulted in SJC having many important job positions in local state, educational 
institutions, private firms, and not-for-profit organizations being occupied by graduates from the 
Aeronautics Institute of Technology as well as people who have worked for a local aerospace 
company, such as Embraer or for aerospace-related institutions. 
This organic coupling and consequent spillovers have created personal and professional 
bonds among local governance actors that facilitate governance interactions around aerospace 
issues, and grant Embraer direct access to public institutions, including public educational 
institutions, such as the ITA and the FATEC. Therefore, the ease with which Embraer employees 
represent the company’s needs to governance actors along with its socioeconomic power and 
central role in local development explain why SJC form of governance tends to reinforce 
Embraer’s processes of corporate capture. Several examples can be given to illustrate this 
argument. Most major job positions in SJC city hall, such as in the Secretary of Economic 
Development of SJC, are occupied by alumni from the ITA, or former employees from Embraer. 
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This is also the case for the SJC Technology Park, the FATEC, and the CECOMPI. The 
evolution of the processes of corporate capture at the ITA and at the FATEC happened based on 
the personal and professional bonds. 
Another important finding, which demonstrates whether forms of governance tend to 
reinforce or minimize corporate capture is related to their governance mechanisms through 
which skill problems are identified and addressed, and through which MNCs foster their 
interests. Up to this point, this research has emphasized how Charleston’s local form of 
governance reinforces processes of corporate capture at the local scale, which is related to a 
dynamic fostered by a manufacturing fraction of capital at its subnational level, and in regard to 
South Carolina’s educational agenda and training initiatives. Nonetheless, corporate capture in 
South Carolina is not only structural and due to fractions of capital permanently influencing 
South Carolina’s educational agenda and policies, but also due to single firms’ influence over 
training initiatives. One particular case explored was the case of Boeing structural coupling and 
the consequent capture of the ReadySC program. In this respect, it is also important to analyze 
whether and why the local governance of Charleston reinforces or minimizes this particular 
process of corporate capture. As stated before, such a tendency is related to the governance 
mechanisms through which skill problems are identified and addressed, and through which 
MNCs foster their interests. 
When contrasting both cases, findings in this matter reveal their forms of governance are 
shaped by the way their states select which interests, actors, and initiatives to attend—an aspect 
that this research explored as state selectivity. So, as local forms of governance seek to present 
their local actors’ interests, they function according to the specificities of their state selectivity. 
In the case of Charleston, governance actors identify and address skills gaps and training issues 
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based on formal studies and four-year local strategies, which are used as instruments to present 
their needs to state managers and to justify public investments in educational institutions, in new 
training centers, and in new training initiatives and programs. In this context, Charleston’s local 
form of governance while reinforcing processes of corporate capture initiated at higher-scale, has 
attempted to minimize processes of corporate capture at least in relation to some of its 
detrimental outcomes at the local scale such as workers being hired from outside the region. 
Such attempts to minimize processes of corporate capture are related to how its formal local 
strategy One-Region is based on sector-level studies that pay particular attention to the skill 
needs of the business community in general instead of single firms. Such formal studies are also 
used as an instrument of power, through which local governance actors use in order to do 
lobbying. As one participant from the Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce explained, 
formal studies are used to educate legislators regarding their training demands, and to convince 
them about investment needs. 
It is also worth recalling that such attempts to minimize corporate capture are limited and 
problematic, only partially addressing existing issues. While Charleston’s local governance 
actors seek to develop a regional training system based on the needs of the local business 
community, such an attempt is a long-term solution, which ignores the short-term skill demands 
of local small aerospace firms. ReadySC Program could address such problems. Nonetheless, the 
program has prioritized and been captured by large MNCs, such as Boeing, where the skills 
needs of local aerospace firms in the business community have been overlooked. Moreover, 
ReadySC demands MNCs that have received its services pay competitive wages. In the case of 
Boeing, this has not happened, and such a negative outcome has been addressed by governance 
actors in a problematic way. In Charleston’s regional strategy, governance actors link increases 
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in wage to local residents getting the right skills, overlooking how possible changes in ReadySC 
requirements could foster important increases in the wages and benefits of the local working 
class. Such an action is supported by regional business actors, who are are against raising 
workers’ wages via unions, collective bargaining or by the state raising minimum wages. 
Additionally, local actors lack the power to advance structural changes at the subnational scale, 
where ReadySC resides. Therefore, Charleston’s local form of governance contradictorily 
reinforces the broader and structural processes of corporate capture while attempting to minimize 
some of the detrimental effects of such capture. 
In contrast to Charleston, SJC presents a significant difference regarding its governance 
mechanisms through which how skill problems are identified and addressed, and MNCs such as 
Embraer foster their interests. Different from Charleston, such governance mechanisms reinforce 
processes of corporate capture. This is because skill problems are identified and addressed based 
on informal one-on-one interactions among governance actors. Such interactions are 
characterized by clientelistic practices (see De Oliveira 2017), where the governance actors’ 
local professional ties (acquired from its aerospace organic coupling process) serve as the main 
mechanism of state selectivity regarding the establishment of training initiatives. This form of 
state selectivity combined with Embraer’s financial and social power magnify the company’s 
power of influence over educational institutions such as the ITA and the FATEC, and thus 
explain why SJC form of governance has a tendency to reinforce processes of corporate capture. 
In conclusion, the tendencies of SJC’s and Charleston’s local forms of governance to 
reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in their regional training systems are related 
to their state forms and accumulation strategies. Moreover, such tendencies are also associated to 
their governance mechanisms and, more specifically, to how governance actors identify and 
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address skill needs, and allows MNCs to advance their interests. The table below summarizes 
such findings. 
 
Table 9. Charleston’s and SJC’s Local Forms of Governance in Comparison. 
Local Forms of 
Governance 
Charleston São José dos Campos 
Leadership - Charleston Metro Chamber of 
Commerce (CMCC) 
- Charleston Regional 
Development Alliance (CRDA) 
- SJC City Hall 
- Technology Park 
(CECOMPI) 
State Selectivity - Interests are presented to state 
managers through formal 
strategies and studies. 
- Strong lobbying to “educate” 
politicians at the subnational 
scale. 
- Formal governance meetings 
at the local scale to establish 
goals and strategies and to 
create common discourses about 
the needs of Charleston. 
- Manufacturing corporations 
such as Boeing with structural 
advantages over the state. 
- Interests are presented to 
state managers through 
informal one-on-one 
interactions, and marked by 
individualism and 
discontinuity. 
- Personal/professional ties 
are important for actors to 
present their interests and to 
be attended by state 
managers. 
- MNCs such as Embraer 
with structural advantages 
over the state. 
Institutional 
Legacy/Political Culture 
- Urban Entrepreneurialism. 
- Skill needs identified through 
formal studies. 
- Skill needs addressed 
collectively through four-year 
strategies 
- Political culture/legacy 
marked by a mix of 
clientelistic, bureaucratic, and 
managerialist relations. 
- Skills needs identified 
through informal one-on-one 
interactions. 
- Skill needs addressed 
through firms directly access 
to educational institutions. 
Reinforcing Corporate 
Capture 
- Governance actors implement 
and expand higher-state 
programs seen as forms of 
corporate capture.  
- Clientelistic relations at the 
local governance (based on 
professional ties related to the 
aerospace sector) along with 
Embraer’s economic and 
political power allow the firm 
to influence educational 
institutions, and thus, to 
reinforce corporate capture. 
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- Lack of collective strategies 
and studies benefit single 
firm influence such as 
Embraer. 
Minimizing Corporate 
Capture 
- Formal studies and the One-
Region strategy minimize single 
firm influence. However, 
attempts to minimize Boeing’s 
corporate capture of ReadySC 
have focused on long-term 
training initiatives. 
Additionally, the responsibility 
regarding issues of corporate 
capture related to low wages 
and lack of transparency have 
been transferred to individuals. 
Local governance actors not 
only lack the power to address 
these issues but also believe that 
providing the right skills along 
with firms’ competition can deal 
with such wage problems. 
- Attempts to minimize 
corporate capture have not 
been made. However, 
educational institutions like 
the ITA and FATEC do take 
advantages of their processes 
of corporate capture. They do 
so by learning through their 
relationship with Embraer the 
skill needs of the sector. 
Therefore, these educational 
institutions are able to update 
their courses, create new ones 
and to make their programs 
more relevant to other firms 
in the aerospace sector. 
Source: Author. 
 
6.3 The Processes of Corporate Capture of Charleston and São José dos Campos in 
Comparison 
The findings regarding the processes of corporate capture in both regions suggest that 
such dynamics are significantly more complex than mainstream literature has suggested. When 
comparing the major characteristics in the processes of corporate capture within SJC’s and 
Charleston’s regional training systems two major findings stand out. First, corporate capture in 
regional training systems is a multi-scalar process. Second, the detrimental outcomes of 
corporate capture should be understood beyond the binary view of corporate capture versus 
externalization, MNCs interests versus government interests, incorporating its relation to class 
and uneven development. 
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As discussed in the second and third chapters, mainstream literature has identified 
processes of corporate capture in regional training systems according to how MNCs influence 
the state, receive customized training packages, distort local skill agendas and policies, recruit 
the most talented workforce from the local business community and from outside the region, 
and/or avoid knowledge sharing (Phelps 2000, 2008; Dawley 2007; Phelps and Fuller 2010). In 
this regard, mainstream literature has predominantly stressed how FDIs do or do not result in 
wider cluster benefits and externalization. Corporate capture is understood in relation to the 
unequal power relations in which the interests of MNCs versus the interests of governments are 
at play.  
Although such a portrayal is important and valid, the processes of corporate capture in 
the regional training systems of Charleston and SJC reveal a need to expand this comprehension. 
Regarding what corporate capture looks like, the findings of this research reveal a much more 
detailed description of its particularities. For example, corporate capture can be conceptualized 
as permanent or temporary. The corporate capture of ReadySC Program by Boeing exemplifies a 
process that is sporadic and will end after the state of South Carolina delivers skills agreed upon 
to Boeing, while Embraer’s customized training programs at the FATEC and at the ITA can be 
conceptualized as a permanent form of corporate capture, given that this process will exist as 
long as both parties are interested in keeping such arrangements. Another example concerns the 
specificities of customized training services.  
Customized training services can assume different forms. In the case of Charleston, it 
includes not only the state training workers for firms free-of-charge and bureaucracy, but also 
practices such as the development and customization of curriculum and courses, the provision of 
instructors to teach on-the-job, reimbursement for firms to pay internal training, and travel 
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funding for firms to send their workers to other countries in order to receive training. Moreover, 
customized training can also involve the free use of educational institutions’ infrastructure and 
apparatuses not only for training purposes but also for recruitment. For example, ReadySC 
Program in Charleston as well as the ITA and the FATEC in SJC allow Boeing and Embraer to 
use their apparatuses to recruit and leverage the number of applicants. 
Another detail often neglected by scholars regarding the details of processes of corporate 
capture relates to how these processes are often marked by a lack of transparency. Furthermore, 
it reveals how MNCs circumvent the juridical form of national, subnational, and/or local states in 
regard to existing institutionalized training incentives and laws that apply for the business 
community in general. For example, in Brazil it is illegal for public educational institutions to 
provide free-of-charge customized training services for firms. As discussed previously, this is 
considered a type of lobbying. However, to establish customized training programs for Embraer, 
the FATEC and the ITA have used a not-for-profit institution (Foundation Casemiro) as a 
mediator for their relations. In such a way, the FATEC and the ITA are not supposedly related to 
Embraer, but to a not-for-profit organization. In the case of Charleston, the state of South 
Carolina has documents that establish the parameters and levels of training incentives for the 
business community; however, as demonstrated before, Boeing has received training initiatives 
that are way beyond what is established in such documents. Moreover, the whole bargaining 
process between Boeing and South Carolina happened in secret and the exact extension of 
incentives has not been fully disclosed, even today. 
The cases of Charleston and SJC also point out to another major aspect of processes of 
corporate capture in regional training systems, which has been overlooked by scholars. This is 
related to its multi-scalar nature. When comparing the processes of corporate capture in SJC and 
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Charleston, it becomes clear that such processes can take place at different scales, result from 
isolated initiatives or broader structural and institutional dynamics, and can be fostered either by 
single firms and/or fractions of capital. For example, in SJC, processes of corporate capture are 
isolated initiatives, and take place at the local scale—under the influence of a single firm, 
Embraer—through informal and often one-on-on interactions. Different from SJC, in Charleston, 
processes of corporate capture are linked to broader institutional dynamics, taking place at the 
subnational scale, and are fostered under the influence of fractions of capital. The development 
of its Career Academies, Apprenticeship programs and ReadySC happened under the influence 
of South Carolina manufacturing fraction of capital. Additionally, processes of corporate capture 
in Charleston also originate associated to isolated initiatives like in SJC, under the influence of a 
single firm, which was illustrated through the case of Boeing and ReadySC. 
Another major aspect of processes of corporate capture in regional training systems, 
revealed in both cases, relates to how such processes have been understood beyond the binary 
view of corporate capture versus externalization, and in relation to class and uneven 
development. First, as Phelps (2008) argued, processes of corporate capture are always partial, 
meaning that rarely will MNCs have the ability to fully capture the capacity of educational 
institutions. What the cases of Charleston and SJC demonstrate is that educational institutions 
will concomitantly develop firm-specific customized training initiatives along with general 
training initiatives, unless of course, if such institutions are intentionally designed to provide 
only customized training services, which is the case with ReadySC. The FATEC and the ITA in 
SJC provide customized training services for Embraer along with training services that are 
intended to provide skills for the business community in general. The same happens in 
Charleston, where governance actors, seeking to address the skill needs of its business 
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community, have worked with educational institutions (under the One-Region strategy goals) to 
expand their training centers, programs, and courses. Therefore, such dynamics in both regions 
imply that corporate capture in their regional training systems should be understood in relation to 
the degree of duality existing between customized firm-specific and general-skills training 
programs. As conceptualized on chapter three, regions are often based on what was termed dual 
regional training systems. The existence of customized training programs, or the influence of 
MNCs over the educational strategies of regions does not always imply a lack of training for the 
general business community, or distortions in local educational agendas.  
Moreover, the processes of corporate capture in SJC and Charleston demonstrate a need 
to go beyond the dichotomy MNCs interests versus government and business community 
interests. Educational institutions can have their own interests in being captured. Such a capture 
can result in a closer relationship with major local employers, build experience and knowledge 
regarding the skill needs in the sector, and result in reforms in their existing educational 
programs, courses, and initiatives. As Rikowski’s (2000) argued, education is a capitalist social 
form, and educational institutions have their own interests. In this regard, the success of 
educational institutions is partially dependent on having programs and courses that deliver 
relevant and up-to-date skills for employers. In this context, corporate capture of certain 
programs can allow educational institutions to work with large firms and to make their courses 
more valuable in the local labor market. 
Going beyond this dichotomy also involves considering how processes of corporate 
capture are related to class and uneven development. This was particularly clear in Charleston 
and SJC. As discussed, the processes of corporate capture in SJC and Charleston reinforce class 
inequality. In the case of SJC, the Embraer’s customized training program at the ITA, intended 
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not only to address a skill gap in the market but also to replace high wage, long-term 
employees—engineers—with highly skilled young engineers from the elite with much lower 
wages and career plans. Somehow such a process of corporate capture initially acted as a form of 
job “elitization” along with a form of job precariatization. In the case of Charleston, corporate 
capture reinforces class inequality in regard to how careers academies and apprenticeship 
programs are developed in low-income schools, where local actors seek to convince students and 
their parents to pursue vocational careers. As Bowles and Gintis (1978) would claim, working 
class jobs for working class students. 
Another relationship of corporate capture to class, revealed in both cases, involves how 
their processes of corporate capture, and more specifically in relation to customized training 
programs, can result in training initiatives that do not provide possibilities for continuous, life-
long education, and can provide skills that are not transferable to other firms due to the highly 
specific skill content of their curriculum, which are intended to meet the interests of single firm 
interests. While this is not the case of the processes of corporate capture at the ITA and at the 
FATEC, in Charleston, the corporate capture of ReadySC by Boeing resulted in the program 
giving the company carte blanche in regard to the design of curriculums and courses. Training 
for Boeing is highly specific, and many skills are non-transferable to other firms due to the 
specificity of aerospace production. Such issues diminish workers’ empowerment by reducing 
job mobility. 
Finally, the processes of corporate capture in both regions, related to their customized 
training programs, have serious issues concerning wage and benefit requirements. In the case of 
SJC, these issues are even more drastic given that free-of-charge customized training is provided 
by the ITA and the FATEC without any requirements for Embraer to pay high wages, offer 
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benefits, or even hire registered students. In contrast to SJC, in South Carolina, state managers 
have put some requirements for firms receiving ReadySC services. For example, firms must 
generate a certain number of jobs, pay competitive wages, and offer permanent jobs with benefits 
in order to receive free-of-charge customized training services. Although this can be seen as a 
gain for the working class, “competitive wages” paid by Boeing in Charleston are 30% lower 
than the wages paid in Everett, Washington. Moreover, there is a lack of transparency and 
accountability regarding whether Boeing is meeting such requirements. No information is 
available in this regard. 
In conclusion, when the processes of corporate capture in SJC and Charleston regional 
training systems are put in comparison, greater details regarding corporate capture in regional 
training systems are revealed. In this regard, comparing both cases not only allows this research 
to provide further details of what corporate capture looks like, but also enables this research to 
re-conceptualize it. As demonstrated, two major findings stand out. First, corporate capture is 
multi-scale process. Second, the detrimental outcomes of corporate capture surpass the binary 
view of corporate capture versus externalization and demands scholars to extend such analysis 
beyond MNCs interests versus government interests to incorporate its relation to class and 
uneven development. The table below summarizes these findings. 
 
Table 10. Corporate Capture in the Regional Training Systems of SJC and Charleston. 
Corporate Capture Charleston  São José dos Campos 
Temporality  Temporary Permanent 
Multi-scale Process - Capture evolves at the subnational 
scale and then it is expanded at the 
local scale. Its evolution is intrinsically 
connected to SC accumulation strategy 
in which corporate capture works as a 
form to attract MNCs and foster 
structural coupling processes. 
- Corporate capture happens 
locally. Different from South 
Carolina, it is not related to 
bargaining events. Capture 
evolves organically through 
informal one-on-one 
interactions. Embraer’s access 
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Subnational Scale: 
- South Carolina’s Educational Strategy 
and Agenda.  
- Training Programs such as Career 
Academies, ReadySC and 
Apprenticeship Carolina. 
 
Local Scale: 
- The Charleston Career Academies 
Program.  
- The Charleston Youth Apprenticeship 
Program. 
- ReadySC Program under the 
“control” of MNCs such as Boeing. 
- Boeing’s influence over high schools 
such as R.B Stall High School. 
to state managers is easily 
granted due to professional ties 
among local actors related to 
the aerospace sector and to the 
former national collective 
developmental project. 
Additional, Embraer’s 
economic and political power 
magnifies its power of 
influence. 
 
Local Scale: 
- Program Designer Embraer at 
the FATEC. 
- Embraer Program of 
Specialization in Engineering 
at the ITA. 
Incentives - $33 Million. 
- Cost-free recruiting. 
- Cost- and bureaucracy-free 
customized training for more than 
3,800 workers in manufacturing 
positions. 
- Cost-free recruiting. 
- Cost-free customized 
training. However, Embraer 
pays for professors’ teaching 
hours. 
Requirements for 
cost-free 
customized training 
- Payment of competitive wages, 
provision of permanent jobs with 
benefits packages. But problematic. 
- No requirements. 
Skill Transferability  Low Medium 
Transparency - Lack of transparency regarding 
whether Boeing is meeting the 
requirements established by the 
ReadySC Program. 
- Lack of transparency regarding the 
amount of training incentives given by 
state managers. 
- Illegal association between 
Embraer and the FATEC and 
the ITA (considered lobbying). 
Form of Relations Asymmetric relations Symmetric relations  
Uneven Class 
Relations 
- Low wages 
- Poor benefits package 
- No requirement for hiring locals for 
high edge jobs. 
- Vocational education and jobs 
targeting the working class.  
- Strong discourse to convince working 
class students to pursue vocational 
careers. 
- ITA: Training as a form of 
job “elitization” along with a 
form of job precariatization. 
Training to replace engineers 
with high salaries and benefits 
packages. 
- Workers typified as students 
during training. 
 
 
 244 
 
- Militancy against unions such as 
IAM. Maintain the right-to-work state 
status. 
Source: Author. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to put in perspective the major findings of this research in regard to 
the processes of corporate capture in Charleston and SJC. By contrasting the major similarities 
and differences in the findings of both cases, I attempted to abstract some major conclusions in 
regard to the relationship between the state, local forms of governance, and processes of 
corporate capture. Regarding the state and its relationship to processes of corporate capture, my 
empirical evidence suggests that in SJC and Charleston, such processes are related to broader 
causes than levels of coordination and asymmetrical informal, being intrinsic and structurally 
related to their state and their state accumulation strategy, which provide structural advantages 
for MNCs such as Boeing and Embraer to advance their interests. 
In regard to whether the local forms of governance of SJC and Charleston reinforce or 
minimize processes of corporate capture, a correlation between their states—more specifically 
their form, accumulation strategy and state selectivity—and the tendency of their local forms of 
governance to reinforce corporate capture was established. As revealed the tendency of their 
local forms of governance to reinforce corporate capture is related to their states, the mechanisms 
through which skill gaps are identified and addressed, to the multiple interests of governance 
actors in the commodification of education and workers as well as the political and economic 
power of MNCs like Embraer and Boeing. 
Finally, in this chapter, by comparing the processes of corporate capture in the regional 
training systems of Charleston and SJC, I sought to demonstrate how such processes involve 
 
 
 245 
 
dynamics at different scales and go beyond the traditional dualistic view of corporate capture, 
being related to uneven development and class relations. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
In today’s globalized world, the power of influence of multinational corporations over the 
state and society is significant. MNCs have become giant global corporations whose size in 
terms of value added is greater than many nation states (Chandler and Mazlish 2005). In the last 
decades, the power of corporations has drastically increased not only due to mergers and 
acquisitions—which have resulted in some of the largest conglomerates of corporations in the 
world such as Unilever—but also due to how the liberalization of international trade has 
culminated in more fluidity of MNCs across nations (Chandler and Mazlish 2005; Hudson 2011; 
Featherstone and Mackinnon 2017). 
This context allows MNCs to expand their influence over different areas of our society. 
Several studies have demonstrated how corporations influence, according to their interests, how 
schools, colleges and universities educate, how states design their environmental laws, how 
states regulate the use of pesticides, or the commercialization of certain medications, among 
many other things (Chandler and Mazlish 2005). The influence of large corporations over 
governments across the world has even led scholars to denounce them as a threat to democracy, 
conceptualizing this process as the privatization of democracy (Berrón and González 2016).  
One facet of this is related to how MNCs are influential today in regard to how states 
have re-organized their roles, their functionalities and their operations to find ways not only to 
maintain the firms that are well-established in their regions, but also to attract new ones. One 
particular area is related to how states have actively advanced the commodification of education 
by, for example, aligning their educational agendas and strategies with businesses, or by creating 
training initiatives and programs as incentives to attract and retain firms (Markusen and Nesse 
2007). Many scholars have conceptualized such an influence of MNCs over the state as 
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processes of corporate capture (Phelps 2008). It is in this context that this dissertation was 
developed.  
As stated previously, the main goal of this research was twofold. First, it was to analyze 
the existing processes of corporate capture related to Boeing South Carolina and Embraer in the 
regional training systems of Charleston and SJC respectively. Second, this research sought to 
investigate how SJC and Charleston forms of state and governance accounted for differences in 
the evolution of corporate capture. In this respect, throughout this study, I strived to answer three 
main questions.  
In the first question, it was asked: Do Boeing South Carolina and Embraer foster 
processes of corporate capture in the regional training systems of Charleston and SJC? In this 
regard, I believe this research not only answered this inquiry but was also able to advance the 
theoretical and empirical understanding of processes of corporate capture in regional training 
systems. As revealed, Boeing and Embraer do foster processes of corporate capture in the 
regional training systems of Charleston and SJC. In the case of Charleston, this research 
disclosed how manufacturing MNCs have influenced the educational agenda and strategy of 
South Carolina, fostering for example the creation of different programs such as Career 
Academies, ReadySC, and Apprenticeship Carolina. Moreover, this study explored how Boeing 
was able to obtain several training incentives, exploiting, for example, the institutional capacity 
of ReadySC, a public program from South Carolina that committed to provide customized 
training, free-of-charge, to Boeing. In the case, of SJC, this research revealed how Embraer 
fostered processes of corporate capture in the FATEC and the ITA, influencing these educational 
institutions to establish customized programs that could deliver highly specific skills, also free-
of-charge, for Embraer.  
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When analyzing these existing processes of corporate capture in SJC and Charleston, this 
research realized that such processes were much more nuanced than what the FDI studies and 
GPN literature had presented (see Phelps 2000, 2008; Dawley 2007; Phelps & Fuller 2010). For 
example, processes of corporate capture in both regions were related to multiple scales, were 
marked by illegalities and a lack of transparency, and had clear links to class relations, going 
beyond the view of government interests versus MNCs interests often stressed by mainstream 
literature (Phelps 2000, 2008; Almond et al. 2014). This required this study to rethink the term 
theoretically. Engaging with Neo-Marxist scholars, this research sought to reconceptualize the 
concept of corporate capture in terms of uneven development. Such a reconceptualization also 
attempted to develop an understanding of corporate capture that is not dualistic (meaning that 
corporate capture excludes the existence of processes of externalization) and is more sensible to 
questions of scale. Empirically, this analysis was able to incorporate a much more detailed 
description of what is corporate capture in regional training systems. 
In my second research question, I inquired: How does the state in each region account for 
differences in how corporate capture evolves? When examining the evolution of processes of 
corporate capture in the regional training systems of SJC and Charleston and its relation to their 
state forms, it was also clear the need to rethink mainstream literature explanations. In this 
respect, as demonstrated in the second chapter, the GPN literature and FDI studies had a 
problematic approach to explain the relationship between the state and processes of corporate 
capture based on the lack of specific assets and low levels of institutional coordination 
(Mackinnon 2012; Coe & Hess 2011; Yeung 2016; Phelps 2000, 2008). As FDI researchers 
claim, liberal states are more prone to capture than developmental states, given that such a lack 
of coordination results in an absence of initiatives fostering processes of externalization such as 
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cluster formation (Phelps 2008). The processes of corporate capture in SJC and Charleston posed 
a challenge to such conceptualizations. Corporate capture is present in both states, even in the 
state of South Carolina, which as described on chapter four, is marked by high degrees of 
coordination. Additionally, the state of South Carolina, according to its state accumulation 
strategy, seeks to be intentionally captured in some cases in order to foster structural coupling 
processes. Moreover, the case of SJC revealed that the “classic” developmental states are also 
prone to corporate capture. Both cases also pointed to the need for an approach more sensible to 
state scale, which could break with mainstream broad generalizations. Therefore, corporate 
capture could not be only a matter of existence/lack of specific assets or state coordination. 
Capture evolves in much more complex ways and at multiple state scales. 
In this regard, drawing from the variegated capitalism literature as well as Neo-Marxists 
readings of the state, this research developed an approach, which could explain why and how 
corporate capture evolves in relation to the state. Answering the question posed, I demonstrated 
that in SJC and Charleston the evolution of their processes of corporate capture is intrinsically 
related to how their state accumulation strategies privilege manufacturing MNCs, providing them 
structural advantages. Furthermore, I revealed that such an evolution happens related to their 
state forms and degrees of autonomy, thus, at multiple state scales and through different 
mechanisms.  
In Charleston, processes of corporate capture in training initiatives evolved at multiple 
scales but mostly at the subnational. As disclosed, the state of South Carolina has developed an 
institutional apparatus that privileges manufacturing corporations, given that accumulation is 
pursued based on structural coupling processes. Such corporations have influenced the state of 
South Carolina, advancing their interests in regard, for example, to vocational training. In this 
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respect, the state of South Carolina in the last few years went through a drastic change, further 
aligning its educational agenda and strategy with the interests of MNCs. This in turn has resulted 
in the creation of several vocational training programs, which I depicted as examples of 
corporate capture. I argued that the programs ReadySC, Careers Academies and Apprenticeship 
Carolina were intentionally created to be captured by MNCs as a form to foster structural 
coupling. Therefore, capture in this case was not about a lack of specific assets or state 
coordination but the opposite. This research went further to demonstrate that corporate capture in 
South Carolina is related not only to its manufacturing fraction of capital but also to single 
MNCs such as Boeing. In this particular case, I revealed that the ReadySC Program was 
automatically captured by Boeing, given that the company met its requirements to receive 
incentives. Nonetheless, as demonstrated, Boeing advanced the degree of corporate capture 
regarding ReadySC program to a higher level, receiving many more benefits and incentives than 
would a regular business from the local business community.  
In the case of SJC, I unveiled how Embraer’s processes of corporate capture evolved also 
related to its accumulation strategy. However, the Embraer case shows that the evolution of 
corporate capture happened through different mechanisms and at a different scale. As it was 
argued, Embraer’s evolution of corporate capture at the ITA and the FATEC happened through 
an organic form. As disclosed, the Brazilian developmental state, under the collective 
developmental project, fostered an organic coupling process in SJC, which was based on the co-
evolution/co-creation of the CTA, the IPD, the ITA, and later on, Embraer. Such a co-evolution 
established a professional aerospace community with strong ties. Main local actors in the state, 
educational institutions, firms, research institutes, and not-for-profit organizations have often 
worked or graduated at the ITA and/or worked for an aerospace firm. This created a professional 
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bond among local actors, which has granted Embraer access to educational institutions and an 
easiness to establish customized training partnerships with public local educational institutions 
seen as processes of corporate capture. Different from Charleston, capture in SJC involves 
informal symmetric power relations at the local scale and did not emerge as part of a bargaining 
event. 
Finally, in my third question, I established the following inquiry: Do the local forms of 
governance of each region reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in the regional 
training systems of SJC and Charleston? When analyzing my empirical data in order to answer 
this question, it was clear that mainstream literature in regard to two main approaches was 
problematic: Workforce development systems and local forms of governance. First, mainstream 
literature has problematically depicted local forms of governance as collective modes of 
coordination, as marked by trust and reciprocity, shared power and interests, and as having a 
strong autonomy from the state was problematic (Blanco 2015; Davies 2011). However, SJC and 
Charleston forms of governance have a strong relationship to their state forms and accumulation 
strategy and are marked by hierarchical power relations. Regarding workforce development 
systems, the GPN literature has conducted their studies on a conceptualization based on market 
relations, overlooking the contradictory nature of labor and labor markets (Gereffi and 
Fernandez-Stark 2016; De Vries et al. 2016; Chin and Liu 2014; Fernandez-Stark et al. 2011). 
The workforce development systems of SJC and Charleston were contradictory, requiring 
discursive and institutional regulation. An analysis based on demand and supply of labor and 
training would not be sufficient to explain the dynamics taking place in both regions.  
In this regard, this study engaged with Neo-Marxist conceptualizations of labor, 
governance, and the state to address such an issue (Jonas 1996; Phelps & Wood 2006; Lovering 
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2011; Block 1987; Offe 1984). This research developed an approach to local forms of 
governance and regional training systems that could provide a more refined explanation of the 
training dynamics of both regions. This was important for this research to demonstrate whether 
SJC and Charleston forms of governance reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in 
their regional training systems. I argued that the tendency of SJC’s and Charleston’s local forms 
of governance to reinforce processes of corporate capture is related to their state form, 
accumulation strategy, and type of state selectivity. Moreover, it was also claimed that even in 
regions where their forms of governance tend to minimize processes of corporate capture, MNCs 
are still able to influence and capture regional training systems despite subnational states’ 
accumulation strategies and local forms of governance prioritizing domestic SMEs. This is due 
to the multiple interests of governance actors involved in the commodification of education and 
workers, as well as, the economic and political power of MNCs.  
This argument about corporate capture has implications in regard to the nature of 
capitalism and the state. Despite Charleston and SJC being located in different national and 
subnational states and being marked by distinctive contexts and backgrounds, there was a 
relative similarity of the outcomes of corporate capture in their regional training systems. Such a 
similarity points out to how corporate capture is a structural feature of capitalism and the 
capitalist state. Acknowledging corporate capture as a structural feature of capitalism and the 
capitalist state enforces the importance of the concept of corporate capture. This is because the 
concept not only accounts for the nuances and degrees of corporate power and influence (MNCs 
and fractions of capital) over the interests of states and local business communities, but also 
acknowledges the dynamics and outcomes for the working class. Therefore, the concept is useful 
to account for the multiple actors and their interests around policies of inward investments, and 
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more specifically, around training policies and initiatives. Moreover, as conceptualized in this 
dissertation, the concept of corporate capture is sensitive to the multiple state scales in which 
corporate power and influence take place. 
In SJC, I claimed that its local form of governance reinforces processes of corporate 
capture. This happens due to a combination of factors: How skill needs are identified and 
addressed based on clientelistic relations, how the local existing aerospace professional bond 
grants to firms easier access and cooperation with educational institutions, and how Embraer’s 
economic and political power allows the company to take advantage of such features. As 
revealed, based on clientelistic relations—strengthened by the existing aerospace professional 
bond among local actors, as described before—skill needs are identified through informal one-
on-one interactions among governance actors. Based on the same relations, skill needs are 
addressed through direct interaction between firms such as Embraer and educational institutions. 
Personal/professional ties are important for actors to present their interests and to be attended by 
state managers. In this context, clientelistic relations in local governance, the existence of 
professional ties related to the aerospace sector along with Embraer’s economic and political 
power allow the firm to influence educational institutions, and thus, to reinforce corporate 
capture. The lack of formal studies and strategies to identify and address skill needs at the labor 
market, benefits single firm influence such as Embraer over public educational institutions. 
In the case of Charleston, I also argued that its local form of governance reinforces 
processes of corporate capture. However, it was acknowledged that local actors have, although 
problematically, attempted to minimize such processes of capture. As was claimed, Charleston’s 
local form of governance reinforces processes of corporate capture by implementing and 
expanding higher-state programs seen as forms of corporate capture. To illustrate my argument 
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two examples in this regard were given: The Charleston Youth Apprenticeship Program and the 
Charleston Career Academies Program. In the case of the Charleston Career Academies 
Program, it has allowed, for example, Boeing to exert influence over high schools vocational 
training programs such as at the R.B Stall High School.  
One major difference from the SJC’s local form of governance resided in the fact that 
skill needs are identified and addressed based on a different political culture (and legacy). 
Having a political culture based on urban entrepreneurialism, the local form of governance in 
Charleston has a much more technocratic and broad approach to identify and address its region’s 
skill needs. Skill needs are identified based on sector-level studies and collective governance 
meetings, and are mostly addressed through formal four-year strategies such as the One-Region. 
Such studies and strategies serve as a tool for governance actors such as the CMCC and the 
CRDA to present the region’s skills needs to local educational institutions and state managers. 
Governance actors such as CMCC use these studies and the One-Region strategy to influence 
educational institutions, so that they can reformulate, create or expand their courses and 
programs. Governance actors also used such studies and the One-Region strategy to represent 
(i.e. “to educate”) the skill needs of the region to state managers, and more specifically, as a tool 
for lobbying for investments, expansion of educational institutions and programs, creation of 
new programs, courses and training initiatives, among others. 
The existence of sector-level formal studies and strategies have the potential to decrease 
single firms’ influence over the educational agenda and training initiatives of regions, as scholars 
such as Phelps (2008) have showed. However, as I argued, attempts to minimize Boeing’s 
corporate capture of ReadySC Program have been problematic.  Attempts to minimize Boeing’s 
corporate capture of ReadySC have focused on long-term training initiatives. Additionally, the 
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responsibility regarding issues of corporate capture related to low wages and lack of 
transparency have been transferred to individuals and to the market. Local governance actors not 
only lack the state power at the local scale to address these issues, but also believe that providing 
the right skills along with firms’ competition can deal with such wage problems. 
This research, therefore, by engaging with labor geography studies and Neo-Marxists 
scholars attempted to contribute to the FDI and GPN literatures, more specifically, in discussions 
regarding the “dark side” of strategic coupling processes related to issues of labor and uneven 
development (Mackinnon 2012; Bair and Werner 2015). As scholars have stated, the GPN 
literature has overlooked these questions (Rutherford et al. 2018; Gutelius 2016; Coe 2015; Bair 
and Werner 2015). By addressing the relationship between the state, governance, and processes 
of corporate capture, this study hopes to contribute to other studies and scholars who have 
worked toward addressing similar issues. Moreover, this research’s contribution to studies of 
corporate capture related to regional training systems can serve as an initial reflection (and for 
action) for state managers to rethink their practices when bargaining with MNCs. More 
specifically, this study by bringing some light to how MNCs have exploited the institutional 
capacities of regions in regard to training initiatives, hopes to provide some considerations—
although not so direct—of what could be done to ameliorate issues related to labor. Additionally, 
this research calls our attention in regard to the need for the working class through its 
representatives such as unions to be more proactive, and thus more involved in MNCs/states 
bargaining events in terms of demanding, as part of the negotiations, better working conditions 
and more inclusive training initiatives in regard to gender, race, and ethnicity. 
Worth noting, in my attempt to answer the research questions above mentioned, this 
study met several difficulties, having various theoretical and empirical deficiencies. Empirically, 
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some of the deficiencies presented in this research is associated to its task of comparing the 
evolution of corporate capture and its relation to the state of two regions located in different 
contexts. First, it was a challenge to compare the processes of corporate capture between two 
different forms of state. While the federal government in Brazil is much more active than the 
federal government in the United States, we see the opposite in regard to their subnational states. 
South Carolina was a major actor in the processes of corporate capture in Charleston, while the 
state of São Paulo had a much less significant role. Charleston was also much more active than 
SJC. In this respect, instead of starting this study with bounded units, comparing SJC and 
Charleston, their subnational and national states, this research departed with the processes and 
practices under study, more specifically their processes of corporate capture, and then their 
relation to the state. Yet, at many times this study had to deal with issues when comparing 
distinct realities and contexts. 
Such a difficulty was not only related to differences in state power and structure, but also 
to the task of comparing the evolution of corporate capture in both regions in relation to their 
accumulation strategies, which had a historical mismatch. As described, the evolution of 
corporate capture in SJC was related to the Brazilian import-substitution accumulation strategy, 
which was replaced almost 40 years ago, while the evolution of corporate capture in Charleston 
is associated to its current accumulation strategy. Therefore, it was complex to compare issues 
that are related to different historical moments. Moreover, I compared regions with different 
levels of maturity regarding their labor markets and regional training systems. Boeing was 
established in Charleston in 2011, therefore, its influence, in a context in which the aerospace 
labor market and training system of Charleston are just being built, is much clear than in the case 
of SJC, where its regional training systems and labor market are well established. This can lead 
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this research to consider that Boeing is much more influential than Embraer in their regions 
without contemplating that such an influence resides in the emerging aerospace labor market of 
Charleston.  
This research also draws only on two case studies in order to make broad claims, and 
although this study analyzed other empirical studies to support its claims, more empirical studies 
are needed to strength and confirm the findings presented in this dissertation, and to assess its 
established theoretical approach and arguments. Hopefully, such an issue will serve as 
motivation to stimulate more studies in this regard. 
Another issue is related to a lack of interviews with some key actors. First, a small 
number of interviews were conducted with representatives of aerospace SMEs in both regions. In 
total, six firms’ representatives were interviewed, three from each region. Many researchers 
analyze matters of corporate capture based on the interest of MNCs versus the interests of 
governments along with the interests of their local business communities. In this respect, this 
research was not able to collect significant data in regard to the interests of the local business 
community of both regions. Several attempts were made to contact firms’ representatives; 
however, the response rate was very low. Governance actors, public educational institutions and 
state managers provided substantial information in this matter but still, having more interviews 
with aerospace SMEs could enrich this research substantially. Second, as stated in the 
introduction, this research was not able to have interviews with representatives from Boeing. 
This is an important limitation encountered in this research. Boeing’s representatives were 
contacted through several mechanisms such as phone calls, emails, and in-person. Some 
participants were also requested to ask Boeing’s staff for an interview. All requests were denied. 
Boeing’s refusal to participate in this research reinforces one of the claims presented in this 
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research: Processes of corporate capture often involves issues of transparency. Boeing has 
received from the state of South Carolina nearly one billion dollars in incentives and subsidies, 
still the company refuses to share information that is of public interest. The impossibility of 
collecting information directly from Boeing’s representatives made the task of understanding 
Boeing’s training strategies, influence over South Carolina’s and Charleston’s educational 
strategy agenda, skill deficiencies, and problems regarding the workforce much more difficult. 
Nonetheless, this does not invalidate this research. This research sought to mitigate this issue by 
directing questions related to Boeing to all research participants, and by analyzing secondary 
documents such as newspaper articles, yet, this still represents a significant a problem. In the 
case of Embraer, its representative was more than willing to participate in an interview, and this 
might be related to the predominance of clientelistic relations, as described previously, which 
prevail in the local political and economic culture of SJC. 
Theoretically, one of the issues concerns the concept of corporate capture. Corporate 
capture cannot be easily measured or quantified. As the market requires state intervention in 
order to function, MNCs are always influencing the state and its actions. Therefore, what is the 
point at which the influence of MNCs can be considered or not considered a process of corporate 
capture? Additionally, the processes of corporate capture in SJC and Charleston did not always 
have the same resemblance. For example, corporate capture in SJC is not related to processes of 
corporate capture at its subnational state (São Paulo) like in the case of Charleston and South 
Carolina. Another example concerns the differences in levels of skill specificity provided in 
these regions’ customized training programs. Training and skills in Charleston are much more 
firm-specific—therefore less transferable—than in SJC. This means that establishing variables to 
measure whether corporate capture exists in different regions can pose a challenge, given that the 
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ways corporations influence the state in terms of education and training can greatly vary across 
space, and thus, corporate capture can present different characteristics. Yet, in both locations, 
MNCs do influence their states’ regional training systems.  
Another issue is related to how the term corporate capture can mislead readers to a view 
that such a process only involves the interests of MNCs being advanced, neutralizing for 
example, the interests of states and public educational institutions. However, as the cases of SJC 
and Charleston revealed, corporate capture is more a process of accommodation than imposition, 
involving multiple interests. The state and public institutions also have their own interests. 
Another theoretical deficiency in this research concerns its focus on the relation between 
capital and the state, which resulted in a lack of attention toward the role of the working class in 
processes of corporate capture. As some scholars have argued, such a disregard concerning the 
role (or agency) of workers in shaping the state is a common feature found in the work of 
scholars engaging with Marxist state theorists (Clarke 1991; Kelly 1999). This is the particular 
case of Jessop’s strategic-relational approach (Pfister 2004; Las Heras 2018; Kelly 1999). 
Jessop’s approach, by placing emphasis on the overdetermining role of capitalist structures, 
undermines the role that individual and collective actors (and more specifically of the 
‘dominated’, such as the working class or social movements) have in the emergence and shaping 
of hegemonic state projects (Pfister 2004; Las Heras 2018). In other words, Jessop overlooks 
how the state continuously interacts with the ‘dominated’, responding to and therefore being 
shaped by their interests. As Davies (2013) stated, this is problematic because hegemony and 
consent under hegemonic state projects tend to be fragile, and often encounter resistance and 
confrontation from the ‘dominated’, who actions can lead to counter-hegemonic projects due to 
their emancipatory power. 
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As stated before, this illustrates one theoretical—and consequently empirical—deficiency 
of this research, which by engaging with Jessop and other Marxist state theorists, lacked 
attention to how workers in SJC and Charleston—who have been part of the processes of 
corporate capture—perceive, conform, or react to such processes. In this regard—and although 
unions’ representatives were interviewed—this research did not conduct interviews with 
workers, for example, to inquire about their experiences, views and evaluation regarding the 
training programs under study (such as main problems), or about whether workers push their 
own agenda, find ways to resist existing detrimental outcomes of corporate capture. Interviewing 
workers could also be of great contribution, for example, to further analyze whether Boeing has 
met ReadySC program’s requirements such as hiring trainees in permanent positions, paying 
competitive wages, etc. Therefore, a significant problem that this research acknowledges is that 
the working class and its representatives were scarcely given voice, and their agency barely 
recognized. Such an issue calls for the adoption of a more refined approach to labor agency, and 
provides some potential empirical guidance for future research. 
The first potential topic for future research could be to analyze national and subnational 
states that are marked by a strong influence of workers in the functioning and design of their skill 
training systems and curriculum (Busemeyer & Trampusch 2011; Rutherford el al. 2018; 
Rutherford 1998). That is the case of national states such as Germany and Switzerland (the so-
called, by VoC scholars, coordinated market economies), or subnational states like Quebec, and 
even some sectors such as the steel sector in Canada, which are marked by strong union 
representation and involvement in training initiatives (Deissinger & Gonon 2016; Busemeyer & 
Trampusch 2011; Rutherford et al. 2018; Rutherford 1998). For example, in Germany, unions 
and works council work with the state and capital (local chambers) to negotiate skill 
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improvement and qualification, codetermining its skill training system (Franz & Soskice 2005). 
Unions have a crucial role in advising the government on vocational and education training 
decisions, and thus, in the design and updating of training regulation for occupational profiles. 
Unions in Germany understand vocational training as a public issue, and thus, a matter of 
education rather than employment (Deissinger & Gonon 2016). In such a model, vocational 
training provides marketable/transferable certified skills (Busemeyer & Trampusch 2011; Franz 
& Soskice 2005). In this context even though this research sees corporate capture as a structural 
feature of the capitalist state, and thus, a common aspect of European coordinated market 
economies (see Tansey 2018), it would be interesting to examine whether workers, in states with 
strong labor representation in training like Germany, are able to minimize, or offset FDI 
processes of corporate capture in their regional training systems. In such a context, are workers 
involved in FDI training initiatives incentives, and able to minimize corporate capture in 
training? 
The second potential topic for future research could be to analyze how labor can have a 
crucial role in amending processes of corporate capture even in more liberal forms of state like in 
the United States, where labor representation is often weak. Scholars such as Rutherford (1998) 
revealed, that even in more liberal states such as Canada, workers can have in some sectors 
greater power to advance their agenda, for example, developing more labor friendly training 
systems. For example, the author demonstrates how the Canadian steel sector has large corporate 
actors more opened to dealing with unions whereas in the automobile sector, companies are often 
hostile to union involvement in training, even when having industry-wide skill transferability is 
of their interest (Rutherford 1998). As this research overlooked the fact that labor, as an 
independent actor, can have an important role in invoking counter-narratives and pushing back 
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processes of corporate capture, it would be interesting to examine cases in which workers and 
their representatives were successfully able to oppose MNCs’ processes of corporate capture. 
One potential case for future research could be the case of Amazon and its bargaining event with 
New York City. This well-known case could demonstrate how workers and their representatives 
can take part in MNCs’ negotiations with states, contesting and resisting the influence and power 
of MNCs over the state, and thus, minimizing processes of corporate capture (see Goodman and 
Weise 2019). In this case, labor organizers, progressive groups and some city politicians worked 
together, using the New York City’s $3 billion offer in subsidies to Amazon as an asset to push 
the company to commit to union jobs (Riley 2019). Although resulting in Amazon withdrawing 
its deal with New York, such a study has potential to shed some light in regard to how labor can 
amend processes of corporate capture in more liberal forms of state like in the United States. 
To conclude, some of the deficiencies present in this research point to the potential 
theoretical and empirical areas that I would like to engage in my future research. As stated, more 
theoretical and empirical research is needed in regard to how different actors with differential 
powers, such as labor, the state and MNCs, have important roles and capabilities to advance their 
interests and ideologies concerning how skills are socially constructed. More specifically, how 
workers are able to push their agenda over issues of corporate in regional training systems. This 
also involves the need to equally recognize the importance of geographic and historical 
specificity of such processes. 
This research then, joins other scholars who have begun to give greater attention to the 
tensions around labor that emerge from the differential powers of key actors (Rutherford et al. 
2018; Coe 2015; Werner 2018), and provides some relevant points for future research. Finally, 
by engaging with the GPN literature and attending some of its scholars’ call to explore the “dark 
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side” of strategic coupling (Mackinnon 2012; Bair and Werner 2015), this research hopes to 
contribute to such a topic as well as to spark more discussions in regard to how GPNs, the state, 
MNCs, and labor are related to uneven development and issues of corporate capture in regional 
training systems.  
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